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ABSTRACT 
Indian economy since independence followed a path 
of controlled development. The financial sector too had 
been functioning under a highly regulated environment till 
mid-80's. The late 80's witnessed the introduction of the 
deregulation process beginning with the deregulation of 
money market which lead to intense volatility in the money 
market rates, this was totally new to the Indian Financial 
sector. 
In early 1990's the reforms in the real sector of the 
economy collectives in the financial sector to support 
these reforms became imperative and the committee on 
financial system was appointed known as Narsimham's 
Committee. Narsimham's Committee suggested the ways 
and means to restructure the financial sector to sub-serve 
the objective. The committee proposed reforms in the 
banking sector to provide it with operational flexibility and 
functional autonomy for over all efficiency, productivity 
and profitability. In the banking sector the particular 
measures have be^n taken aimed at restoring viability of 
the banking sector bringing about an internationally 
accepted level of accounting and disclosure standards and 
introduction of capital adequacy norms. Interest and 
exchange rate have been deregulated in a phase manner, 
branch licensing procedure has been liberalized and 
statutory liquidity ratio has been lowered. The entry 
barriers for foreign banks and new private sector banks 
have been lowered as a part of the medium term strategy 
to improve the financial and operational health of the 
Indian banking system by introducing an element of 
competition into it. 
The major banks in India are largely managed by the 
govt, of Jndia. These Nationalized banks has to improve 
the financial performance, but the performance of 
nationalized banks are still continues to be constraint by 
operational inflexibility and lack of autonomy in several 
critical areas, which inhibit them from effectively 
competing with other banks. In such a scenario private 
sector banks and foreign banks have generally being able 
to set their deposit rates, prime lending rate and interest 
spread significantly higher than those of Nationalized 
banks. It is, therefore, imperative to create enabling 
environment wherein the Nationalized banks could respond 
to the pressure of competition more rigorously. Though 
the reforms are broad enough in content. Many vital areas 
remained untouched the reconciliation of profitability with 
social responsibility still remain a challenge. The crucial 
area of functional autonomy for nationalized banks is not 
been addressed, while the reforms so far made are fully 
justified at the same time. It is the responsibility of the 
owners to insure are in a fit state of health to fight 
competition. The deregulated environment has exposed 
the banking system to newer forms of risks, that is 
exchange rate risk, asset liability and mismatch risk. 
The present study is divided into six chapters the first 
chapter is devoted to the introduction of the study and 
examined the significance of the commercial banks in our 
society. It further reveals objective, hypothesis. 
Methodology and chapter schemes. It also explore the 
establishment of banking in India from the beginning of 
19**^  century till the nationalization of banks. Further study 
reveals the progress of banking after nationalization and 
also includes the summary of the books studied. 
Chapter two studies historical perspective of the 
banks in India. History from vedic period (2000 B.C. to 
1400 B.C.) to development of modern banking is also 
studied in this chapter. Further examined the banking 
policies during Mughal period, emergence of Imperial bank 
and the impact of Ilnd world war and partition of India on 
banking business. Progress of banking from 1949 to 1969 
in India and incorporation of Reserve Bank of India and 
the Indian govt, proposal for nationalization of major 
banks is also examined in this chapter. 
Chapter three focuses on the impact of 
nationalization on banks performance and also examine 
the cause of nationalization of banks in India and the 
impact of nationalization on general performance of the 
nationalized banks. The major cause of nationalization was 
to provide banking facility to the weaker section of the 
society. There is remarkable development in banking after 
nationalization geographically as well as functionally. A 
largely implemented branch expansion programme with a 
major concentration to village and remote areas comprised 
of millions of borrowers, benefited. Attempts at 
decentralization of power and delegation of authority, 
introduction of special credit scliemes to meet the credit 
needs of majority engage in small but gainful business and 
shift in emphasis from security oriented lending to 
production based lending are all indicator of 
revolutionarization of banking system in India. This 
chapter further examines the proper growth in field like 
branch expansion, deposit mobilization, advances to 
priority sector, low interest rate schemes and decline in 
inter-state disparity in the availability of bank offices and 
the impact of nationalization on the banking performance. 
Fourth chapter attempts to analyze the impact of 
banking sector reforms on nationalized banks. As reforms 
of the financial system takes root, it is the banking system. 
Despite the over all progress made by the banking sector 
in terms of geographic and functional coverage 
nationalized banks operational efficiency has been 
unsatisfactorily characterized by low profitability high level 
of non-performing assets and relatively low capital base. 
As intermediation process has improved, as is evident from 
the ratio of net interest income to total assets of 
nationalized banks has decreased from 3.22 in 1990-91 to 
2.84 in 2000-01 . The profit of asset portfolio and also 
the extent of the net non-performing loans (NPLs) as 
percentage of total assets have shown improvement during 
reforms period. Further study reveals that the supervisory 
strategy has undergone a change moving from capacity 
towards transparency. A positive externality of the 
reforms process has been the building up of the 
institutional architecture in terms of markets, and creation 
of enabling environment through technological and legal 
infrastructure and improving the managerial competence. 
There is . welcome increase in emphasis on non-interest 
income, banks have tended to show risk averse behavior by 
opting for risk free investments over risky loans. 
Intermediation costs as a percentage of total assets has 
also declined for nationalized banks. Capital adequacy and 
asset quality (measured by the net NPA, as percentage of 
net advances) have both improved over the period of 
reforms. Median profit per employee of nationalized banks 
witnessed a significant rise between 95-96 to 2000-2001. 
Non-interest income to working funds rose modestly and 
the ratio of wage bill to total expenses remained at a high 
level for nationalized banks. Cost to income ratio declined 
at the nationalized banks. Further this chapter examine the 
nationalized banks performance in respect of key 
performance indicators like interest spread, intermediation 
cost, non-performing assets, operating and net profit, 
brancii expansion, deposit mobilization and capital 
Adequacy Ratio. 
When we compare the nationalized banks with 
respect to Pvt. Sector banks during reforms period we find 
that nationalized banks performance is clearly inferior but 
just opposing the above with the improvement in 
performance of nationalized banks over the reforms period 
we can say that nationalized banks are catching up with 
Pvt. Sector banks. Further this chapter reveals that in the 
wake of reforms nationalized banks have improved their 
performance in both absolute and relative terms over 
banking sector reforms. 
Fifth chapter deals with the case study of Canara 
Bank. This chapter brings to light detailed account of the 
establishment of Canara Bank its performance since its 
incorporation and analytical study of the various financial 
indicator in the wake of the growth of the bank after 
banking sector reforms. Further finding reveals that 
Canara Bank recorded satisfactory growth in post reforms 
period on various business parameters. Bank have 
significant growth in branch expansion and crossed no. of 
2405 branches till 2000-2001 around the world. Priority 
sector advances continued to record higher growth. Banlcs 
global deposit posted to Rs. 59070 crore 
(Rs. 590.70billion) till 2001. The capital adequacy ratio of 
the bank rise to 10.96, non-performing assets of the bank 
as percentage of its net advances declined further up to 
7.90% operating profits of the bank recorded a 
noteworthy growth during the year. Net profit of the bank 
increased to Rs. 285 crore (Rs. 2.85 billion) in 2001, 
registering a growth of 11%. 
The last Chapter of the study points at the 
conclusions and suggestions. This chapter examines over 
all performances of the nationalized banks, and highlights 
the findings of the study which indicate that banking sector 
reforms have progressive impact on the nationalized 
banks. 
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Banking system is one of the many institutions that 
impinge on any economy affect its performance for the 
better or the worst. In what measure a given banking 
system contributes to economic development depends 
upon the governing policy. Economists have expressed a 
wide variety of opinions on the effectiveness of banking 
systems in promoting or facilitating economic 
development. Schumpeter, the first modern economist to 
study the relationship, regarded banking system as one of 
the two key agents other being entrepreneurship in the 
whole process of development. Alexander Gerschenkron 
looks at banks as a substitute for deficiencies in the 
original accumulation of liquid wealth in moderately 
backward economies. Banks are considered to be the most 
important of all the financial intermediaries and the 
commercial banks are playing a dominent role in the 
financial system of a country like India. 
The commercial banks have the following primary 
reasons for its significance: 
1. Commercial banks are the only institutions in the 
economy with ability to create money in the form of 
demand deposits; 
2. Commercial banks are the primary financial 
institutions responsible for administering the 
payment mechanism; 
3. Commercial banks represents the focal point through 
monetary policy is implemented by the Central Bank; 
4. Commercial banks affect all sectors of the economy 
because of their broad lending powers and 
consequently have a relatively pervasive impact on 
economic growth; 
5. Commercial banks are generally more heavily 
regulated than any other financial institution. 
The importance of banking institutions is felt rather 
deeply in the underdeveloped economies in the sense that 
these economies are usually short of capital and the task 
of mobilisation of resources and their channelisation to 
the priority sector belongs to such institutions. Broadly 
speaking the financial institutions have been assigned the 
task of accelerating the economic growtli by bringing 
about a revolution in industrial and agricultural sectors of 
the economy and better distribution of income and wealth, 
reducing unemployment and inter/intra-regional economic 
imbalances and ameliorating the economic lot of the vast 
majority of people living in substandard economic 
conditions. It is not very unusual to find that in the history 
of economic growth in different countries of the world, 
the importance of banking institutions and their role in 
the national development projects have been found to be 
of a great significance. In few countries, banks were 
created by the government to exploit mineral resources 
and to build power plants on behalf of the government, to 
draw up and carry out a general plan, to promote 
production in all sectors of the economy, to obtain credit 
from abroad, to provide long-term finance to private 
sector and to supply capital and enterprise in order to 
give a fillip to the process of development. The 
importance of banks in stimulating the economic growth is 
evident from the fact that in some of the countries, the 
governments had to establish these institutions to provide 
facilities for expediting the development projects. 
Being an underdeveloped economy, India has all the 
features of such economy like preponderance of the 
agrarian sector, high density of population, low level of 
income, low standard of living and high propensity to 
consume. Low income leads to low savings which, in turn, 
result in low capital formation. Agriculture needs new 
implements,Hybrid seeds regular water supply ,dense 
population needs more lively hood more shelter more 
consumables etc.lower income reduces the efficiency due 
to lack of neutrition to children and compel to parents for 
early labour of children and low standard produces more 
children and cause further growth in population The 
economy, therefore, suffers tremendously from the vicious 
circle of poverty. 
Moreover, with the existence of large non-monetised 
sector in the economy and the prevalence of widespread 
illiteracy and conservatism amongst the masses, savings 
remain either unutilized or hoarded in the form of cash, 
gold and silver or invested in land or real estate. Thus the 
saver's peculiar preferences are also responsible with 
other factors for the meagre capital formation. Therefore, 
any effort to develop the economy requires an action to 
increase, mobilise and appropriately channelise the 
domestic financial resources towards productive 
investment in the economy. This calls for not merely the 
presence but also an active role of banking sector and 
other financial institutions in a country like India.Out of 
the many structural and institutional changes that are 
necessary in developing countries, not the least is the 
adaptation of financial institutions to serve the objectives 
of development and to ginger up mobility of resources to 
meet the emerging needs of the economy. 
The Indian banking system has undoubtedly been 
influenced by the characteristics of an underdeveloped 
economy, but it is a paradox at the same time that it 
compares every favourable steps with what is to be found 
in some of the developed countries of the world. 
All scheduled commercial banks in totality account 
for 99.9 per cent of the total business. The remaining 0.1 
per cent of the total business goes to non-scheduled 
banks. Among the scheduled commercial banks, more 
than 90 per cent of the business is in the hands of public 
sector banks. 
Historical Perspective: 
The beginning of modern banking in India is traced 
back to early nineteenth century with the establishment of 
three presidency banks, but its growth till the beginning of 
the 20*^ century was negligible. During the first half of the 
20'^ century, the banking system progressed rapidly, but 
this was largely in line with their commercial principles 
and there was no system to regulate them properly. A real 
start of the present day banking is said to have been made 
with the enactment of the Banking Regulation Act in 
1949 and the commencement of economic planning in 
the country. This is primarily because with the beginning 
of planning era, the banks have been called upon to act as 
an instrument of growth and development. In the three-
and-a-half decades that followed the enactment of the 
Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the Indian banking system 
underwent significant organisational and structural 
changes. Most of these changes were caused by some of 
the under note features exists in the then banking system: 
1. Banking system was highly urbanised. Banking 
activities were concentrated in big cities and even as 
late as December 1967, the two metropolitan cities 
of Bombay and Calcutta accounted for about one-
third of the total deposits and one-half of the total 
credit disbursed by banks. The ratio of credit to 
deposit was more than 100 per cent in the 
metropolitan cities, which meant that deposits 
mobilised at small centres were diverted for financing 
activities of big business in metropolitan centres. At 
the end of 1967, the credit-deposit ratio was as high 
as 147.4 per cent for Madras, 128.8 per cent for 
Calcutta, 116.3 per cent for Ahmedabad and 102.2 
per cent for Bombay, while for the country as a 
whole the ratio was 69.3 per cent. According to the 
study conducted by the Reserve Bank of India, out of 
336 districts in India the bank offices did not exist at 
all in 13 districts up to the end of 1967. There were 
453 towns where there was no office of any 
commercial bank and an other 827 potential centres 
for developing agro-industrial businesses were 
deprived of banking facilities. The Gadgil study 
group vividly brougiit out of delinquencies in banking 
development in the country. It pointed out that till 
December 1967, out of 5,64,000 villages in the 
country, not even one per cent were being served by 
commercial banks. There were as many as 63 
districts in which per capita credit was less than one 
rupee. In another 13 districts, credit was not 
extended even to a single individual although 
deposits were mobilised from the people living there. 
In 61 districts, credit-deposit ratio was less than 10 
per cent. 
In the big cities, it was mainly the well-placed 
traders, businessmen and industrialists who availed 
themselves of most of the credit facilities. Ownership 
and control of these banks was in a few hands they 
were expanding the operations for their own benefit. 
Most of the funds were invested in the business in 
which the Directors of the banks themselves had 
some interest. A study of 20 major banks in 1967 
revealed that 188 Directors of banks held 1,452 
directorships of large industrial companies. Till late 
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sixties, banking industry remained in tiie hands of 
those who used the huge resources for the benefit of 
large number well-known customers. The entire 
lending policy was tied up with assets. The larger the 
assets, the easier was to get a loan at a low rate of 
interest. If the borrower was poor and had limited 
assets, normally he did not get a loan and in rare 
lucky case of getting one, he had to pay a relatively 
high rate of interest. The loans were not purpose-
motivated but person or colateral-motivated. 
3. Commercial banks have been mainly concerned with 
short-term and, to a some extent, medium-term 
financing of non-agricultural activities. At the end of 
March 1968. two- thirds of the total credit went to 
industry and one-fifth to commerce. Agriculture 
(excluding plantation) which contributed 45-50 per 
cent of the national product received it was less than 
2 per cent of the bank credit. Commercial banks did 
not consider it to be their function to lend to 
agriculture. Even out of the scanty resources made 
available to agriculturists, what actually reached to 
small and marginal farmers, landless agricultural 
labourers and village artisans, was almost nil. A 
preponderant portion of the credit needs of the rural 
poor was still met by the non-institutional agencies. 
4. There were glaring disparities in the development of 
banking activities. The geographical coverage and 
concentra-ion of banking was largely a reflection of 
the pattern of industrial development i.e., where 
enterprise leads, finance follows. 
This had caused unevenness in the development 
among regions, states and sectors. While the western 
region had a heavy concentration of bank branches, 
deposit and credit, the position of the north-eastern 
region was much below the national average. At the end 
of June 1969, against the national average of 12.52 
branches per million of population, the western region 
had 23.78 bank offices and the north-eastern region had 
only 4.13 offices. Similar was the case of deposits and 




In the annals of Indian banking, nationalisation of 
the Imperial Bank of India, social control over banks and 
nationalisation of 14 commercial banks are three very 
important events. The basic rationale that led to the 
adoption of these measures was to make banks 
instrumental in the translation of the envisaged national 
development objectives into realities. 
Nationalisation of Major Commercial Banks: 
Since social control failed to achieve the desired 
results, some structural change in the functioning of 
commercial banks was considered essential. It was only as 
a consequence of this great realisation that the ordinance 
of nationalisation of 14 major commercial banks in India 
was promulgated on 18*^ July, 1969. The basic objective 
of this step was to accelerate development and thus make 
a significant impact on the problems of poverty and 
unemployment, and to bring about progressive reduction 
of disparities between the rich and poor sections of our 
people and between the relatively advanced and backward 
areas of our country. The main objectives of 
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nationalisation of commercial banks are summed up in the 
preamble to the Banking Companies (Acquisition and 
Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1970 as follows: 
"To control the commanding heights of the economy 
and to meet progressively and serve better the needs of 
development of the economy in conformity with national 
policy and objective and for the matters connected 
therewith or incidental thereto". 
Hence nationalisation was to ensure that no viable 
productive endeavour faltered for lack of credit support. It 
was designed to make the system reach out to the small 
man and to the remote rural areas and to change the 
system in which grant of credit was an act of patronage 
and receiving it an aspect of privilege. Nationalisation of 
banking was, in short, a measure towards socialisation of 
credit. Soon after the social control, national credit 
council was set up with the responsibilities of deciding 
priorities for extension of credit and for making it sure 
that credit became a really effective instrument of 
economic growth. 
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The goals of nationalisation were presumed to be 
achieved through 
(a) Considerable spread of branch network to all parts 
of the country, not confined to urban and 
metropolitan areas only; 
(b) Mobilization of funds from all sections of the society 
by framing deposit schemes tailored to suit its 
different segments; 
(c) Deployment of funds in all productive endeavours, 
big or small, so that production effort becomes 
broad-based; and 
(d) Particular attention to credit needs of hundreds of 
thousands of people engaged in agriculture and small 
business whole production and distribution efforts 
contribute substantially to the national cake; 
Through the above-mentioned measures regional and 
sectoral imbalances in economic development and 
standard of living were to be reduced, if not eliminated. 
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With nationalisation of banks almost 85 per cent of 
the banking has come under public control. 
Post-nationalisation Development in Indian 
Banking: 
In pursuance of the above objectives, changes have 
taken place both qualitatively and quantitatively in banking 
industry. The activities have increased manifold in volume, 
variety and geographical coverage and all are related to 
the needs of national development. Highlights of 
nationalised banking have been: greater stress on district 
credit planning; revamping of branch expansion policy; 
intensive hunt for deposits mobilisation; introduction of 
schemes and programmes like: 
(i) Lead Bank Scheme 
(ii) Differential Rate of Interest Scheme (DRI) 
(iii) 20-Point Programme 
(iv) Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) 
(v) Scheme for Unemployed Graduates. 
Establishment of Regional Rural Banks and National 
Bank for Agriculture And Rural Development was also 
among the developments of post-nationalisation period. 
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Thus, commercial banks have adopted a new social 
philosophy of achieving socialistic pattern of society 
through allocation of available resources to the poor and 
under-privileged classes, thereby raising levels of 
employment and income. Commercial banks are now 
recognised throughout the length and breadth of the 
country as important agents in the socio-economic 
transformation of the society. The traditional goal of 
maximisation of commercial profits has given place to the 
objectives of social benefit. The choice of priorities of 
investible resources is governed by the measuring rod of 
social benefit rather than pure commercial gain. The 
conventional banking norms, such as credit-worthiness on 
the basis of the worth of the borrower, margin money 
contribution, insistence on securities of sound means, 
rigidity in stipulation particularly as to repayment 
schedule, have been kept aside. Incremental income 
coupled with repayment capacity and end use of credit are 
the guiding principles of lending under the changed 
situation. 
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Banks have registered a phenomenal growth after 
nationalisation. Their role in the developmental activities 
has been increasing, year after year. Despite all this, 
actual working of banks during the past 15 years casts 
serious doubts on the wisdom of the policy of 
nationalisation. Under such a controversial stituation, a 
need was felt for a serious indepth probe to examine the 
extent to which the objectives of nationalisation have been 
achieved. 
Reforming the Banking Sector 
After 3 decades of nationalisation the extension of 
banking and other financial facilities to a larger cross-
section of the people stands out as a significant 
achievement. As a ratio of GDP at current prices, bank 
deposits increased from 18 per cent in 1969-70 to 
around 42 per cent in 1994-95. All the indicators of 
financial development, such as, the finance ratio, financial 
inter-relations ratio and inter-mediation have significantly 
increased, implying the growing importance of financial 
institutions in the economy and growth of financial flows 
in relation to economic activity. 
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Despite the overall progress made by the financial 
system in terms of geographic and functional coverage, its 
operational efficiency has been unsatisfactory, 
characterised by low profitability, high level of non-
performing assets and relatively low capital base. The 
balance-sheet of the performance of the banking sector 
was mixed-strong in widening the credit coverage but 
weak as far as viability and sustainability was concerned. 
In July 1991, when a programme of economic 
stabilisation was put in place, long term reforms of the 
financial system were sought to be achieved through the 
following measures: 
> Correct and improve the macro-economic policy setting 
within which banks operate. This mainly involves 
rationalisation of interest rates and bringing down the 
levels of resource pre-emptions. 
> Introduce prudential norms relating to income 
recognition, provisioning and capital adequacy. 
> Improve the financial health and competitive condition 
of banks by re-capitalising banks, restructuring the 
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weaker ones, improving tiie incentives under which 
banks function, and allowing freer entry of new banks 
and other financial intermediaries. 
> Build financial institutions and financial infrastructure 
relating to supervision, audit, technology and legal 
framework. 
> Improve the level of managerial co njpeten ce and the 
quality of human resources by reviewing the policies 
relating to recruitment, training, placement, etc. 
Studies in Banking: 
Many research studies have been conducted in India 
and abroad on various aspects of banking and bank 
management. Most of these studies relate to institutional, 
functional and developmental activities of commercial 
banking. Studies organised in India have investigated 
dynamic and major functional or structural changes in the 
field of banking and new techniques adopted by 
commercial banks to cater to the specific needs for 
transforming the economy of the country. Some attempts 
have also been made to identify the important social 
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obligations of nationalised commercial banks and to assess 
their progress. A few studies conducted in this field are 
reviewed as under: 
Greenberq, in his study, examined the role that 
commercial banks have played in the economic 
development of Philadelphia. He observed that it was 
possible for Philadelphia banks to arrest, although 
impossible to eliminate on their own, the deterioration 
and malaise that had begun to plague the area in the 
immediate post-war years. But rather than encourage the 
development and establishment of new firms in high-
growth, science-based industries, they continued to give 
priority to old firms in slow-growth or declining industries 
and to cultivate the consumer bank market. 
Banton Howard SIII identified and analysed the 
spatial determinants of the demand for bank services, it 
was indicated that when demand deposits or loans were 
used as dependent variables, a high degree of significance 
of the coefficient was noted. However, when time deposit 
was the dependent variable, the level of significance 
decreased. 
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It was noted that a high degree of correlation existed 
between bank competition and the business volume index. 
The implication was that banks tended to be located in 
industrial areas rather than residential areas. 
Aziz carried out an empirical analysis of the portfolio 
management of commercial banks in Malaysia with a view 
to providing some quantitative information about the 
factors influencing the allocation of funds by commercial 
banks. The study has focused attention on issues that are 
specific and relevant to an open and developing economy. 
The evidences in the study indicate that there is 
considerable variation in the way in which banks tend to 
respond to interest rate movement. Domestic banks are 
not induced at the margin to changes in interest rates with 
respect to allocation of funds between foreign and 
domestic instruments. 
Ghoshal and Sharma analysed the basic trends in 
banking system. They examined the various developments 
in the sphere of banking practices, their causes and 
consequences. They have found that the Indian Banking 
system has a reasonably satisfactory mechanism for 
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providing working capital finance to most of the existing 
companies, but the system is only incidentally related to 
the growth needs of the economy. The banks are still 
hobbled by the criteria of behaviour based on outmoded 
theories, supported only by slowly changing legal concepts 
of liability for debt, and by traditional financial and 
accounting practices of companies. 
Niqam tried to evaluate analytically as well as 
empirically the exact significance of banking system in the 
process of economic renovation since 1951. The study 
was focused on performance of Indian banking system in 
order to pinpoint its^eaknesses and failures withja view to 
finding as to how reoriented structure could accelerate the 
pace oi^hcKhh^. 
Birla Institute of Scientific Research ^development 
conducted a study to evaluate the performance of 
nationalised banks in, comparison with that of banks in 
private sector. The emphasis of the study was on the 
objectives of nationalisation and their achievement, 
relative performance of private sector banks and 
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nationalised banks since 1969, and the effect of 
nationalisation on rest of the banking sector. 
The study brings to light that the growth and 
development in banking, which the country has witnessed 
after nationalisation, is not just because of transfer of 
ownership, it is rather because various incentives and 
punitive measures were implemented with more vigilance 
and care after 1969 by the Government and the Reserve 
Bank of India to make banks fulfil their social 
responsibilities. Similar, and in some spheres even better, 
results were achieved by non-nationalised banks. The 
performance of private sector banks in the post-
nationalisation period was noteworthy, especially because 
of the odds they faced in securing the growtlVof the 
business. The achievement of significantly high growth in 
deposits, advances and branches etc. clearly showed the 
p^rsfii/erance and the high quality of entrepreneurship and 
management of these banks. 
Wadikar has made an attempt to examine the trend 
of private sector bank operations and the extent of 
structural changes in the operational composition of 
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private sector banks; to identify and appraise the impact 
of the RBI's bankiong policies and different economic 
variables on the portfolio behaviour of different bank 
groups; and to analyse the profitability of private sector 
banks in aggregate and in relation to liability and asset 
portfolio composition, branch expansion and bank size. 
The study reveals that the performance of private 
sector scheduled commercial banks was better than public 
sector banks during 1969-76. The branches grew at a 
higher rate in private sector banks than in public sector 
banks, and their spread in underbanked and rural areas 
was also better than that of public sector banks although 
their expansion was localised largely in the states where 
their head offices were located. The study further reveals 
that in terms of deposit mobilisation, credit deployment, 
liability and asset management and profitability, the 
position of private sector banks was better than that of 
public sector banks during 1969-76. 
Aqqarwal in his work on 'Progress and Policies of 
Commercial Banking after Nationalisation' has 
concentrated on the performance of banks, their policies 
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and progress after nationalisation. It explores and 
elucidates the operational importance of banking 
popularization, the elements of common interest and 
personal liking. The conclusions are that — 
(i) there was no need of extreme measure of 
nationalisation; banks could have been made to work 
to fulfil the policies laid down by the government 
under social control; 
(ii) keeping in view the importance of banks and. the 
nature of banking service, nationalisation of banks in 
India cannot be justified; and 
(iii) when nationalisation was done, no doubt, some 
advantages definitely accrued but all the hopes have 
not been fulfilled. 
Aggarwal has tried to examine in his work the 
expectations of the nation from nationalised banks and 
the role played by these banks to fulfil their social 
obligations. The study brings out that many steps have 
been taken by nationalised banks towards discharging 
their social duties. However, these are not quite adequate 
24 
and the comparative quantitative performance in the fields 
of all the social obligations of the group of these banks is 
not found satisfactory. To ensure better performance in 
the context of the new social framework, organisation and 
management of nationalised banks still needs to be 
changed. 
Tandon has attempted to analyse the contribution 
made by nationalised commercial banks in the Herculean 
task of reducing disparities between the developed and 
backward states. The study indicates that: 
(i) credit utilisation with respect to deposits grew at a 
faster rate in backward states than in developed 
states, resulting thereby in narrowing of overall 
differentials during 1969-81; 
(ii) the proportion of credit sanctioned by banks in 
backward states increased at a very high rate as 
compared to the proportion of deposits 
collected/mobilised in these states; 
(iii) disparities within the backward states were much 
wider than those within the developed states; and 
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(iii) broadly speaking, nationalised commercial banks 
narrowed down inter-state differentials during the 
period u nder study, thus, suggesting that under the 
overall guidance of the Reserve Bank of India, 
commercial banks were performing their duties as 
the policy-makers wanted them to do. 
Bilarami in his work on growth of public sector 
banks has assessed to what extent nationalisation has 
helped in narrowing down the regional and statewise 
disparities in the provision of banking facilities and to 
what extent economically weaker sections of society have 
been helped by public sector banks. 
The study concludes that although regional and 
state-wise disparities in terms of banking services still 
exist, some healthy trends were developed during 1969-
79 which might have helped significantly and, if continued 
in future, would further help in minimising the widening 
gaps. 
Chippa and Sagar in the study 'Banking 
Development in India' has sought to explain the variation 
in the level of banking development in India on the basis 
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of a cross-section of observation on 18 major Indian 
states. Main findings of the study are: 
(i) There is a wide range of variations in the level of 
banking developments among the different states of 
India; 
(ii) Literacy rate and infrastructural developments have 
the maximum role in banking developments. 
Sandhu has ventured a quantitative analysis of the 
impact of nationalisation on commercial bank deposits in 
India. In the study, a model has been developed. The 
study shows that bank nationalisation significantly helped 
mobilisation of all kinds of deposits, viz., aggregate, 
demand and time deposits with scheduled commercial 
banks in India, thus achieving one of its major objectives. 
Time deposits were observed to grow at a faster rate than 
demand deposits, indicating that India was experiencing a 
rise in the savings propensity with the rise in its national 
income. 
Shah and Rao have studied the achievement of 
branch expansion programme with reference to its two 
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primary objectives viz. narrowing down of regional 
imbalances and provision of banking facilities in rural 
areas. They have found that 'there has been no significant 
progress in narrowing down inter-state and intra-state 
disparities in banking facilities, more so with respect to 
rural areas; not only do regional imbalances persist but 
there is also a thin spread of banking facilities in the 
states where institutional financing is of recent origin'. 
It is stated that there has been a shift away from the 
metropolitan/urban to semi-urban/rural centres. There 
has been an improvement in the coverage and spread of 
banking facilities in all the districts and states but those 
facilities still remain unevenly distributed among different 
regions. 
Basu in his work 'Determinants of Regional 
Imbalance in Banking Development' has scrutinised the 
inter-district variation in per capita credit and deposit of 
commercial banks. It is stated in the conclusions that, 
other factors remaining constant at their respective 
average values, the automatic tendency for per capita 
credit and per capita deposit is also coverage to their 
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respective average values; when other factors deviate 
from their respective average values, obviously these also 
deviate. Particularly, a rise in the degree of urbanisation 
pushes per capita credit up from its average value, 
possibly more than it pushes per capita deposit. An 
increase in the number of bank offices relative to 
population raises per capita deposit more than it does per 
capita credit. An increase in the quantum of co-operative 
credit enhances bank credit but it has perhaps no effect 
on bank deposits. 
Varde, Palav and Sita, carried out a study on branch 
expansion planning for the banking industry and 
formulated a district-wise branch expansion plan for the 
Five Year Plan period, 1974-79. The objective of the 
study was to develop a branch allocation scheme for 
branches to be opened so as to bring about maximum 
reduction in the currently existing disparities in respect of 
banking presence among various districts of the country. 
The study concluded that the planning process evolved 
could better be termed need-based branch allocation, 
balancing demands on banking structure with capacity of 
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banks to respond to the demands. Further, the study 
suggested that if banks felt that they had additional 
capacity to open branches, it would not be incompatible 
to permit them to open the new branches wherever they 
wished. 
Varde in the empirical study on efficiency of rural 
branches maintains that the success of a rural branch has 
to be judged in relation to the objective of rural banking, 
which is two-fold, to act as an active catalyst in the 
integrated socio-economic development of the area served 
by the branch, and to become a commercially profitable 
unit of banking. The study concludes that 
(a) the rural branches operating in groups of 4-5 
sufficiently proximate branches would function more 
effectively than single individual branches; 
(b) it would be appropriate to follow the principle of 
determining the manpower requirements separately 
for an individual rural branch instead of having a 
standard complement of staff; 
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(c) location of a rural branch should be at the hub of 
activity; 
(d) it was necessary and possible to make efforts to 
rescue the rural branches operating at a low volume 
of business and those having large overdues; and 
(e) some of the new rural branches might be opened in 
such a way that a group of 4-5 rural branches got 
formed around an existing rural branch. 
Padwal and Bandvopadhvav examined the problem 
of 'Bank Branch Location in Rural Areas'. The objective 
of the study was to develop a scientific framework for 
analysing environmental data and to arrive at a 
meaningful location and branch expansion plan for a 
district. The results of the study indicate that — 
(a) in the long-term interest of a bank's business, it is 
profitable for the bank to open the maximum 
number of branches in the earlier years of a plan; 
(b) the micro level decision-making, whether for branch 
location or for formulation of specific schemes, is 
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not possible without having the data at the micro-
level; and 
(c) the high cost of starting and operating new branches 
calls for a sound decision-making, based on objective 
criteria rather than on subjective judgements. 
Bhattacharvav has gone into the regional 
performance of banks with respect to the behaviour of 
bank deposits and its components. The conclusions of the 
study are : 
(i) There is a significant inter-state disparity in the 
growth of total deposits, fixed deposits, saving 
deposits and current deposits over the period of 
study; 
(ii) Inter-state disparity of distribution of total deposit 
has been decreasing over the period under study; 
and 
(iii) Growth of saving deposits and total deposit is very 
stable in all the states. There is an inter-state and 
intra-state disparity in the stability of growth for 
different components of deposits. 
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Paul has looked into the structure, trends and 
pattern of the savings behaviour in India. The study 
demonstrated that the demand for gross bank deposits is 
significantly and negatively related to real interest rates on 
industrial securities. The variability of inflation has a 
positive impact on the savings of the households in gross 
and net bank deposits. In Indian economy, savings of a 
household in the form of net claims on government are 
increasing at a higher percentage with respect to national 
income than any other medium of savings. The marginal 
propensity of Indian economy to save in all mediums 
comes to above 27 per cent of current real national 
income. 
Chawla has examined the banking developments in 
Patiala district keeping in view the following objectives: 
(i) to analyse the growth of banking presence in various 
blocks of Patiala district; 
(ii) to find the extent to which credit has been diverted 
to priority sector; and 
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(iii) to critically evaluate the progress made under various 
programmes undertaken by banks for upliftment of 
block level economy. 
The study reveals that the banking spread is 
concentrated in those blocks which are relatively rich in 
business (industry and trade) whereas backward blocks 
have scarce banking facilities. The district has shown an 
outstanding progress in priority sector advances but it is 
found that the comparatively affluent within priority sector 
availed themselves of most of the facilities and the poorest 
of the poor were not benefited much. This argument is 
supported by unsatisfactory performance of differential 
rate of interest scheme and integrated rural development 
programme in the district, 
Bhatia has, in his study 'Banking Structure and 
Performance — A Case Study of the Indian Banking 
System : 1950-68' , examined the historical pattern of 
growth of the Indian banking system as a service 
producing industry, and attempted an analysis of its 
economic performance. The economic performance of an 
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industry is reflected in its output, profitability and growth. 
The study indicates that — 
(i) both in public and private sectors, the Indian 
banking system had output performance superior to 
that of foreign sector during the period 1956-68; 
(ii) during the period under study, the structure of 
banking industry had an insignificant influence on 
the economic performance of the Indian banking 
system; and 
(iii) there is a lot of scope for raising profitability by 
intensive involvement in foreign trade financing. 
Thus, there is no dearth of studies. But in most of 
these, the focus of attention is either inter-region or inter-
state analysis. There have been very few studies dealing 
with inter-district and intra-district analysis, especially in 
this region. The exact quantum and direction of the 
impact of banking developments can be known only if we 
take up the small geographical segment i.e., 
district/tehsil/block as the focus of study. 
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OBJECTIVE, HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY 
Objective: 
Philosophy of welfare state with ideals of socialism 
has made India a mixed economy, where public sector and 
private sector enterprises co-exist. Such co-existence is 
obtained not only in the industrial sector but also in the 
financial services sector. The financial services sector is 
predominantly compared of public sector banks, 
development financial institutions, insurance agencies, 
private and foreign banks and private sector finance co. 
Indian economy, since independence followed a path 
of control development. The financial sector too had been 
functioning under a highly regulated environment till mid-
1980s. The late 80's witnessed the introduction of the 
deregulation process beginning with the deregulation of 
money market which lead to intense volitility in the money 
market rates, something completely new to the Indian 
financial sector. 
In the early 1990's following reforms in the real 
sector of the economy collectives in the financial sector to 
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support these reforms became imperative and the 
committee on financial system better known as 
Narasimham's committee. Narsimham committee 
suggested the ways and means to restructure the financial 
sector to sub-serve the objective. The committee propose 
reforms in the financial sector to provide it with 
operational flexibility and functional autonomy for the 
purpose of over all efficiency productivity and 
profitability. In the banking sector the particular measures 
have been taken aimed at restoring viability of the 
banking sector bringing about an internationally accepted 
level of accounting and disclosure standards and 
introduction of capital adequacy norms. Interest and 
exchange rate have been deregulated in a phase manner, 
branch licensing procedure has been liberalised and 
statutory liquid ratio has been lowered. The entry barriers 
for foreign banks and new private sector banks have been 
lowered as a part of the medium term strategy to improve 
the financial and operational health of the Indian Banking 
system by introducing an element of competition into it. 
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The major banks in India are largely owned by the 
Govt, of India. These banks before the Indian Public 
SectGtf Dank are liiipiuve the-financial performance, but 
the performance of public sector banks still continues to 
be constraint by operational inflexibility and lack of 
autonomy in several critical areas, which inhibit them 
from affectively competing with other banks. In such a 
scenario private sector banks and foreign banks have 
generally being able to set their deposit rates, Prime 
lending rate (PLR) and interest stress significantly higher 
than those of public sector banks. On the strength of their 
better customer services. It is, therefore, imperative to 
create unabling environment wherein the public sector 
bank could respond to the pressure of competition more 
vigorously. Though the reforms are broad enough in 
content. Many vital areas remain untouched the 
reconcilliation of profitability with social responsibility still 
remained a challenge. The crucial area of functional 
autonomy for nationalised banks has not been addressed, 
while the reform so far made are fully justified at the same 
time. K is LlieTespoTrsttrtilty of the owners to ensure are in 
a ^4it~^state—ef—h^atttno fighl" wTth--Gompetttton. The 
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deregulated environment has exposed the banking system 
to newer forms of risk, that is interest rate risk, exchange 
rate risk, asset liability mis-match risk. 
In this study we have tried to find out a winning 
strategy in such an environment which would not be a risk 
aversion which would be a receipe for managing risk in 
such a manner as is to earn profit from them. The 
strategy would give a fine balance between sound banking 
and profitable banking and evolve appropriate risk 
management policies. This is only possible by improving 
organisational effectiveness of banks through imaginative 
corporate planning and organisational restructuring. 
Hypothesis: 
Hypothesis of the present study is confined to testing: 
(i) Whether there has been a significant growth and 
development of banking activities in India after 
nationalisation. 
(ii) Whether financial regulation through statutory pre-
emptions followed while stepping up prudential 
regulations. 
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(iii) Whether nationalised banks performed in respect of 
five key performance indicators. 
— Branch expansion 
— Net-profit 
— Deposit mobilisation 
— Capital adequacy ratio 
— Capital and Reserve Ratio (Own Fund) 
Chapter Scheme: 
This introductory chapter deals with the objectives of 
the present study review of literature, scope, significance 
and methodology of the study. 
Second chapter outline a profile of the economy of 
India. A review of historical perspective of the Banking in 
India and development of modern banking. 
Third chapter elucidate the policy framework of 
branch expansion and its progress since nationalisation. A 
bank wise, statewise and population centrewise analysis is 
done to examine the growth and concentration of banks. 
Fourth chapter devoted to a detailed analysis of 
Banking sector reforms and implementation of 
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Narsimham's committee report on major nationalised 
bank. 
Fifth chapter devoted to a detailed analysis of 
financial performance of Canara Bank after Banking 
sector reforms and impact of Narsimham's committee 
report on the financial performance of Canara Bank. 
Study contains material since 1996 to 2001 . 
Sixth chapter concluding part explains the impact of 
Banking sector reform on the financial performance of 
nationalised banks. Suggested the measure taken for the 
future planning for the development of banks. 
Methodology: 
The methodology of research is simple and based 
upon primary as well as secondary data. The primary data 
has been collected through personal interviews, with 
senior officials of the respective banks of the region and 
also an intensive study of concerning nationalised banks 
was conducted through direct personal investigation. 
The secondary data has been collected from 
statistical bulletin published by various organisations 
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journals, periodicals, newspapers, annual reports of the 
respective banks, annual credit plans of the respective 
nationalised banks, annual report of Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI), RBI Bulletin, trend and progress of banking (annual 
publication of RBI) and all the publications and reports 
published by respective nationalised banks annually. The 
use of the Maulana Azad Library, A.M.U., Aligarh and the 
use of Seminar Library, Department of Commerce, 
A.M.U., Aligarh has also been made. 
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Banking in India 
BANKING IN INDIA 
(HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE UPTO 1969) 
Evidences regarding the existence of money lending 
operations in India are found in the literature of the vedic 
times i.e. 2000 to 1400 B.C. From this time onwards, 
India possessed a system of banking, which fulfilled her 
needs and proved very beneficial to her, although its 
methods were different from those of modern banking. 
The literature of the Budhist period supplies ample 
evidence of the existence of Sresthis, or bankers in all the 
important trade centers and of their wide-spread influence 
in the life of the community. Their chief activity was to 
lend money to traders, to merchant adventures who went 
to foreign countries and discovered valuable materials, and 
to kings who were in financial difficulties due to war or 
other reasons, against the pledge of movable or 
immovable property or personal surety. 
Lending money on interest was practiced but it was 
against the law. From the laws of Manu, it appears that 
money lending and allied problems had assumed 
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considerable importance and that deposit banking in some 
form had come into existence by the second or third 
century of Christian era. 
Hundis or indigenous bills of exchange came into use 
from the 12*" century, and it appears from the writings of 
a few Muslim Historians, European travelers, state records 
and the Ain-i-Akbari that both under the early Muslim and 
Moghul rulers in India indigenous bankers played a 
prominent part in lending money with cash or bills and 
giving financial assistance to rulers during period of stress. 
During the Moghul rule the issue of various kinds of 
metallic money in different parts of the country gave the 
indigenous bankers great opportunity for developing the 
very profitable business of money changing. The 
indigenous bankers, however, could not develop to any 
extent the system of obtaining deposits regularly from the 
public and paying interest on them, and those who made 
savings either hoarded them, or lent them to friends and 
neighbors. The reason • seems to be that many of them 
combined trade with banking business and such type of 
combination cause reduction in banking business and have 
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got negative impact on the development of banking in 
India. The entry of English traders in Indian market during 
17*" century doesn't make much effect on the indigenous 
banking because of lack of the knowledge of financial 
terminology used by the local traders. Although East 
Indian Company make much effect towards such scenario 
and tried to established connection with the local bankers. 
English agency- houses in Calcutta and Bombay began to 
conduct banking business besides their commercial 
business. From this time the business and power of 
indigenous banks start decreasing, although East India Co. 
successfully promoted the establishment of banking in 
India on western line, on the ground that the agency-
houses and the indigenous bankers wore more suitable for 
the banking requirement of India. Gradual expansion of 
power of English trade in India led the East India 
Company to abandon its opposition to establishment of 
banks on western lines in India. The result of such 
favorable condition to the English Empire gave them way 
for the establishment of govt, treasuries and bankers, 
which lead the decline of indigenous bankers. This 
condition lead Indian indigenous bankers, towards reduced 
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resources and limited facility, made them handicapped on 
their competitive area with commercial banks and 
gradually they began loosing their ground just like in 
England, where family bankers had to give place to the 
larger joint stock banks. 
Emergence of Imperial Bank of India 
After the establishment of English houses, with the 
policy of providing finance facility to the traders, these 
houses started serving as bankers to the East India Co., 
the member of the services and the European merchants 
in India, at Calcutta and Bombay. They financed the 
movement of crops issued paper money and make a 
roadway for the establishment of joint-stock banks. First 
among them was Hindustan Bank in Calcutta establish in 
1770 by one of the agency houses. Later on Bengal Bank 
and the Central Bank of India were established during 
1785 and later voluntarily liquidated in 1791 due to some 
political instability. 
The Bank of Bengal, was established in 1806 and 
got its charter as Bank of Bengal in 1809. So as to 
establish its own borrowing facility, the charter imposed 
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certain restrictions on its working. The greatest 
development made in tliis bank was permission to issue 
notes in 1823, and 1839, and also allowed to open 
branches and to deal in land exchange. During 1840-43, 
Bombay and Madras banks came into being with the 
capital of Rs. 50 and 30 lacs. 
Emergence of joint stock banks 
An Act was passed in 1860 and according to this 
Act, it permitted the starting of joint stock banks on the 
basis of limited liability, as it was essential to enable large 
business companies to secure the large amounts of capital 
that they needed, but soon afterwards the banks were 
checked to the right of note issues. During American civil 
war American cotton supply being terminated, due to 
which there was a boom in Indian cotton trade with 
England, which led to blind speculation. These Banks with 
other companies jumped into this speculation, but all of 
them got failed within a short span of time and suffered 
heavy loss and also loose public confidence. Followed by 
this incident, currency confusion arises during 1873-93, 
cause trade uncertainity and created an unfavouable 
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atmosphere to the establishment of new banks. Due to 
these unfavourable circumstances, from 1865 till the end 
of the century, the progress in the creation of joint stock 
banks was very slow. Because of this prevailing condition 
it resulted into gradual fall of successful banking in India 
and there were only 9 banks with capital and reserve of 
over 5 lacs and their total paid up capital and reserve 
being Rs. VA crores and then total deposits Rs. 8 crores. 
The Allahabad Bank and the Alliance Bank of Simla were 
established in -1865 and 1875 under European 
management. In 1881, the first ever bank came into 
existence with limited liability and controlled by Indians 
was Oudh Commercial Bank, followed by Punjab National 
Bank in 1894 by Lala Harkishan Lai. All of them made 
good progress but failed in 1913, because of ^ maximum 
investment in industrial development. It had locked its 
maximum investment in industries, which caused panic 
among the depositors and it found its liquid resources 
inadequate, and the other banks declined to come to its 
assistance. 
50 
In 1906, with the Swadeshi movement wave, which 
brought about much excitement in banking business during 
1913, the member of smaller banks were established 
which were controlled by Indian with capital and reserve 
of over 5 lacs to 9 and 18 lacs, with a total paid up 
capital was 4 crores and total deposits of Rs. 22 crores. 
The some of the present, prosperous Indian banks of the 
present times were the Bank of India, the Indian Bank of 
Madras, the Central Bank of India, the Bank of Baroda 
and the Bank of Mysore which were established during 
this period. Some of them, which were established during 
this period got failed were Bengal National Bank, the 
Credit Bank of India, the Bombay Merchants Banks and 
the Standard Bank of Bombay and Bank of Upper India. 
This boom not only brought lots of banks into 
established condition, but it also followed with the failure 
of around 87 banks with total paid-up capital of over 1.75 
crores, which was slightly more than half of the total paid-
up capital of all the joint stock banks that survived in 
1917. Due to failure of such a huge no. of banks public 
confidence started depleting on Indian joint stock banks 
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and checked the growth of banking habits in India. It was 
a great setback to the banking development in India. Due 
to such conditions banks suffer heavy loss and comes 
under the financial pressure. Due to such heavy financial 
pressure banks almost wholly dependent upon public 
deposits for conducting their business. But due to high 
competition among the banks, led them to offer lucrative 
and very high interest rates that really could not be 
afforded by the banks. To control the outflow and inflow 
of money banks starts conducting risky ventures, in the 
expectation of high gain and balance of their business. 
The large sums were locked-up in speculative dealings like 
- silver, pearls and other commodities. This was not 
enough, banks in the expectations of high gains, did long 
term finance without efficient investigations. This resulted 
into the heavy losses, and large proportions of the total 
available funds were frequently sunk in a single business. 
Bank Management 
On the other hand these banks were handled by the 
incapable men. who did not have little knowledge either of 
the principles of the practice of banking. Even the 
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shareholders were too ignorant to exercise their rights and 
duties and to control either the directors or managers. 
Thus, banks generally issued letter without doing many 
formalities, which further led to the fraud and criminal 
mismanagement. Even directors and managers of the 
concerned banks ran away with the assets of the banks by 
showing in the book debt to the banks that didn't exist. 
To hide their activities they left books in an incomplete 
state. This description of the causes of the banking crises 
and failure didn't apply to all the Indian joint stock banks 
many of them function successfully especially, larger and 
the older ones conducted their work on sound lines and 
although not as strong as presidency bank, but strong 
enough to withstand the crisis without untoward 
consequences. By the failure of joint stock banks in India, 
no conclusions-were drawn, because it was witnessed at 
the same time in western countries, that, there was a 
similar type of crisis with the joint stock banks there. 
This crisis with the joint stock banks came into existence 
because of the non-cooperation attitude between them 
and the Preside,ncy and exchange bank. Even the bank of 
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Bengal refused to lend the money to the banks, those 
were in difficulty in Lahore, against the Govt, securities. 
The development of Indian joint stock banks from 
1913 to 1949 can be seen from the following table 1. 



















The foHowiftg table clearly indicated the public 
confidence enjoyed by the banks. It clearly shows crisis 
period till 1917 and gradual increase in deposit is shown 
between 1918-21 but again joint stock banks came under 
the crisis between 1922 and 1928 and further recovered 
after 1928. After 1928, Indian joint stock banks tfoes^ot 
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see back. Thus the figures sl^Q^n in the is)^ shows that 
" - ":''tn (,nn»- J>^ 
how the weakness of J.S.B. came out when the economic 
conditions become unfavourable. But it can't be ignored 
that in between 1917-1947, when the deposits of Indian 
joint stock banks were trippled those of the imperial banks 
and the exchange banks increased only by 33 and 20 
percent. Their deposits increased substantially at the time 
of second world war, but this doesn't exist for long. After 
the partition the deposits again fell down, which further 
increased only after 1953. 
Deposit Trends of Indian Banks 
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The Development of Banking Industry During 
Second World War: 
After doing much research it is found that the 
progress of banking in India was slow during Second 
World War (1939-41). But just after war in 1942-46, this 
progress increased with much faster rate , branches were 
opened and deposits were rapid. Even the number of 
scheduled banks including the Imperial bank and the 
exchange banks, increased from 51 to 93 in June 1946 
and the total no. of their offices including head office 
from 1,328 to 3,106. Their deposit rose from 238 crores 
at the beginning of the war, raised to 1,097 crores at the 
end of 1946. This rise was very little during the war, it 
was only 20 crores in that three years (1939-41). But the 
growth of baaking business rose so fast after the world 
war. 
But this was not the end of the agony. In 1947, the 
devil of partition again over powered the whole country 
and along with other system banking system was also 
effected very much and it faced strenous condition. But 
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fortunately except failure of some banks it did not get 
much effected. But after the partition India passed 
through a serious economic condition. During 1942-48, 
its progress was mainly quantitative while from 1949, the 
quality of its working improved appreciably. Post world 
war period was very friendly for the growth of banking 
business, because after world war enormous fund 
available. At this time investment in industries was very 
less, due to non-availability of raw material, import of 
machinery, therefore funds were unused and there was no 
hindrance in the development of banks. Therefore, lots of 
new banks established during this period. Some of them 
were the United Commercial Bank, Calcutta and Bharat 
Bank, Delhi, sponsored by the houses of Birla and Daln.ia 
respectively. Around 1,778 new banking offices were 
established, during this period and only 47 belonged to 
the imperial Bank, one third to the Big Nine and a little 
less than two thirds to the sandier Indian scheduled Banks, 
which had only one third of the deposits of the 
Indianbanks. The result of this inspite of the enormous 
increase in total bank deposits the value of resources of 
the smaller scheduled banks did not exceed Rs. 5 lakhs 
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per branch, while in case of bigger banks this amount 
raises to about 20 to 35 lakhs per branch. During the 
period of 1939-46 it was observed that the non-scheduled 
banks having paid-up capital and reserves of Rs. 5 lakhs 
and over, and between Rs. 1 and 5 lakhs and between 5 
lakhs and 7 lakhs. 
It can't be ignored that the war condition brought 
about a change in the structure of the assets of the banks, 
but during greater part of the war, the value of bills and 
advances of schedule banks was somewhat larger than the 
pre-war value, their growth was much smaller than that of 
the other assets of the banks. It was seen that the 
percentage of bills and advances of scheduled Banks to 
their total assets fell from 62% to 25% and in case of 
Imperial Bank this percentage of bills and advances, fell 
from 55 to 20% and in case of big five banks it decreases 
from 53 to 30%. 
To overcome fall in the percentage of bills and 
advances banks tend to increase their holdings in 
government and other securities and on the other hand 
the government • was also wanted banks to subscribe as 
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much as possible to its enormous war loans. But it was 
witnessed that the period of 1939-44 was still better, 
because in this period the percentage of the holding to 
total assets increased from 54 to 6 1 % in case of Imperial 
bank and 43 to 51% in case of their scheduled bank 
respectively. 
Impact of Partition of India on Banking Business 
Partition period was tough time for the banking in 
India, before partition banking was conducted mostly by 
Hindus even in the Muslim populated areas. But after the 
partition, they "change their places for the purpose of 
safety. The banking was hugely effected and caused 
heav#y losses to the banking system. But when serious 
disturbances occured in the area of west punjab where 
most of the bank offices close down on account of the 
lack of security-''and the evacuation of their Hindu staff. 
Only the exchange bank could function in that area, with 
considerable difficulty owing to the shortage of staff. But 
govt, of India helped considerably to such types of banks 
and section 17 of the Reserve Bank Act which had 
considerably restricted the power of the Reserve Bank to 
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make advance to schedule banks, was modified so as to 
empower the Reserve Bank to provide support and 
security, which is proper to such banks, other steps were 
taken by the govt, was to make an order for the banks 
who have their head offices in east Punjab or Delhi, given 
legal authorization to postpone their payment and if they 
pay, they have to clear payments to depositors not 
exchanging 10% of their current deposits in India or Rs. 
250, whichever was less. Further govt, arranged Rs. 1 
crore for rehabilitation programmes for affected banks, 
these measures'became necessary because, while some of 
the banks that had taken the precaution of removing the 
bulk of their assets from West Punjab, before the 
occurance of the disturbances, others had not done so and 
found that, although their assets had remained in West 
Punjab, their clients had transferred themselves from West 
to East Punjab and demanded their deposits bank in the 
later area. 
The trend of expansion and development of banking 
in India that was started in 1942 continued upto 1948 
and end at 1949. But this trend gets contracted in 1953 
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after the fall in deposits and profits of banks. In this 
circumstances the number of scheduled banks get declined 
from 96 to 89in numbers at the end of the 1948 to 
1953. When we study the period between 1957 and 6 1 . 
We can find that the number of non-scheduled banks and 
their offices fell further by 39-318 and other no of banks 
cases to function in 1958-61, these were 29 in 1958, 33 
in 1959, 27 in 1960 and around 53 in 1961. This was 
again a major set back on banking section in this period. 
Growth in Deposit during 1951 to 1 9 6 4 : 
It was observed that during the first five-year plan 
the growth in deposit rises upto 3 percent, which was 
increased around Rs. 129 crores, this was further 
observed that after the second five year plan, during 1955 
t o l 9 6 0 , the bank deposits increased upto 602 crores, by 
an annual average of 12 percent. In general observation 
the study shows a drastic increase in deposits during 1961 
to 1964. This charge was around 2,049 to 2,820 crores 
and average of 9% growth in deposits. This drastic growth 
observed in deposits, just because of the same reasons 
that are mentioned in above discussion, rise in branch 
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circulation of note and spread of banking habit. This time 
the situation was reversed in this period, the percentage 
of demand deposits to total deposits increased from 
39.9% to 46.7% while time deposit fell from 6 0 . 1 % to 
53.3%. This reverse trend was observed due to the 
emergency created by the Chinese aggression. In this 
period public desire to keep more liquid assets owing to 
emergency rather than locked their money in fixed 
deposits or other long term ventures. It was seen that the 
ownership of deposits, personal deposits increased from 
Rs. 309 to 1,166 crores i.e. from 47.8% to 49.02% of 
the total, during this period. The business deposits 
increased from Rs. 564 to 675 crores but their % of the 
total declined from 33.5 to 28.5% while the percentage 
of Government and Quasi Government deposits increased 
by 0.7%. The current operating earning of Indian 
scheduled banks increased from 3.7 crores in 1954 to Rs. 
16 crores in 1964. 
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Borrowings from Reserve Bank Advances and 
Investments: 
Due to rise in industry and trade, tlie scheduled 
banks liave increased tiieir borrowing from Reserve Bank. 
But this borrowing was not a stead as it gets changed 
from season to season, depending upon the change in 
market scenario or business. This demand was further 
encouraged by Reserve Bank for the industrial 
development policy passed in five-year plan, prfs^ 
Borrowm^from Reserve B a n l ^ to make capable to 
scheduled banks to lend on large scale to big^medium^or 
^^iiergrT" scale industries. This provides fuel Mtp the 
•gQwewHR€TTr''ortHeindustries in India. 
This credit increases from 1951 to 69, 
tremendously. It expanded with a growth of 11 percent 
per annum. This was possible only because of planned 
economic policy. It-is observed that bank credit 4n-^r951 
i4^to_52,6 only in the-n€xM5y-ifl-4^^2. While in 1954 it 
gets down trend from 596 crores to 562 crores, but this 
further rises to 894 crores in 1957. Now it further rises 
yearly and reach 2051 crores in 1965. The increasing 
percentage of bank credit to industries at the expense of 
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commerce shows the rapid development of industries in 
the country 
Investment Policy During 1 9 5 1 to 1 9 6 4 : 
Upto 1953 the Investment policies of the banks 
were steady. But it was noticed that there was gradual fall 
in the investment of the banks, percentage of govt, debt 
fall from 12% in 1956 to 11% in 1963. The investment 
policy for other securities increased in 1955. it may also 
be mentioned that the holdings of banks in treasury bills 
increased from 0.7% in 1951 to 11% in 1962 on the 
percentage of. securities with maturity of 5 rupees or less 
held by banks has increased from 26% in 1951 to 37% in 
1962 to 69. The' percentage of securities with maturity 
between 5 to 10. years held by then decreased from 47 to 
39% during the same period. 
It was observed that there was a decline in the 
percentage of cash on hand ar^ d reserves with the Reserve 
Bank to depositors of scheduled banks fall from 11% in 
1957 to 7% in 1962 on account of the growing demand 
for banks credit, larger scope for borrowing from the 
Reserve Bank, a rapid increase in the number of branches 
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of the state bank through remittance facilities enable 
banks to have cash readily at points of need and a larger 
increase of time deposits slow of demand deposits, which 
needed a smaller statutory reserve. 
Banks Earning and Expenses upto 1 9 6 4 : 
When we study the trends of earning and expenses 
of banks during 1954 to l964 . . We can find that the 
current operating earning of Indian scheduled banks 
increased from Rs. 3.7 crores in 1954 to 16 crores in 
1964. While in the case of foreign banks it was witnessed 
that it got doubled from 12 crores to 28 crores. At this 
time, the main earning sources were interests from 
advances and discounting of bills were the main 
component of the earnings. This earning get enhanced by 
10% in case of scheduled bank during this period. While 
foreign banks could not raise their income through the 
same source in same circumstances. 
Rural Finance: 
Standard of living in rural Indian is one of the major 
problems because of poverty and extremely low standard 
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of living. It was always a problem to provide them proper 
finance facility. According to the Central Banking 
Committee the average annual income of an agriculturist 
in British India was then at Rs. 42 or little. It was 
estimated by the Central Banking Committee,that the 
rural indebtness was around 900 crores in this period and 
it was further increased by 1200 crores upto 1940. It was 
inherited by the past generation to the present 
generation. 
Licensing of Rural Subsidiary Banks: 
Central Banking Committee have recommended that 
the new rural subsidiary bank should obtain a license from 
the Reserve Bank. Committee has suggested that a simple 
procedure might be evolved for dealing with applications 
for licensing and that as far as possible a license may not 
be refused except on substantial grounds. Since the rural 
sbsidiaries would be promoted by commercial banks which 
might be licensed and which would provide the necessary 
expertise and guidance for the effective functioning of 
rural subsidiaries, it has been recommended that the 
licensing process might be simplified and licence issued on 
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the fulfilment of certain objective Committee also 
recommended that the Reserve Banks should take over 
the charges of licensing the rural banks instead of 
Registrar of Companies. But there was no such 
recommendation which made this licensing simple while 
the recommendation of Reserve Bank might have proved 
strict for licensing the rural subsidiary bank so unlicensed 
subsidiary rural bank might be discouraged to develop. 
There would be no point in registering a rural subsidiary 
bank, if, for any reason, the Reserve Bank is not likely to 
grant a licence to it. What is required is the prior approval 
by the reserve bank before registering a subsidiary. 
Progress of Banking in India till 1 9 6 9 : 
In the two decades following the enactment of the 
Banking Companies Act, 1949, the Indian banking system 
underwent substantial changes structurally, geographically 
and functionally. This was a period which witnessed 
economic development of the country in accordance with 
a series of Five-Year Plans. The banking system and the 
Reserve Bank of India endeavored to adapt themselves to 
the changing economic scene under planning, but in 
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retrospect it would appear this was comparatively a slow 
pace till recently. This period also saw the Reserve Bank's 
efforts towards the institutionalisation of savings in order 
to orient the credit system to the needs of a developing 
economy and the consolidation and strengthening of 
banking structure and organisation with a view to 
improving the quality of its service and the widening of 
the geographical and functional spread of its activity. 
The Indian commercial banking system has been 
regulated and controlled mainly under the provisions of 
the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. Till recent years, the 
primary objective of the measure was the protection of 
the interests of depositors, but the need to strengthen and 
expand the banking system to meet the needs of a 
developing economy was also recognised and some steps 
were taken in this direction. The Act was suitably 
amended, from time to time. Thus, the Reserve Bank was 
empowered to secure compulsory mergers of banks. The 
failure of a couple of banks in the early 1960's made it 
necessary to amend the Act further to empower the 
Reserve Bank to apply to the Central Government for 
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grant of moratorium of banks and sanction schemes for 
the reconstruction or amalgamation with another banl^ing 
company. Even before this amendment, the Reserve Bank 
was encouraging the merger of small banks with big banks 
to make them viable units. After the amendment of the 
Act in 1960, the process of amalgamation gained 
momentum. 
As a result of the coming into force of the Banking 
Companies Act and the efforts to bring about mergers, 
there was a decline in the number of non-scheduled 
commercial banks and their offices. At the same time, 
there was a remarkable increase in the number of 
branches of scheduled banks. Compared with over 500 
non-scheduled banks in 1951, there were less than 20 
such banks in 1969. The number of offices of non-
scheduled commercial banks declined from about 1,500 in 
1951 to a little over 200 in 1969. In the case of 
scheduled commercial banks, expansion of offices was 
fairly rapid. Thus, from 2,689 banking offices at the end 
of March 1952, the number rose to 4,166 at the end of 
March 1961 and further to 7,731 at the end of March 
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1969. Besides opening of branciies, anotlier measure was 
taken to develop the banking habit, namely, the 
introduction in January 1962 of a system of deposit 
insurance, India being the second country to do this. The 
system is being administered by the Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, whose capital of Rs. 1 crore is owned 
entirely by the Reserve Bank. The insurance cover was 
originally a modest sum of Rs. 1,500, in respect of each 
depositor in each bank. The cover was raised to Rs. 
5,000 in 1968 and further to Rs. 10,000 in 1970. By an 
amendment to the Act, State Central and urban co-
operative banks with a paid-up capital and reserves of Rs. 
1 lakh or more have been brought under the scope of the 
Act. The scheme has been extended to co-operative banks 
in some states, viz., Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, 
Andhra Pradesh and the Union Territory of Goa, Daman 
and Diu, which have passed the necessary enabling 
legislation. 
Formation of the state bank of India: 
A major banking development in the 1950's was the 
nationahzation of the Imperial Bank of India and its 
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transformation into the State Bank of India, effective July 
1, 1955. Ttiis was tiie outcome of tiie recommendations 
of the Committee of Direction of the All-India Rural 
Credit Survey appointed by the Reserve Bank of India in 
1951. The Committee recommended the setting up of a 
State Bank as "one strong state-partnered commercial 
banking institution with an effective machinery of 
branches spread throughout the country to stimulate 
banking development by providing vastly extended 
remittance facilities for the co-operative and other banks 
and by following a policy consistent with national policies 
adopted by the Government without departing from the 
canons of sound business". Subsequently, in 1960 seven 
banks, which had special connections with the erstwhile 
princely states such as Hyderabad, Mysore and 
Travancore, became subsidiaries of the State Bank of 
India. This arrangement was preferred to their merger 
with the SBI. 
The State Bank of India has made good progress in 
the matter of expansion of branches, particularly in areas 
not served by banks and in meeting the credit needs of 
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small-scale industries and rural finance, in particular 
marketing of agricultural products. Between the time of its 
establishment in July 1955 and July 1969 when 14 
commercial banks were nationalized, the State Bank of 
India's branches rose by over 200 per cent, to 1569; on 
the latter date, the subsidiaries of the SBI had 863 
offices. Nearly one-third of the bank offices at the end of 
June 1969 were situated in rural areas, that is at centers 
with population below 10,000. During the subsequent a 
little over three-year period ended September 1972 the 
number of offices of the SBI group in rural areas more 
than doubled and their share in the total number of offices 
increased from 33 per cent in 1969. 
Table - 2 
Centre-wise classification of bank offices of SBI 
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Indexes of banking growth till 1 9 6 9 
An idea of the substantial growth of banking in the 
country can be had from the five-fold increase in deposits 
from Rs. 835 crores in March 1951 to Rs. 4,338 crores 
in March 1969. The share of the commercial bank 
deposits owned by the household sector in the total 
savings in financial assets (gross) rose from 1.94 per cent 
in 1950-51 to 27.14 per cent in 1965-66. The ratio of 
deposits to national income, however, was steady around 
14 per cent of branch expansion programmes. The other 
notable features in deposit growth of the period were the 
higher rate of growth in time deposits relative to savings 
deposits, the rise in the number of personal accounts 
relative to business accounts, a substantial share of the 
deposit expansion in the State Bank of India Group due to 
branch expansion in semi-urban and rural areas and an 
uneven growth of deposits as between different States. 
Another index of growth of banking is the sharp 
expansion of bank credit, at a compound rate of 11 per 
cent per annum during 1951-69. As a result, the credit-
deposit ratio increased from 62 per cent in 1951 to 78 
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per cent in March 1969. The major part of commercial 
bank credit has traditionally gone particularly to large and 
medium-scale industries, whole-sale trade and other bigger 
borrowers. At the end of 1968, the share of commercial 
bank credit to industry was 68 per cent as against 34 per 
cent in 1951, while that of commerce was 19 per cent as 
against 36 per cent for the same period. 
Tablc-3 
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Small-scale industries, agriculture and allied 
activities, retail trade, self-employed and small borrowers 
for long remained, by and large outside the purview of 
commercial banks. Commercial bank lending to 
agriculture, excluding plantations was negligible. The 
major proportion of institutional finance for the 
agricultural sector came from the co-operative agencies. 
A significant feature of banking in India since the 
early fifties is the ernergence of term lending by 
commercial banks, particularly after the establishment of 
the Refinance Corporation for Industry in 1958, which 
was later merged with the IDBI in 1964. In addition, 
commercial banks have been subscribing to the capital 
stock and debentures of the specialized financial 
institutions. 
Reserve Bank of India 
In any credit system, the central bank has a very 
important role to play. This is especially so in developing 
countries, where the role of a central bank is not merely 
that of regulation of credit, but also one of establishment 
of an adequate institutional machinery for the provision of 
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credit to the various sectors of the economy. The Reserve 
Banlt of India, established in 1935 initially as 
shareholders' bank and nationalized with effect from 
January 1949, has been fulfilling its dual role of 
regulation and promotion fairly well. Till about the early 
1950s, the Bank did not have much oi scope for credit 
regulation, since credit expansion by the banking system 
was of modest dimensions and there was little need for 
the banking system to borrow from the Reserve Bank. So, 
the Bank concentrated its efforts on three areas of policy, 
namely, the strengthening of the commercial banking 
system, the reorganization and streamlining of the co-
operative credit structure, to purvey in particular the 
needs of agriculture and the promotion of institutions for 
the provision of medium and long-term finance for the 
manufacturing sector on a modest scale. In all these 
areas, it must be said that the record of the Reserve Bank 
has been on the whole good. 
In respect of weeding out the weak elements in the 
banking system and in ensuring growth of banking on 
sound lines, the main statutory instrument was the 
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Banking Companies Act tiiat^^pr^e-tnto.^far^ in Marcii 
1949. It siiould be emphasized that till a few years ago, 
the fundamental objective of the authorities in the sphere 
of banking was to keep the interest of the depositors. 
Other objectives such as enlargement of the role of banks 
in economic development were subordinate to that of 
protecting moneys of the depositor. In the early years of 
the working of the Banking Companies Act, the emphasis 
of policy by the Reserve Bank and Government was more 
in the direction of containing what was feared would be 
over expansion of branches rather than any aggressive 
keenness for opening of branches. In any event, except in 
regard to the State Bank of India, no financial or other 
inducement was given to the non r iiionaliscd banks to 
embark on expansion of branches in a big way. 
Credit regulation assumed importance with the fairly 
rapid growth of the economy as part of a series of five-
year Plans. Although the First five-year Plan began some 
time in 1952, inflationary pressures gathered momentum 
only from the time of the Second Plan onwards in 1956. 
Apart from the expanded credit demand from the private 
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sector, the primary source of inflation in the Indian 
economy has been budgetary deficits of the Central 
Government. Credit policy in the ordinary way cannot be 
of much avail in a context where the biggest monetary 
expansion is occurring through deficits of the Government 
sector. However, even in such a situation, the central 
bank of a country has a role to perform, namely, 
preventing any marked secondary inflationary pressures as 
a result of rising liquidity of the banking system. In this 
spirit, the Reserve Bank has endeavored to control credit 
expansion for the private sector. The Reserve Bank now 
possesses all the usual instruments of central bank 
regulation, namely, bank rate, open market operations, 
variable reserve ratio and selective credit controls. In a 
developing economy, as already mentioned, the central 
« 
bank's promotional role is very important. Extension of 
the/magnetizecz sector and of the banking habit, narrowing 
of seasonal and regional gaps between the supply of and 
the demand for funds, the availability of adequate credit at 
reasonable cost to neglected and priority sectors, such as 
agriculture, small-scale industries and exports, and the 
development of adequate institutional machinery for 
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meeting the requirements of industry and agriculture for 
medium and long-term funds are important aspects of the 
central bank's promotional growth. In all these respects, 
the Reserve Bank's performance should be said to have 
been good. The Reserve Bank has also played an active 
role in the establishment of institutions for/^purveying^ 
credit to agriculture and manufacturing. Besides helping in 
the establishment of apex institutions in the co-operative 
field, the bank established as a part subsidiary, in 1963, 
the Agriculture Refinance Corporation. In the field of 
credit for industry, the bank played an important role in 
the establishment of the Industrial Finance Corporation of 
India in 1948, the State Financial Corporations from 
1952 onwards, the Refinance Corporation for Industry in 
1958 and the Industrial Development Bank of India, a 
wholly owned subsidiary, in 1964. In all these institutions, 
the Bank's contribution has been in terms of share capital, 
loans and management. The establishment of the Deposit 
Insurance Corporation in 1962 to provide insurance cover 
to depositors has already been referred to. 
79 
An important development in the field of expanding 
the flow of credit to small-scale industry was the 
institution of a credit guarantee scheme in July 1960, in 
respect of loans made by banks and other credit 
institutions to small-scale industrial units. While the risk 
was borne by the Central Government, the formulation of 
the scheme and its administration has been the 
responsibility of the Reserve Bank. 
Scheme of social control over commercial banks; 
Government in December 1967 initiated the scheme 
of social control over banks. The Boards of Directors of 
commercial banks were reconstituted, providing for a 
majority of members having specialized knowledge or 
practical experience in the fields of economics, law, co-
operation, agriculture and rural economy, banking, 
finance, small-scale industry, etc., and any other 
knowledge or experience useful to a bank. In addition, the 
chairmen of the banks, who were to be appointed as 
whole-time executives, had to be professional bankers and 
not industrialists or businessmen. The banks were also 
prohibited from making loans to their Directors of 
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concerns in which their Directors were interested. The 
Reserve Bank was given further powers over bank 
r 
management. A high level body called the National Credit 
Council was set up in February 1968, with the Finance 
Minister as Chairman and the Governor of the Reserve 
Bank as Vice-Chairman, and consisting of representatives 
of industry, trade, agriculture, commercial banking, co-
operative sector and professionals including economists, 
to assess periodically the demand for bank credit and to 
provide guidelines for credit priorities on an all-India 
basis, for ensuring a purposeful and equitable distribution 
of bank credit. 
The legislative measure for social control of banks 
was the Banking Laws ^Amendment) Act, 1968, which 
came into force on February 1, 1969. In terms of the Act, 
not less than 51 per cent of the total number of members 
of the Board of Directors of a bank had to consist of 
persons who have special knowledge or practical 
experience in one or more of matters such as 
accountancy, agriculture and rural economy, banking, co-
operation, economics, [finance, law and small-scale 
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industry. In addition, every bank was to iiave a wiiole-time 
chairman who is not an industrialist but is a professional 
banker and has special knowledge and practical 
experience of banking (including financial institutions) or 
financial, economic or business administration; his term 
was not to exceed five years at a time. The Reserve Bank 
was vested with the powers of appointment, removal or 
termination of the services of not only the chairman, but 
also any director, the chief executive officer (by whatever 
name called) or any other officer or employee of a bank, 
whenever the circumstances so required. In exercising 
these functions, the Bank was required to have, as its 
criteria, not only the interests of the bank or its 
depositors, but the interest of banking policy or public 
interest. 
Another notable development to enlarge the 
commercial bank's involvement in agricultural finance was 
the establishment in 1968 of the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation Limited, as a joint venture by the leading 
commercial banks for financing priority agricultural 
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projects and to help commercial banks participate actively 
in developing the agricultural sector. 
In accordance with the guidelines indicated by the 
National Credit Council, the Reserve Bank also introduced 
changes in its branch expansion policy with a view to 
extending the banking facilities to wider areas and also 
mobilizing their deposit resources. It was when the social 
control experiment was in progress that the Banking 
Commission was set up in the early part of 1969. 
As regards the functional aspects of banking, the 
major change in policy was one of directing credit to the 
priority sectors, in particular agriculture, small-scale 
industry and exports and of translating credit priorities 
into individual banking credit decisions. 
Nationalization of 14 commercial banks 
A far-reaching measure affecting the banking system 
was the nationalization of the 14 major Indian commercial 
banks with effect from July 19, 1969, on account of what 
was regarded as inadequacies of the social control device. 
True, the necessary organizational changes to give effect 
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to social control were put through by the banks fairly and 
promptly. They also reduced their loans to directors and 
the concerns in which they were interested and increased 
their lending to agriculture and small-scale industries. 
Nevertheless, it was felt that the social control experiment 
was basically inadequate to achieve the social goals. 
Although the Boards were reconstituted, the industrialists 
and businessmen remained on the Boards and could still 
exercise their personal influence. The powers of the 
Reserve Bank to reconstitute the Boards were also not 
sufficient. The directors of the banks could be removed by 
the Reserve Bank only in specified circumstances and 
under prescribed procedures. Further, the Bank's powers 
to issue directives could be exercised only in excepti^^'al 
or unusual cases. In these circumstances, it was felt that 
only through public ownership of banks could the desired 
objectives be achieved. Consequently, the nationalization 
of 14 major Indian banks was announced on July 19, 
1969. This meant that nearly 85 per cent of banks' 
deposits (including those of the State Bank of India and its 
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-3 
Impact on Banking 
Performance After Nationalization 
"IMPACT ON BANKING PERFORMANCE AFTER 
NATIONALIZATION" 
The nationalization of 14 major commercial banks was 
announced by the g9vt. of India through an ordinance by 
the president under Art. 123 of the constitution of India on 
July 19, 1969. The ordinance was replaced with the 
Banking Companies Act (Acquisition and transfer of 
undertakings) passed by the parliament on August 9, 1969. 
Causes Behind Nationalization: 
The first step In this direction was taken by the 
Government in 1955, when Imperial Bank of India 
converted into State Bank of India. This policy of the 
government was completely materialized when the fourteen 
(14) major commercial banks with a deposit of Rs. 50 crores 
or above were nationalized by the govt, of India under 
Banking Companies Act 1969. After nationalization the 
public sector of India now cover 84% of the banking 
business as against 27%. 
If we study the total deposits of 14 nationalized banks 
(the commercial bank) in 1967 and bank credits they were 
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Rs. 2312 and Rs. 1583 crores respectively. In 1968 the 
position of deposits and banl< advances in respect of the 
nationalized banks. We can observe that all the nationalized 
banks now cover 84% of the total deposits and 82.8% of 
the total bank credits of all banking business in India. These 
14 nationalized banks alone cover 62,8% of the total 
deposits and 63.5% of the bank credits of the all 
nationalized banks including the State Bank and its 
subsidiaries. The estimated position of 14 Nationalized 
Banks, State Bank of India and subsidiaries in respect of the 
deposits during 1970 were as follows: 
Table - 1 
Bank Deposit during 1 9 7 0 : 
1 
14 Nationalized Banks 
S.B.I. 
Subsidiaries 
yOTAi- - = — ^ 





Source:Banking in india, panandnikar. 
From the above figure it is clear that during 1969 (post 
nationalization) very few banking business was left to handle 
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by private sector. These banks were left open to run their 
business among small borrowers small business and small 
industrialist. The exact figure of deposits of these banks was 
nearly Rs. 95 crores as in July 1969. 
The main cause of nationalization of banks have been 
stated as to include the enlargement of resources for 
economic growth, the development of Agriculture and 
Industry in backward regions as well as making bank credit 
available to priority areas which had generally been 
neglected. To fulfill such objectives govt, felt that the 
lending policy should be governed by the government rather 
than by few monopolist shareholders who in the past divert 
bank resources to their self-desired channels ignoring the 
needs of the country's economic planning. In this way the 
use of bank money for purposes of speculative activities and 
unproductive works shall be eliminated. The bank resources 
shall be utilized for encouraging new entrepreneurs. It is 
also proposed to secure professional standards in bank 
management and provide adequate training facilities for 
banking personnel by assuring reasonable terms of 
employment for the banking industry's staff. 
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Economic Justification: 
When we study pre-nationalization scenario we will 
find that the commercial banks were always favoured their 
lending for industry, trade and commerce in which their 
'directions^ them self were interested, but they always 
deliberately neglected the requirement of the farmers 
artisans and small scale enterpreneures because they were 
not intrested to finance these communitiy of the country due 
to the fact that they would not be benefited in person. The 
distribution of bank credit to these above sectors viz. 
farmers, artisans and small scale entrepreneurs, shows that 
only a negligible share of the total advances by the banks 
were made available to the said sector while the fact was 
that the govt, had always emphasized priority for them 
(farmers artisans and small scale entrepreneurs). 
Further findings shows that the divergence of the 
commercial bank's credits for financing the farmers in the 
absence of adequate farm-finance from cooperatives was 
under the policy of the govt, to initiate for social control 
and effective measures to be adopted for Agricultural 
development though financing it by commercial cooperative 
90 
banks where as commercial banks complied with the 
formalities of reconstituting their boards in the desired 
manner, they reduced the size of the book-loan from 10.1% 
to 3 .1% in 1968. They sanctioned additional credit limits to 
Agriculture and small scale industries and introduced new 
schemes to assist farmers. But these commercial banks 
explain their reasons to govt, that due to mass illiteracy of 
village^'peoples^^^nsuitable conditions, inadequate and 
practically nil transportation their staff are not willing to go 
to rural areas such social control could not compel these 
commercial banks to open their branches in such areas. In 
other condition there was around 200<Q^^ ^^ 300 crores^l^^was 
estimated to finance the agricultural needs and it was clear 
that even only 40% of farmers requirement can be fulfilled 
by these commercial banks and cooperative societies by 
March 1974. 
Performance Appraisal: 
(a) Banking in India after nationalization: 
The history of the banking system in India has been 
changed by the nationalization of 14 commercial banks in 
1969. It added a new chapter of progress and development 
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in banking system. At tiiis juncture tiie banks were required 
to transform themselves into an instrument for social 
development and well being. These objectivejwas achieved 
only by expansion of their branches and penetration of the 
rural and semi-urban areas explicit recognition of banks as 
an agency for mobilization of savings and development of 
the money-market promotion of the banking habits and 
exploration of new avenues for credit deployment, especially 
for the benefit of the weak and under-privileged sections of 
the community. 
It was observed that there was a remarkable change in 
banking both geographically and functionally. A largely 
implemented branch expansion programme with a major 
concentration to villages and remote areas surrounded by 
millions of small borrowers, attempts at decentralization of 
power and delegation of authority, introduction of special 
credit schemes to meet the credit needs of majority engage 
in small but gainful business, and shift in emphasis from 
security-oriented lending to production based lending are all 
indicator of revolution in banking system. 
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The major achievements of the banking industry in the 
first decade (1970-80) can be explained as follows: 
« 
(i) Tremendous improvement in branch expansion. It was 
8262 in 1969 and raise to 30,303 in June 1979. 
(ii) There was 65000 population per branch in June 
1969. It decline to 18000 per branch in June 1979. 
(iii) The inter-state disparity in the availability of bank 
offices declined from the highest of 4,97000 and the 
lowest of 7000 persons per bank office in June 1969 
to the highest of 35000 and lowest of 3000 per bank 
office in June 1979. 
(iv) Level of deposit mobilization of Nationalized Banks 
rise 48|)percent till 1979. 
(v) Public sector bank advances to priority sectors 
increased from Rs.441 crores covering 2.6 lakhs 
accounts in June 1969 to Rs. 4791 crores covering 
89.1 lakh accounts in December 1978. 
(vi) Public sector bank's advances under the differential 
rate of interest scheme, increased from Rs. 87.7 lakhs 
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covering 26,202 borrower, accounts in December 
1972 to Rs. 103.17 crores, covering 17.57 lakhs 
borrower accounts at tiie end of Marcii 1979. 
Tlie major aciiievement of banking sector after 
nationalization was fast growing branch network throughout 
the country. The main thrust of banking administration has 
been towards making credit available to those sectors of 
society which have all along been neglected by the security-
oriented banking system which used to operate mainly from 
metropolitan and urban centres. The hitherto neglected 
sectors have now been given priority and government has 
deliberately adopted the policy that bank credited should be 
available to small scale agriculture so long dependent on 
village money lenders. Similarly, priorities have been 
specifically allocated to artisans and small scale 
industrialists, operators of transport services and those who 
are self employed. By and large, bank advances to these 
sectors, which stood at about 15% of their total advances in 
1969, had exceeded 26% of total advances by June 1975. 
ti 
After nationalization various policy initiative have 
followed, lead bank scheme was the first measure which 
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implemented. In this schemes specific commercial bank 
allotted the responsibility of a specific district where they 
have to provide all the banking facilities and initiative for 
process of other developmental activities of the same 
district. All of the 338 rural districts in India have been 
allotted to specific lead banks. So far survey reports have 
been received with regards to 330 districts. 
Since nationalization the branch expansion was given 
highest priority, on an average about 1800 branches have 
been open annually. It is fact that the principal hindrance of 
Indian economy is that it is not monetised and it can only be 
fulfilled by providing adequate banking services. The total 
absence of banks in vast tracts of the country inhabited the 
development ot niodern financial discipline. Therefore it is 
very important to make a drive to take banks to unbanked 
or under banked areas. There is a need to bring banking not 
only door to door but also invite public for taking 
maximum participation in fund mobilization. After 
nationalization all these hindrances were near about 
removed further. After nationalization there was 
introduction of several schemes for fulfilling the needs 
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of backward and weaker section of the society. Under sucfi 
schemes loans were given to the backwards at differential 
rates of interest. On March 20, 1972, it was announced 
that a specified weaker sections of the society would get 
loans at 4%. The scheme has since been extended to all 
districts where the agriculture ministry offers special 
assistance because of backwardness so that practically 265 
out of 338 districts of India covered by the scheme. There 
was provision of maximum limit of working capital provided 
under such scheme. The maximum amount was Rs.1500 
for working capital and for loan the amount has been fixed 
at Rs. 5000 .Persons engaging paid labor on a whole time 
basis are ineligible under this scheme. The progress under 
the scheme upto the end of June 1975 was that an amount 
of Rs. 148 million had been loaned approximately to 
347,152 persons. 
Before 1969 (Pre- nationalization era) it was observed 
that the concentration of business was restricted to only 
metropolitan and urban areas, where large amount of bank 
credit and top management of major banks being held by 
leading business tycoons in the country. At that time loans 
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were sanctioned only on the basis of credit worthiness of the 
borrowers and viability of the schemes were ignored. The 
performance of a bank was judged by the amount of profit it 
made and the dividend it declared. Under such condition it is 
clear that, it was very difficult for entrepreneur or a small 
farmer to procure credit even if he had a viable schemes. It 
was surprisingly to know that the agriculture, which 
employed about 70% of the labor forces and contribution of 
about 50% of the national income got only 2% of total bank 
credit. There was a thinking among commercial banks that 
they were not to serve the interest of farmers, small 
business and rural artisans. After considering all such 
problem govt, plan to do the nationalization of some of the 
major commercial banks. 
By the end of June 1969, the commercial banking 
sector consisted of 72 scheduled commercial and 16 non-
scheduled banks out of the 72 banks, 8 banks - State Bank 
of India with its 7 subsidiaries, were in the public sector and 
there were 49 Pvt. Sector banks, 15 foreign and 16 non-
scheduled banks. Fourteen banks (Commercial) with deposit 
of Rs. 50 crores and above were nationalized in June 1969. 
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In further development on nationalization on April 15, 1980 
the govt, of India nationalized six more commercial banks 
having more than Rs. 200 crores of total deposits, and now 
9 1 % of total deposits came under the nationalized banking 
sector of the country only about 4.5% banking now remain 
in the private sector. 
At the time of first nationalization, the total deposits 
of all commercial banks stood at Rs. 5000 crores and about 
31000 crores Rs. at the end of 1978. In case of schedule 
commercial banks the deposit is around 27250 crores. The 
14 nationalised bank and SBI and its subsidiaries alone 
share of Rs. 24,262 crores. Now the total balance of about 
2988 crores Rs. in which the six neatly nationalised banks 
holding was Rs. 1,903 crores whichis about 63.6% of the 
non-nationalised and non-public sector of the banking 
industry. The credit facility provided by the six newly 
nationalised banks at Rs. 81,174 crores at the end of 1978 
formed 6.4% of the total credit of Rs. 18,350 crores of all 
commercial banks and 48.7% of the total credit of Rs. 
2,412 crores of all the non-nationalised non-public banks. 
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The performance record after nationalization was not 
satisfactory during seventies. It has created a serious 
credibility gap with respect of public ownership and control 
by govt. Indian economy faces severe setback during this 
period. The rate of inflation was too high drought and acute 
poverty problem was high in the country, and the first phase 
of nationalization doesn't prove much effective. It was only 
a walk of power struggle and the radicals led by Mrs. Gandhi 
who swore by socialism and Gharibi hatao andolan. People 
were having faith in public philosophy that the assumption 
of comminuting heights by the public sector was 
synonymous with advancement towards social justice. This 
philosophy now turned out to be hollow. Under such 
circumstances the nationalization of six more b<=iMks on April 
15, 1980, draw very poor response from economist even 
the then FICCI President comments on the second phase of 
nationalization that, this decision is not only bad as well as 
sad, because, when many urgent problems are crying out for 
solution of which /improvement in the services of 
nationalised banks is one, the govt, should not waste their 
energies in this type of exercise and bad because at this 
juncture it will disturb the investment climates. 
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After the nationalization of six more banks, it can't be 
ignore tliat tlie additional sum of Rs. 945 crores more will 
now be available for credit allocation to agriculture and 
other priority sectors. When we study the following figure 
we can see that these six banks contribute about 30.9%. 
Whereas previously nationalised, 14 banks contribute 30.4% 
to the priority sector till December 1978. 
Branch Expansion After Nationalization : 
The branch expansion programme was one of the 
major agenda of nationalization. The Prime Minister Mrs. 
Indira Gandhi clearly indicated in her speech on July 19, 
1969, that bank can be a source of financial facilities to the 
self-employed persons, farmer and other small and neglected 
areas of the society. Therefore, it was clearly indicated that 
the branch expansion programme must be of paramount 
importance in whole agenda. Therefore, the most obvious 
achievement since nationalization of banks, has been the 
spread of banking branch network throughout the country. 
Therefore, the total number of branches of commercial 
banks has increased from 8262 in June, 1969 to 30,303 in 
June 1979. As a result of their rapid expansion, the average 
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population served by each branch has came down from 
65,000 in June 1969 to 18,000 in June 1979 of this public 
sector bank alone 79% of the total banking facility provided 
by the commercial bank till 1979. This shows that branch 
expansion programme gained real pace after the 
nationalization. 
The average population served per bank office at the 
time of nationalization was 65000 approximately and it 
comes down to 17000, December 1979. There was clear 
improvement in some bank shared states, like Assam, Bihar, 
J&K, U.P. as compare to 1969, the population per bank 
office in Assam has come down from 1.98 lakhs to 33000 
has come down from 1.98 lakhs to 35000 in June 1979 in 
Bihar from 207 lakhs to 35000 in Orissa from 2.17 lakhs 
to 31000, in Jammu & Kashmir from 1.14 lakhs to 12000 
and in Uttar Pradesh from 1.19 lakhs to 26000. 
It was observed that in the year 1978-79 commercial 
bank open 2,191 offices. They have prefer Assam, Bihar, 
M.P., Orissa, U.P. and W.B. Thus we can say that the 
growth of branches was very rapid after nationalization. 
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It become quite clear that the nationalization of 14 
banks in 1969, laid great emphasis on the coverage of 
unbanked centers by banks as compared to the pre-
nationalization period. This is clear from the data available 
that commercial banks in India open around 22090 
branches in between the year 1969-79 and out of this, 
11.373 offices were opened in unbanked centres which 
comprise more than 50% of the total bank offices, during 
this period. Nationalized banks alon have opened 9,379 
branches in unbanked centres which is 82.5% of the total 
branches opened in unbanked centres. While 54.2% were 
situated in unbanked centres as against 57.5% in case of 
commercial bank since July 1969. 
As per the Government decision that there must be 
atleast one office in unbanked area, latest by June 30, 
1979, the commercial banks had opened offices in 619 
blocks out of 697 unbanked community development blocks 
in the country, till Juhe 1978. 
Under the branch expansion programme of commercial 
bank since nationalization, there is a distinct shift in favour 
of areas designated as rural population upto 10,000. 
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Therefore such rural branches increased from 22.4% in 
June 1969 to 44 .1% in June 1979. There was around 
13,333 rural branches till June 1979. As per government 
decision that, there should be one branch per 10,000 
population in rural areas, there must be around 32000 
additional offices are needed for, then rural population of 
around 450 million. It was also witnessed that, when the 
share of rural branches increased from 22.4% to 26% 
during 1969-79. If we take "rural" and "semiurban" areas 
together the increase in their share to total bank branches 
appears very ineffective it increase from 62.4% in June 
1969 to only 70 .1% in June 1979. thus we can say that the 
increase in rural branches since nationalization has taken 
place at the cost of semi urban centres, whose share of 
branches come down from 40% in June 1969 to 26% in 
June 1979. 
If we make an analysis of new rural branches in total 
new branches opened after nationalization, we find that it 
has declined from 66% in 1969-70 to 35% in 1976. The 
percentage share of new rural offices in total new branches 
has declined rapidly after 1970-71 to 1975-76 During the 
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same period, the share of new rural branches in total bank 
offices has increased from 35.4% to 51.5% in 1976-77, 
which is partly because of the establishment of Regional 
Rural Banks in October 1975 and imposition of internal 
emergency in June 1975. 
After the implementation of new branch licensing 
policy, formulated by R.B.I, in September 1978, about 
45000 new offices were opened up within 1978-81. The 
formula for branch licencing in force since Jan. 1, 1977 
stipulates that a bank will have to open 4 offices in the 
embarked rural areas to get an entitlement to open one 
office in a metropolitan and one office in a baked centre. 
This is known as 4:1:1 formula. 
The needs of the riiral sector including small scale and 
cottage industries would be adequately taken care of by the 
spread of bank branches. 
Impact on Priority Sector After Nationalization : 
Beside branch expansion and availability of banking 
services to remote area, priority sector was also one of the 
major target of nationalization of Banks in India. Because 
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priority sector was the most neglected area in pre-
nationalization area. The credit facilities were available to 
only those who are directly related to the banks and very 
low risk area because of high risk and non-availability of 
participation in key position of banks these areas were 
neglected by the security oriented banking system which 
used to operate mainly from metropolitan and urban 
centres. Therefore, the neglected sectors like artisans, small 
scale industrialists, operators of transport services and 
farmers were provided highest priority, for credit 
distribution. 
As we know that the different sectors of the economy 
like Agriculture industry, trade, transport-services, education 
etc. are inter-related to each other and simultaneous 
development of all these sectors are guarantee of rapid 
economy development in country in long-run. However at 
any time a particular sector or one or two of these sector is 
may be more important than the others either as the leading 
sectors in realising certain immediate and short run 
objectives or as the limiting sectors which obstruct the 
realisation of such objectives like increasing production. 
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containing inflationary pressures of generating employment 
opportunities such sector are then designated as the priority 
sectors of the economy, though at some other point of time 
some other sectors may assume a strategic role and may 
come to be called the priority sectors. The role of 
agriculture, cottage and small scale ir\dustry, retail traders, 
small businessman, water transport undertakings, education 
and self employment, are considered to be the priority 
sectors because they play major role in accelerating the 
rapid and long-term development of the Indian economy, 
these sectors are designated as the priority sectors of the 
economy. For the growth of priority sector it is important to 
make available the sufficient credit at low rates of interest. 
The nationalization of banks in particular prooved very 
helpful and since 1969 all the nationalized banks and other 
commercial banks in general are asked to mobilise funds at 
large to meet the credit needs of these sectors and from 
help to the growth of Indian economy. 
When we study the trends of scheduled commercial 
banks to advances to priority sectors from 1969 to 1978 we 
find that the share of priority sectors in the total credit 
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advanced by the scheduled commercial banks in the country 
has been steadily on the increase except for the two years 
1976 and 1977 since 1969, from 14% at the end of June 
1969 to 27 .1% at the end of June 1973. The incremental 
ratio is still higher at -30.9% at the end of June 1978, 
showing thereby that 30.9% of the additional credit granted 
by the scheduled commercial banks in the country since 
1969 has gone into the priority sector I nthe economy. At 
the end of June 1978 we see that the small scale industries 
get highest share around 78.9% of the total credit available 
to priority sector. 
In March 1979, the govt, of India suggested to the 
banks that they have to direct their one third of the total 
credit to the priority sector. Such type of suggestion cause 
rapid development in priority sector and clearly visible in 
agriculture sector, which gives desired result in recent year. 
Impact of Nationalization on Banks Profit: 
By the analysis we find that during 1970-71 there was 
increase in profits and in 1972-73 the trend become dealing 
in the profitability of the operation of scheduled commercial 
banks in the country, as is indicated by the percentage ratio 
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of their aggregate profit to their aggregate credit. During 
1974 and 1975, situation become better compared to 1973 
and then deteriorating again in 1976-77. Reserve bank of 
India mention this decline, because of the profitability of 
bank become slower in growth of earning as a result of a 
relatively lower bank credit expansion during the year in 
Nov. 1976, the increase in liquidity requirement of banks 
and imparting of a part of the incremental deposits from 
January 1977. It may be pointed out that in view of the 
need to mobilize a still larger share of their resources to the 
priority sectors of the economy and to the weaker sections 
of the society. 
Financing of the priority sectors on an increasing scale 
required to meet i.'.v nt tds of rapid economic development, 
price stability and social justice criticism may raise if the 
nationalization proved at the cost of profitability and 
efficiency. 
The diversion of larger bank credit into these sectors 
of the economy requires that the commercial banks should 
give up the traditional commercial loan, while deciding loan 
and should make the purpose of the loan, rather than the 
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formal security against it to be tiie deciding factor while 
assessing a loan application. The banks are prepared to 
sacrifice 'private profitability' in favour of the social 
importance and necessity of the project finance from the 
point of view of attaining the various socio-economic 
objective of the economic planning in the country. It may be 
pointed out that this total preoccupation in the past, of the 
Indian commercial banks with "profitability" that had been 
partly responsible for denying the priority sectors their 
genuine need for banking credit, since the financing of these 
sectors is subject to a higher degree of risk of default and 
lower profitability when compared with the financing of 
large scale industry and commerce, which are the traditional 
sector as commercial bank operations in India. After 
consideration of priority sector the definition of profitability 
of the banks reinterpreted in order to include in it the socio-
economic importance of the purpose of the lone. There are 
lots of difficulties in financing the priority sectors. The 
major difficulty face by the banks in diverting larger bank 
loans to the priority sector involves round the need for 
theoretical and policy changes, but it is easy to change 
policy rather than conceptial belief like security and 
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profitability of banks. As we know that the traditional 
concepts are easy to implement rather than modern concept 
of fast growing economic and social concept. There are 
further lots of other difficulties arises after loan sanctioned. 
It is difficult task to superwise the agriculture loan, borrowed 
by the cultivation dispersed all over the village often at long 
distance from the lending bank office, and in their 
circumstances the user may be liable to put loans in 
unproductive uses, resulting in mounting debts apart from 
the waste of scarce resources from the social point of view. 
Therefore to over power such circumstances banks are 
needed to have extra staff which ultimately cause extra 
overhead expenditure to the banks. Ultimately diversion of 
high amount towards priority sector will divert the banks 
attention from their traditional customers who are profitable 
and strength of the banks may cause heavy loss. All the 
points indicates that it is good to divert the attention 
towards priority sector but traditional sector should not be 
ignored because their strength know the banks. So banks 
should make their policy which is security friendly as well as 
profitable to the commercial banks. Such a participation will 
accelerate the commercialisation of Indian agriculture, a 
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trend that has recently set into the Indian agricultural 
system, so as to increase the marketable surplus of food 
grains in the country required to feed its non-agricultural 
population and possibly even for export. It will help in 
providing the banking habit among the rural peace and in 
mobilising rural savings for the purpose of capital formation 
and economic development and enable the Indian 
commercial banking system to fulfil its socio-economic 
obligations in the context of the rapid economic progress of 
the country. 
I l l 
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Banking Sector Reforms and their 
Impact on the Financial 
Performance of Nationalised 
Banks 
BANKING SECTOR REFORMS AND THEIR IMPACT 
ON THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF 
NATIONALISED BANKS 
In the previous chapter I have discussed about the 
nationalization of major commercial banks. It was 
considered to be the giant stride in view of the public 
sector banking provide the banking facility among the 
public. Since nationalization, the progress of banking in 
India has been quite impressive. Specially in case of 
branch expansion and priority sector lending. Different 
loan schemes were announced for very weaker section of 
the society & agriculture sectors. To reach the rural poor 
section of the society banks adopted some regional rural 
schemes. With nationalization, the responsibility for 
appointing directors to the boards of the banks has fallen 
on government. The govt, have taken the opportunity 
and proposed the representation of employees of the 
banks. There is provision of two representatives of the 
employees one from among the clerical staff and another 
from officers are appointed directors. This type of 
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scheme brings management nearer to the employees and 
creates a healthy working environment. 
It is believe that the banking in India before 1969 
was characterized by concentration of business in 
metropolitan and urban centers with major industries and 
whole sale trade claiming a large chunk of bank credit 
and the control and management of major banks being 
held by leading business tycoons in the country loans 
were advanced not on the viability of the project but on 
the credit worthiness of the borrowers. This situations 
get reversed after nationalization and banks have change 
their definition of profit and progress. They emphasized 
on the development of weaker section of the society and 
provide large banking facility to the farmers, poors, and 
small-scale industrialist. 
After nationalization banks fulfilled the need of the 
society but with the changing environment they have to 
face the challenges of competition for their growth and 
development. Development in the financial sector would 
have to be supportive of the metamorphic changes taking 
place in the industry trade and fiscal sections. The 
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banking sector need reforms to face the greater 
competition from pvt. banks, financial institution and 
non-banking financial companies which were the great 
threat to the Indian banking industry. The reform would 
have to aimed at further development. The process of 
liberalization and deregulation in the banking sector 
began with the initiation of financial sector reforms and 
the 90s have come to be a decade of the "second 
revolution" in Indian banking sector. There has been a 
marked shift in ideology as evident from the emphasis in 
favor of prudential regulation instead of structural 
regulation. 
In any financial sector reforms the institutions 
immediately affected are the banks, since banks typically 
dominate the financial system in the early stages of 
financial development.The Banks are main institutions for 
providing short-term finance to various economic entities 
and formers etc. Banks also are distinguishable from 
other financial institutions by a unique characteristic, 
which gives them power to provide means of payment in 
non-cash transactions too. As reform of the financial 
116 
system takes root, it is the banking system, which comes 
to face increasing competition from non-banks and the 
capital market. The extension of banking and other 
financial facilities to a larger cross-section of the society 
stands out as a significant achievement. As a ratio of 
GDP at current prices, bank deposits increased from 18% 
in 1969-70 to 42% approximately in 1994-95. All the 
indications of financial development such as the financial 
ratio financial inter-relations ratio and intermediation 
have significantly increased, implying the growing 
importance of financial institution in the economy and 
growth of financial powers in relation to economic 
activity. 
Despite the overrtil progress made by the financial 
system in term of geographic and functional coverage, its 
operational efficiency has been unsatisfactory, 
characterized by low profitability, high level of non-
performing assets and relatively low capital base. The 
balance sheet of the performance of the banking sector 
was mixed strong in widening the credit coverage but 
weak as far as viability and sustainability was concerned. 
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In July 1991, when a programs of economic 
stabilization was put in place and durable reform of the 
financial system was sought to be achieved through the 
following measures: 
(i) Correct and improve the macro-economic policy 
setting within which banks operate. This mainly 
involves rationalization of interest rates and 
bringing down the levels of resource pre-emptions. 
(ii) Introduce prudential norms relating to income 
recognition provisioning and capital adequacy. 
(iii) Improve the financial health and competitive 
condition of banks by re-capitalizing banks, 
restructuring the weaker ones, improving the 
incentives under which banks function and allowing 
free entry of new banks and other financial 
intermediaries. 
(iv) Build financial iiistitutions and financial 
infrastructure relating to supervision, audit, 
technology and legal framework. 
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(v) Improve the level of managerial competence and the 
quality of human resources by reviewing the policies 
relating to recruitment training, placement etc. 
The high level Committee appointed has recently 
examined these issues by the Government of India under 
the Chairmanship of. Shri M. Narasimham in August 
1991 to examine all aspects relating to the structure, 
organisation, functions and procedures of the financial 
system. The Committee's Report was tabled in 
Parliament on December 17, 1991. The findings and 
recommendations of the Committee cover a wide gamut 
of issues. The Committee's approach to the issue of 
financial sector reform is to ensure that the financial 
services industry operates on the basis of operational 
flexibility and functional autonomy with a view to 
enhancing efficiency, productivity and profitability. In its 
view, a vibrant and competitive financial system is also 




The Committee's main recommendations include: (i) 
phased reduction in the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) to 
25 per cent over a period of five years; (ii) progressive 
reduction in cash reserve ratio (CRR) from its present 
high level; (iii) phasing out directed credit programs and 
redefinition of the priority sector; (iv) deregulation of 
interest rates so as to reflect emerging market conditions; 
(v) achieving a minimum 4 per cent capital adequacy ratio 
in relation to risk weighted assets by March 1993; (vi) 
adoption of uniform accounting practices particularly in 
regard to income recognition and provisioning against 
doubtful debts; (vii) imparting transparency to bank 
balance shct'ts and making full disclosures in them; (viii) 
setting up of Special Tribunals to speed up the process of 
recovery of loans; (ix) establishment of an Assets 
Reconstruction Fund (ARF) to take over from banks and 
financial institutions a portion of their bad and doubtful 
debts at a discount; (x) restructuring of the banking 
system so as to have 3 or 4 large banks which could 
become international in character, 8 to 10 national banks 
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with a network of branches throughout the country 
engaged in 'universal' banking, local banks whose 
operations would be generally confined to a specific 
region, and rural banks (including RRBs) whose 
operations would be confined to the rural areas and 
whose business would be predominantly to engage in 
financing of agriculture and allied activities; (xi) setting 
up of one or more rural banking subsidiaries by each 
public sector bank to take over all its rural branches; (xii) 
permitting PRBs to engage in all types of banking 
business; (xiii) abolition of branch licensing and leaving 
the matter of opening or closing of branches to the 
commercial judgement of individual banks; (xiv) 
liberalizing the policy with regard to allowing foreign 
banks to open offices in India as branches or as 
subsidiaries; (xv) rationalisation of foreign operations of 
Indian banks (xvi) permitting individual banks the freedom 
to recruit officers; (xvii) inspection by supervisory 
authorities based essentially on the internal audit and 
internal inspection reports; (xviii) ending duality of 
control over the banking system between the Reserve 
Bank and the Banking Division of the Ministry of Finance 
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and making the Reserve Bank the primary agency for the 
regulation of the banking system; (xix) hiving off the 
supervisory function over the banks and other financial 
institutions to a separate authority to operate as a quasi-
autonomous body under the aegis of the Reserve Bank, 
which would be separate from other central banking 
functions of the Reserve Bank; (xx) certain specific 
recommendations relating to the appointment of chief 
executives of banks and directors on the boards of the 
public sector banks and institutions; (xxi) transfering the 
direct lending function of IDBI to a separate institution 
while retaining only IDBI's apex and refinancing role; 
(xxii) obtaining resources from the market on competitive 
terms by DFIs and phasing-out of their privileged access 
to concessive finance through the SLR and other 
arrangements; (xxiii) substantial and speedy liberalisation 
of the capital market and dispensing with the prior 
approval of any agency for any issue in the market; (xxiv) 
supervision over institutions such as merchant banks, 
mutual funds, leasing companies, venture capital 
companies and factoring companies by a new agency to 
be set up under the aegis of the Reserve Bank; (xxv) 
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enactment of new legislation on the lines obtaining in 
several countries with a view to providing an appropriate 
legal framework for constitution and functioning of 
mutual funds; (xxvi) laying prudential norms and 
guidelines governing the functioning of such institutions 
as in the case of banks, and financial institutions; and 
(xxvii) proper sequencing of reforms in the financial 
system. 
The recommendations by the Narsimham Committee 
would have far reaching implications on the working of 
the banking and financial system in the years to come. 
The feasibility of implementing these recommendations, 
the sequencing of measures and the infrastructure 
necessary in a reformed financial system are being 
examined by the Government and the Reserve Bank. 
Major elements of reforms: 
(i) Pre-emptions and Interest Rate Structure: 
The relaxation of external constraints bearing on 
the profitability of banks has essentially taken two form 
in the last few years. One has been to reduce the pre-
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emptions in the form of reserve requirements and the 
other to make the interest rate structure more flexible 
and responsible. In mid 19.91 pre-emptions in the form 
of cash reserve ratio and statutory liquidity reserve 
requirements on incremental deposits, amounted to 
63.5%. Today the incremental ratio is 39 percent. 
Reduction in reserve requirements has necessary to be 
co-ordinated with fiscal adjustment, while the developed 
countries are in a position to make use of various 
instruments of monetaVy control such as market 
operations, in an economy like ours, cash reserve ratio 
still remains the major instrument of control. 
In terms of administered structure of interest rates, 
it has came a long way in terms of de-regulations. The 
process in fact began in 1990 when plethora of lending 
rates for different slabs of borrowing were rationalized 
into six. A minimum lending rate prescription for large 
borrowers was introduced in 1988. After the recent 
changes, there are only two rates of interest prescribed 
on the lending side and on the deposit side, there is only 
the prescription of a maximum rate on deposits up to two 
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years maturity. A continuous and a careful step by step 
approach has thus been adopted in terms of regulation of 
the interest rate structure. 
Prudential Norms: 
The world over greater opportunities competitive 
pressures financial deregulation and liberalization have 
led to a tendency on the part of the banks and 
liberalization have led to a tendency on the part of the 
banks and financial institutions to over extend their 
lending and investment decision such as by accepting 
debtors of lower credit worthiness in an attempt to 
maintain profitability. This phenomenon is very often 
referred to as adverse selection. It is however to be noted 
that banks and other institutional lenders are not 
unconstrained profit maximisers. Profit maximisation is 
subject to the constraint of an acceptable level of risk. 
A major element of the financial sector reform in 
India has been the introduction of prudential norms and 
regulations, directed to ensure the safety and soundness 
of the financial system, impart greater transparency and 
accountability in operations and restoring the credibility 
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of and confidence in the Indian financial system. Tiiese 
norms serve an extremely useful purpose, in compelling 
banks to pay adequate attention to the quality of loan 
assets. It help serve two purposes. One they have 
brought out the true position of the banking system's 
loan portfolio and two, the norms have helped to check 
the deterioration. Prudential reforms introduced in India 
relate to income recognition provisioning for doubtful 
and bad debts and capital adequacy. A capital risk 
weighted asset ratio system has also been introduced 
more or less in conformity with international standards. 
Indian banks, which have branches abroad and foreign 
banks operating in India have already, achieved these 
norms. As at the end of March 1995, 13 public sector 
banks had attained "the minimum CRAR of 8%, 11 banks 
atleast 4% and the remaining three banks less than 4%. 
The process of re-capitalization has been facilitated 
primarily by a large dose of equity capital injection made 
by the Government of India to the nationalized banks. In 
additions, several banks have also been allowed to access 
the capital market to raise equity on their own. The state 
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bank of India was able to enter the capital market in 
December 1993 and raise Rs. 2,532 crore witii an 
equity-cum-bond issue. For the nationalized banks the 
Banking Companies'Act 1970/80 was amended in June 
1994 (Acquisition and transfer of undertaking) so as to 
make able the nationalized banks to raise capital by 
public issue of shares with the govt, of India at all times 
holding not less than 51% of the shares in each bank. 
This act was further amended in January 1995 allowing 
reduction in the paid up capital of a nationalized bank 
before making any public issue by canceling any other 
paid up capital which is lost or is underrepresented by 
available assets. 
Competition and Transparency: 
High competitive environment is being created. 
Banks are facing heavy competition within the industry 
and outside like NBFCs, permitting new private sector 
banks and more liberal entry of branches of foreign 
banks. Therefore Indian banks need to gear themselves 
up to meet this challenge on the other hand the share of 
public sector banks in banking business is going down 
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particularly in metropolitan areas. Competition is sought 
to be fastered in rural and semi-urban areas also by 
encouraging local area banks. Some diversification of 
ownership in select public, sector banks has helped the 
process of autonomy and has thus generated some 
response to competitive pressures. The RBI's effort to 
entrance competition do, however, take into account the 
response of public sector banks and their principal, the 
government. The transparency and disclosure standards 
have been enhanced to meet international standards 
through there are a few areas where we lag. These relate 
to the maturity pattern of assets and liabilities, 
movements in the provision account and non-performing 
assets (NPAs) and progress needs to be made in all these 
areas. 
Efficiency: 
Considerable emphasis is being laid on increasing 
productivity and efficiency of the banking system, more 
generally, analysts talked operational efficiency and 
allocation efficiency former relates to transaction costs 
the latter deals with the distribution of mobilized funds 
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among competing demand. But functional efficiency must 
therefore relates to. • 
(a) A soundness of the appraisals as measured by the 
level of overdue. 
(b) The resource cost of specific operations. 
(c) The quality and speed of delivery of services. 
Supervision: 
A strong system of supervision is essential for a 
sound banking system, therefore an independent board of 
financial supervision under the protection of the RBI has 
been established, and consistent with international 
practice, main focus "of the Board is also on off-site 
inspections and on control system internal to the banks. 
The status of implementation of core principles of 
banking supervision shows that of 46 principles, 33 have 
been implemented, 11 are partially implemented, while 
only two are yet to be implemented. These two relate to 
the critical aspect of adequacy of reserves against country 
risk and transfer risk and consolidated reporting. While 
the former is not a major issue at this juncture in view of 
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limited cross-border exposure the latter is of significance, 
warranting early action. 
Credit Control: 
Selective credit control have been dispensed with 
Micro-regulations of credit delivery has been given up 
and there is a greater freedom to both banks and 
borrowers in matters relating to credit. However, there 
are understanding on two counts, viz. the discipline of 
priority sector lending and the flow of credit to the needy 
and deserving on a timely basis. The advances eligible for 
priority sector lending have been enlarged interest rates 
deregulated and alternative avenues of investment 
permitted, thus making the priority lending far more 
flexible than before. No doubt banks are averse to 
subceilling in the priority sector, and have some problems 
with procedural requirements. The major area of serious 
concern relates to Gqvt. sponsored programs including 
subsidies, where there are serious problems of both 
coordination and recovery. 
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Incentives and Legal Reforms: 
The most critical issue in financial sector reform 
relates to consequences of the extent of public ownership 
and special laws governing publicly owned banks. The 
CBSR has devoted a significant part of its report to 
reform of public sector banks, on which the govt., as the 
principal, needs to act. At present, public ownership has 
adverse effects on a level playing field among banks, 
capacity and willingness to compete in the market place, 
incentives to perform and binding work 
practices/methods that inhibit efficiency. Issue of optimal 
efficiency, autonomy and ownership are intervened and 
need to be resolved. Reduction of public ownership below 
the majority level prescribed would need an amendment 
to three different loans that govern public sector banks. 
The sale of shares already held by the govt, also needs 
enactments to the law. 
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Review of the Action Taken on the 
Recommendations of the Committee on Financial 
System 
The Committee on the Financial System had 
approached the task of financial sector reform by placing 
emphasis on the steps needed to improve the financial 
health of banks and development financial institutions to 
make them viable and efficient in order to serve the 
emerging needs and enhance the competitive efficiency 
of the real sector. The Committee suggested several 
policy and structural changes designed to enhance 
competitive efficiency, productivity and profitability of 
the financial system and enhance flexibility and autonomy 
in the functioning of banks and DFIs. The Report covered 
policy aspects accounting standards, institutional and 
structural issues and organizational development. 
Many of the recommendations of the Report have 
been accepted and implemented. Some have not been 
accepted and some implemented in a manner somewhat 
different from what was recommended. 
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The following indicates the various actions taken on 
the Report of the CFS(committee on financial system). 
Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR): 
The Committe^e had recommended that the SLR be 
viewed as a prudential requirement and brought down in 
a phased manner to 25% over a period of about five 
years. This recommendation has been implemented and 
the SLR has been brought down to 25% in a phased 
manner and stands at 25% of demand and time liabilities 
from the fortnight ended October 22, 1997. 
Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR): 
The Committee was of the view that RBI should 
have the flexibility to operate this instrument to serve its 
monetary policy objectives. The Committee however 
added that with Government's resolve to reduce the fiscal 
deficit and with deregulation of interest rates, there 
would be more scope for use of Open market operations 
with perhaps less emphasis on variations in the CRR. It 
therefore suggested that the RBI should consider 
progressively reducing the cash reserve ratio from the 
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then prevalent high level. The average CRR was brought 
down in stages from 15% in 1989 to 9.5% in November 
1997. It was hiked to 10% in December 1997 and to 
10.5% in January 1998 in view of the situation 
prevailing in financial and foreign exchange markets and 
international developments. The CRR was however 
reduced to 10.25% from 28.03.1998 and 10% with 
effect from 11.04.1998. RBI has also been using open 
market operations for monetary policy reasons. 
« 
Interest rates on CRR balances: 
The Committee had recommended that RBI should 
pay interest rates on CRR deposits above the basic 
minimum related to banks average cost of deposits. 
During the regime of administered interest rates the rate 
may be fixed at the level of banks one year deposit rate. 
Till October 1997 under the two-tier formula. Interest 
was paid at the rate of 10.5 percent on eligible cash 
balances based on their Net Demand and Time Liabilities 
(NDTL) as on March 23, 1990 and no interest was paid 
on the increase in eligible cash balances (based on the 
increase in NDTL over the level as on March 23, 1990), 
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maintained with RBI. Thus, the effective rate of interest 
on the entire eligible cash balance worked out to about 
3.5% per annum. Consequent on the latest busy season 
credit policy announcements. Interest on eligible cash 
balances i.e. above the basic minimum is now being paid 
to all scheduled commercial banks at the rate of 4% per 
annum from the fortnight beginning October 25, 1997. 
Eligible cash balances are defined as cash balances above 
the basic minimum of 3%. 
Direct Credit: 
The Committee had recommended that directed 
credit programs should be phased out. It recognized that 
it would be necessary for a measure of special credit 
support through direction to a redefined priority sector 
for which the suggested rates should be fixed at 10% of 
aggregate credit. A review could be undertaken at the 
end of three years .if directed credit programs needed to 
be continued. As regards credit to the target group which 
would not be included .in the new definition. RBI and 
other refinance agencies may institute a preferential 
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refinance scheme to cover incremental credit to tliese 
sectors. 
According to tlie assessment made by RBI the 
redefined priority sector accounts for a little less than 
30% of net bank credit. It was therefore decided to 
continue the existing targets for priority sector lending. 
Concessional finance is however now limited to small 
loans below Rs. 2 lakhs and for DRi advances. For 
advances above Rs. 2 lakhs, the banks are free to charge 
interest rate linked to PLR. The scope of priority sector 
lending has been enlarged to include finance to 
SIDC/SFC, refinance to RRBs by sponsor banks, 
investments in bonds issued by certain specified 
institutions etc. 
Interest rates structure: 
The Committee recommended the deregulation of 
interest rates in a phased manner in line with macro 
economic conditions. The interest rates on bank deposits 
could continue to be regulated, the ceilings on such rates 
being raised as the SLR is reduced progressively. The 
interest rate on Government borrowing could also be 
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gradually broughtin line with market determined rates 
which should be facilitated by the reduction of SLR. 
Meanwhile concessional interest rates should be phased 
out. The structure of interest rates should bear a broad 
relationship to the Pank Rate which should be used as an 
anchor to signal the RBl's monetary policy. A Prime rate 
may be set which would act as a floor for the lending 
rates of banks and pFIs . The spreads between the Bank 
Rate, the bank deposit rates the Government borrowing 
rates and the prime rate. may be determined by RBI 
broadly in accordance with the criteria suggested by the 
Chakravarty Committee so as to ensure that real rates of 
interest remain positive. 
These recommendations have since been 
implemented. Except lending to small borrowers and a 
part of export finance, all lending rates have been 
deregulated. Interest rates on deposits are now free 
except for prescription in respect of savings deposits. 
The interest rate on Government borrowings is also now 
market determined. Concessionality in interest rates in 
lending has also been phased out to a great extent. 
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Interest rates are presently prescribed for borrowers 
covered under the Differential Rate of Interest (DRI) 
Scheme at 4 per cent per annum and small borrowers for 
credit limits upto Rs. 2 lakh. It should be added that this 
sector to which concessional rates apply account for a 
significant portion of the priority sector credit. The Bank 
Rate has been reactivated as per the Monetary and Credit 
Policy announced in April 1997, by linking interest rates 
of significance (e.g., refinance from RBI penal interest on 
shortfall in reserve requirements, etc.) to it. Since 
October 1994, a system of Prime Lending Rate (PLR) has 
been put in place under which banks and FI are setting 
out, with approval of their Boards, their PLR which is the 
minimum lending rate for non concessional lending (i.e., 
credit limits above Rs. 2 lakh). The relationship between 
the Bank Rate, the Government borrowing rate, bank 
deposit rates and market forces determine the PLRs of 
banks and developments in the economy like expected 
inflation rate, etc. 
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Capital adequacy: 
The Committee had recommended that BIS(banks 
for international settlement) norms on capital adequacy 
should be achieved over a period of 3 years by March 
1996, the period of being accelerated for banks with an 
international presence. Profitable banks could 
straightaway approach the capital market for 
enhancement of their capital and in respect of other 
banks Government could meet the shortfall either by 
direct subscription to equity or by providing a loan which 
could be treated as subordinated debt. 
RBI implemented these norms. Banks with 
international presence were directed to achieve these 
norms by March 1995 and other banks in two stages by 
March 1996. Eight banks could not achieve the 
prescribed norms as on 31.03.1996. As on 31.03.1997 
only two banks have not been able to achieve the 8% 
norm. 
Five nationalized banks, SBI and two subsidiaries of 
SB! successfully raised capital from the market since 
1993 for a total of Rs. 60.3475 billion(including the 
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premium on the issue prices). Government has also 
directly subscribed to the capital of nationalized banks to 
the extent of Rs. 200.46 billion upto 28.02.1998. 
Income recognition, asset classification and 
provisioning norms: 
The Committee defined the term non-performing 
asset (NPA) and recommended that no interest should 
accrue in respect of NPAs. The income recognition 
norms were to be phased over a period of three years. It 
recommended a four way classification of assets and 
provisions against each category of sub standard assets. 
A four-year period was suggested for banks to conform to 
these provisioning norms. 
The norms have been introduced since 1992 in 
phases as recommended by the Committee. Banks were 
directed that income from Non Performing Assets (NPAs) 
could not be taken to Profit and Loss Account unless 
income had been realized. NPA has been defined as a 
credit facility in respect of which interest has remained 
"past due" for a period of four/three/two quarters as on 
31 March 1993, 31 March 1994, 31 March 1995 
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respectively. A credit facility is "past due" when the 
installment has not been paid within 30 days from the 
due date. Similarly, banks were required to classify 
assets, based on their status, as NPA into sub-standard, 
doubtful and loss assets and make appropriate provisions. 
These norms have been applied to DFIs{direct foreign 
investment) except^ that in case of DFIs an advance 
become NPA(non-performing assets) if interest remains 
overdue for more than 180 days and/or installment of 
principal remains overdue for more than 365 days. 
Transparency of financial statements: 
The Committee recommended that the transparency 
and disclosure standards recommended in the 
International Accounting Standards may be implemented 
in a phased manner. 
RBI modified the format of balance sheets of banks 
with a view to introducing greater transparency and 
disclosures in 1992. In their 1996 accounts banks were 
required to disclose the capital adequacy ratios and in the 
1997 accounts further disclosure requirements were 
introduced; more significant being break up of provisions 
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made during the year percentage of net NPAs to net 
advances and investments on gross and net basis. For ttie 
year 1998 banks-have been directed to disclose seven 
critical ratios relating to productivity and profitability. 
Tax treatment of provisions: 
The Committee recommended that income 
recognition norms as suggested by it may be implemented 
by RBI. The specific provisions made by banks and 
DFIs(direct foreign investment) in line with its 
recommendations should be tax deductible. As regards 
general provisions the tax deductibility should be 
restricted to 0.5% of. the aggregate average non-
agricultural advances and 2% of the aggregate average 
advances by rural branches to all banks including those 
having overseas operations. 
While the income recognition norms have been 
implemented as proposed, in respect of specific 
provisions made by banks against classified assets, these 
are not considered as tax-deductible unless the amount is 
written off. RBI • has taken up the matter with 
Government. As regards general provisions, the limit of 
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admissible deduction has been enhanced to 5% of the 
income and 10% of average aggregate advances of rural 
branches. 
Debt Recovery Tribunals: 
The Committee recommendations for setting up of 
Special Tribunals to speed up the process of recovery by 
specific legislation has been implemented with the 
passage of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and 
Financial Institutions Act 1993 in August 1993. So far 8 
debt recovery tribunals have been established covering 20 
states and 4 Union Territories. An Appellate Tribunal has 
also been established in Mumbai. 
Asset Reconstruction Fund: 
* 
9 
The Committee recommended setting up of an Asset 
Reconstruction Fund to take over bad and doubtful assets 
off the -balance sheets of banks and Foreign Investments 
(FI's) so that banks could recycle the funds realized 
through this process into new productive assets. The ARF 
should be provided with broader powers for recovery and 
should be funded by Government of India, RBI, public 
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sector banks and financial institutions. The Committee 
also suggested the manner in which assets could be 
transferred. 
This set of recommendations has not been 
implemented. 
Structure of the banking system: 
The Committee had indicated a broad structural 
pattern for the banking system consisting of 3 or 4 large 
banks which could become international in character. 8 
to 10 national banks with a network of branch 
throughout the country engaged in universal banking, 
local banks whose operations would be generally confined 
to a specific region and rural banks whose operations 
would be confined to rural areas. The move towards this 
structure should be market driven and based on 
profitability considerations and brought about through a 
process of mergers and acquisitions. 
Except for merger of a weak public sector bank with 
another public sector bank, there has been no 
restructuring of the public sector banking system. Four 
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weak private sector banks were closed/merged during ; 
\h\s period. 
Regional Rural Banks: 
The Committee's recommendations tiiat each public 
sector bank should set up one or more rural banking 
subsidiaries to take over all its rural branches and where 
appropriate, its rural branches with those of other banks 
has not been accepted. The approach instead has been to 
strengthen and restructure Regional Rural Banks on a 
'stand alone' basis. 
Entry of private sector banks: 
The Committee's recommendation to allow entry of 
new private banks has been implemented with ten new 
private banks having commenced business. 
Branch licensing: 
The Committee recommended that branch licensing 
be abolished and the matter of opening branches or 
closing of branches (other than rural branches for the 
present) be left to the commercial judgement of the 
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individual banks. Wliile branch-licensing policy has not 
been abolished, greater operational freedom has been 
given to banks to open certain specialized branches, off-
site ATMs and other non-branch offices. Banks have also 
been given freedom to close branches in urban, semi-
urban and metropolitan centers and for conversion of 
rural branches into satellite offices. In 1994 it was 
decided to give freedom to open branches to banks 
fulfilling certain criteria viz. net owned funds of Rs. 100 
crore, three year track record of net profits, 8% Capital 
adequacy ratio and percentage of gross NPAs to total 
advances not exceeding 15%. 
Foreign banks: 
The Committee recommended a liberal approach in 
permitting foreign banks to open either branches or 
subsidiaries as RBI considered appropriate subject to 
minimum assigned capital and reciprocity. Joint ventures 
between foreign banks and local banks could also be 
permitted. 
The RBI has allowed entry of foreign banks as 
branches subject to reciprocity and other prudential 
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considerations. Foreign banks/finance companies are 
also permitted to invest upto 20% as a technical 
collaborator or (within the overall 40% ceiling) in a new 
private sector bank, subject to Government approval, 
provided the foreign bank does not have presence in 
India. Foreign equity in new Indian private banks has also 
been allowed. Joint ventures between foreign and local 
banks in non-banking financial services are also allowed 
in accordance with the foreign investment policy. Since 
January 1992, 19 new foreign banks with a total of 47 
branches have been allowed. 
The Committee had recommended that the foreign 
banks should be subject to same requirements as are 
applicable to domestic banks and in case of constraints. 
If the foreign banks are unable to fulfil certain 
requirements such as targeted credit the Reserve Bank 
should work out alternative methods. It had accordingly 
been made mandatory for the foreign banks in April 
1993 to achieve the minimum target of 32% of net bank 
credit for priority sector lending, by March 1994. Within 
the target of 32% two sub-targets in respect of advances 
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(a) to small scale sector (minimum of 10%), and (b) 
exports (minimum of 12%) have been fixed. They are 
exempted from targeted credit in respect of agricultural 
advances. 
Foreign operations of Indian banks: The Committee 
had recommended rationalization of foreign operations of 
Indian banks. While the SBI's international operations 
could continue and even be strengthened, other Indian 
banks with the largest presence abroad could jointly set 
up one or more subsidiaries to take over their existing 
branches abroad. It had also suggested that larger Indian 
banks could be permitted to acquire smaller banks abroad 
to increase their presence. 
This recommendation has not been implemented. 
Autonomy Measures-Recruitment and Creation of 
Posts: 
The Committee had recommended that individual 
banks should be free to make their own recruitment of 
officers and wherever appropriate, banks could 
voluntarily come together to have a joint recruitment 
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system for officers. As regards clerical cadres, the 
present system of Banking Services Recruitment Boards 
(BSRBs) could continue. It had also recommended that 
guidelines, which relate to matters of internal 
administration such as creation and categorization of 
posts, promotion procedures and similar matters should 
be rescinded. 
Government of India announced in 1997 a package 
of autonomy to public sector banks fulfilling certain 
criteria viz. capital adequacy of more than 8%, net profit 
during the last three years, net NPA level below 9%, 
minimum owned funds of Rs. 100 crores. In terms of this 
package banks fulfilling the criteria would be allowed to 
recruit specialized officers and also undertake campus 
recruitment for partly meeting their requirements of 
probationary officers. The boards of banks have been 
given powers to decide their own policy in respect of 
creation, abolition, upgradation/modification of posts 
upto the level of DGMs. 
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Supervisory Authority: 
The Committee had recommended that duality of 
control over the banking system, between Reserve Bank 
and the Banking Division of the Ministry of Finance 
should end and that the Reserve Bank should be the 
primary agency for regulation. The supervisory function 
over banks and financial institutions should however be 
• 
hives off to a separate authority to operate as quasi 
autonomou.s body under the aegis of Reserve Bank but 
which should be separate from other central banking 
functions of the Reserve Bank. 
This recommendation has been implemented in a 
somewhat different manner. The Board for Financial 
Supervision (BFS) under the aegis of the Reserve Bank 
with four members drawn froni the Reserve Bank Board 
and serviced by a separate Department of Banking 
Supervision has been constituted. An Expert Advisory 
Council has been set up to advise the BFS on various 
policy matters. 
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Appointment of CEOs/Board Members: 
Laying stress on the depoliticisation of 
appointments for the post of CEOs and Board 
membership of public sector banl<s and financial 
institutions, the Committee had recommended that such 
appointments could be based on a convention of the 
Government accepting the recommendations of a group 
of eminent persons who could be invited by the Governor 
of the Reserve Bank of India to make recommendations 
for appointments of CMDs of banks and Board members 
of banks. 
Government of India has set up an Appointments 
Board for board level appointments in public sector 
banks. This Board which is chaired by the Governor, 
Reserve Bank of India makes recommendations to the 
Government for appointment of Chief Executives and 
Executive Directors in nationalized banks and the Chief 
Executives of financial institutions. The selection by the 
board is based on professional experience and expertise 
* 
in the relevant fields. The other members of the Board 
are Finance Secretary. Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank 
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of India, a management expert and a banking expert, 
Special Secretary (Banking)/Additional Secretary 
(Banking) is the member Secretary. 
Development Financial Institutions: 
Tiie Committee liad recommended that the system 
recommended for commercial blanks in the matter of 
appointment of Chief Executive Officer and the Board 
should apply to DFIs also. The present system of 
consortium lending should be dispensed with and in its 
place a system of syndication or participation in lending 
should be introduced. The Committee had recommended 
that commercial banks should be encouraged to provide 
term finance to industries while DFIs should increasingly 
engage in core working capital. The system of cross 
holding of equity and cross representation on the Boards 
of DFIs should be done away with. The Committee had 
recommended that IDBl should retain only its apex 
refinancing role and its direct lending function should be 
hived off to a separate entity. The infected portion of 
DFIs portfolio should be handed over to ARF. 
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With regard to appointment of Chairmen & 
Managing Directors (CMDs) of DFIs, an Appointment 
Board with the Governor. RBI as Chairman has been 
constituted (vide paragraph 16 abvove). The stipulation 
relating to formulation of compulsory consortium has 
been abolished. DFIs are resorting to 
syndication/participation in lending. As regards DFIs 
providing core working capital and commercial banks 
participating in term finance, a gradual shift is taking 
place in the lending pattern of DFIs and banks as 
envisaged by the Committee. The ceiling imposed on the 
Banking system for grant of term loans for any single 
project was removed in September, 1997. Banks are now 
free to sanction term loans to all projects within the 
overall ceiling of prudential exposure norms. As regards 
the recommendation regarding cross holding of equity 
and cross representation on Boards of DFIs, there has 
been no change in the absolute amount of equity held by 
Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) in Industrial 
Finance Corporation of India Ltd. (IFCI). However, after 
the equity of IFCI went up in 1993, the percentage share 
of equity held by IDBI has come down to below 30% as 
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against 50% earlier. IDBI continues to appoint its 
nominees on tlie Board of IFCI. IDBI is also represented 
on the Board of Export Import Bank of India (Exim 
Bank). Similarly the recommendation relating to transfer 
of the infected portfolio of DPI to ARF has not been 
implemented as ARF has not been set up. . 
It was recommended that State Level Institutions 
should maintain distance from State Governments; an 
action plan to ensure that they function on business 
principle, prudential norms, etc. be implemented in 3 
years. 
This has not been implemented totally. However, 
State Level Financial Institutions have since been 
subjected to prudential norms by IDBI. 
It was recommended that DFIs should extend 
support to existing management with good track record 
in cases of attempted corporate take-overs. Institutions 
should exercise their individual professional management. 
The DFIs are generally following the practice 
suggested by the Committee. 
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It was recommended that DFIs are no longer eligble 
to be considered as SLR asset for bank. DFIs are 
therefore meeting almost their entire requirements of 
funds at market related interest rates. Concessional 
assistance from RBI (LTO) Fund is now available only to 
Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) out 
of repayment is being made by IDBI. Government 
guaranteed bond facility is now available only to 
Industrial Investment Bank of India Ltd. (IIBI) (formerly 
Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India (IRBI) and SIDBI 
besides. National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (NABARD) and National Housing Bank 
(NHB). 
Capital Markets Regulation: 
The recommendations relating to capital markets 
have been almost entirely implemented. Securities and 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has been vested with 
powers under the SEBI Act 1992. The focus of the 
Regulations by SEBi has been on orderly development of 
the capital market. The norms relating to issue of shares 
by corporates has been rationalised subject to compliance 
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with disclosure norms and investor protection guidelines 
formulated by SEBI. Under the powers vested with SEBI 
under the SEBI Act. It has formulated guidelines on 
disclosure requirements and investor protection and due 
diligence norms for merchant banks, portfolio 
management, regulations for mutual funds etc. Foreign 
Institutional Investors (FIIs) have also opened the capital 
market for portfolio management. 
Supervision of new institutions like merchant 
banks, mutual funds: 
The recommendations in this regard have been 
accepted. Under the power vested with SEBI under the 
SEBI Act 1992. SEBI has formulated guidelines on 
merchant banks, mutual funds, venture capital 
companies, etc. With a view to bringing non-banking 
financial companies under an effective supervisory frame 
work, the RBI Act has been amended in 1997 and the 
RBI has recently formulated a fresh set of comprehensive 
guidelines for regulations/supervision of Non Banking 
Finance Companies (NBFCs). 
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With a view to giving sharper focus to supervision 
over these companies, the RBI has set up a separate 
department viz. Department of Non-banking Supervision, 
which would undertake both on-site and off-site 
surveillance over these institutions. 
Sequencing of reforms: 
This recommendation, that the reforms should be 
properly sequenced has been accepted. Deregulation of 
interest rates undertaken during the last 5-6 years has 
been phased in such a manner keeping in view the 
Committee's recommendations. Other recommendations 
such as with regard to prudential norms have also been 
implemented in a sequenced manner. 
Overall assessment: 
It is perhaps somewhat early to assess the impact of 
the reforms, considering that the process was initiated 
only in 1992 and has been implemented in phases. Yet 
even at this early stage one can discern some positive 
developments. 
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One of the significant areas of improvement has 
been the greater accuracy and transparency in respect of 
banl<s financial statements. The acceptance of the 
recommendations with regard to bringing Indian 
accounting standards closer to internationally accepted 
norms, coupled with requirements of fuller disclosure on 
sensitive aspects of operations have rendered financial 
statements of banks more credible and transparent. The 
refinement of accounting practices and disclosure 
requirements to bring them fully in line with 
internationally accepted norms in this regard has to be an 
on-going process. 
All but two public sector banks as on March 31 , 
1997 met the enhanced minimum capital adequacy 
ratios. This contrasts with the position in March 1993 
when as many as 26 public sector banks had not attained 
the prescribed minimum CRAR of 8%. Only 4 Indian 
private sector banks out of 34 were still to meet the 
target in March 1997. All the new private sector banks as 
well as foreign banks have fully compiled with the 
minimum ratios. 
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The application of prudential norms on income 
recognition, stricter definition of NPAs and the revised 
format for classification and related provisioning since 
1992-93 have had the result of some banks showing net 
losses and consequent erosion in their net worth in the 
earlier years. This is not so much because of an actual 
deterioration in the quality of their operations in the 
period but a reflection of the true state of affairs as a 
result of strict accounting and provisioning norms. 
Losses, which were not being revealed earlier because of 
the absence of strict requirements relating to accounting 
and provisioning norms, have now been brought out. The 
definition of NPAs has been made progressively more 
stringent. Despite this, gross NPAs of the public sector 
banks in absolute amounts have not shown much change, 
rising from somewhat over Rs. 39,000 crores at the end 
of March 1993 to around Rs. 43,500 crores in March 
1997 with the proportion to total advance coming down 
in this period from 23.2% to 17.8%. Provisioning 
requirements against the substandard assets have also 
been progressively applied since 1994 in March 1997. 
More interestingly, a frequency distribution of net NPAs 
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of banks indicates that those public sector banks having 
net NPAs of above 15% of their loan portfolio declined 
sharply from 10 to 1 in this period while the number of 
banks with net NPAs below 10% has increased to 17 in 
March 1997 as against 6 in March 1994. 
These developments are also reflected in 
profitability trends. During the reform period, gross 
profits to total assets have risen for the public sector 
banks in the aggregate. The State Bank Group has 
improved its profitability ratio (gross profit as a 
percentage to total assets) from 1.8% during 1992-93 to 
2.18% during 1996-97. In the case of nationalized 
banks, the corresponding percentage are 0.42 and 1.26. 
The profitability levels are also related to the interest 
income spread with the percentage for all scheduled 
banks going up between 1992-93 and 1996-97 from 2.5 
to 3.22. The performance of the State Bank Group is 
particularly significant, followed by that of the new Indian 
private sector banks. However, intermediation costs as 
percentage of total assets still remain high. In the Indian 
banking system, a major component of this being the 
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wage bills. The need for enhanced provisions has also 
resulted in an increase in the intermediation costs. High 
intermediation costs have to be considered also in 
relation to movement in productivity per employee. This 
still remains low particularly for the public sector banks. 
This is an area, which continues to call for attention. The 
emphasis on efficiency and productivity is necessary for 
effecting cost economies and needs to be continued so as 
to give Indian banks, particularly the public sector banks, 
greater ability in meeting the competitive challenges from 
newer Indian banks and foreign banks. 
The strength of these competitive challenges facing 
the Indian banks is reflected also in a measure of banking 
disintermediation that has marked developments in the 
last five years. The rate of growth of aggregate deposits 
of scheduled commercial banks declined from 19.8% in 
1991-92 to 16.5% in the year ended March 1997. Even 
abstracting from the impact of some slowing down of 
overall monetary aggregates, the differential performance 
in deposit mobilization by the banks on the one hand and 
by non banking finance companies and other non bank 
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financial intermediaries like mutual funds is significant 
and suggests the need to persist with efforts at cost 
reduction so as to be able to meet competitive pressures. 
Post reforms development in nationalised banks: 
The recommendations of the Narasimham 
Committee-I in 1991 provided the blueprint for the first-
generation reforms of the financial sector. The period 
1992-97 witnessed the laying of the foundations for 
reforms in the banking system. This period saw the 
implementation of prudential norms pertaining to capital 
adequacy, income recognition, and asset classification 
and provisioning, exposure norms, etc. While these 
reforms were underway, cataclysmic changes were taking 
place in the world economy, coinciding with the 
movement towards global integration of financial 
services. Against such backdrop, the Report of the 
Narasimham Committee-II in 1998 provided the roadmap 
for the 'second generation' reforms process. Two points 
are worth nothing at this juncture. First, as mentioned 
above, financial sector reforms were undertaken early in 
the reforms cycle, and secondly, the reforms in the 
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financial sector were initiated in a well-structured, 
sequenced and phased manner with cautious and proper 
sequencing; mutually reinforcing measures; 
complementary between reforms in banking sector and 
changes in fiscal, external and monetary policies; 
developing financial infrastructure; and developing 
financial markets. 
By way of visible impact, one finds the presence of 
a diversified banking system. What is more important is 
that apart from growth of banks and commercial banking, 
there are various other financial intermediaries including 
mutual funds. NBFCs in various fields (equipment leasing, 
hire purchase, etc.), primary dealers, factors, housing 
finance companies, to mention a few. Another important 
aspect is that while the Nationalised Bank have played a 
significant role in promoting these new institutions, the 
contribution of private initiative is equally significant. 
The other noteworthy developments are: 
(a) Financial regulation through statutory pre-emptions 
has been lowered, while stepping up prudential 
regulations at the same time. 
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(b) Interest rates have been deregulated, allowing banks 
the freedom to determine deposit and lending rates. 
Currently, on the deposit side, the interest rate on 
saving deposits is administered (presently fixed at 4 
per cent); whereas, on the lending side, while sub-
PLR lending has been permitted, the maximum 
spread is restricted to 4 per cent over the PLR of 
each bank and there is ceiling of PLR on small loans 
upto Rs. 2 lakh; 
(c) Steps have been initiated to strengthen nationalised 
banks through increasing their autonomy, 
recapitalisation etc; several banks' capital base has 
been written off and some have even returned 
capital to the government . It was recognized that 
restoration of health of the banking system required 
both a 'stock' solution (i.e., restoration of net 
worth) and a 'flow' solution (i.e. an improvement in 
future profitability). Restoration of net worth was 
achieved through capital infusions from the budget. 
Competition has been infused by allowing new 
private sector banks and more liberal entry of 
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foreign banks (as at end-March 2001 , there were 8 
new private sector banks, 23 old private sector 
banks and 42 foreign banks); 
(d) A set of micro-prudential measures have been 
stipulated to impart greater strength to the banking 
system and also, ensure their safety and soundness 
with the avowed objective of moving towards 
international best practices (capital adequacy norms, 
exposure limits, recognition rules for NPAs, 
provisioning norms, accounting rules, valuation 
norms, etc.); 
(e) Measures have also been taken to broaden the 
ownership base of Nationalised Bank; consequently, 
the private shareholding in Nationalised Bank has 
gone up. 
(f) The banking system has also witnessed greater 
levels of transparency and standards of disclosure; 
(g) As the banking system has liberalized and become 
increasingly market-oriented, the financial markets 
have been concurrently developed, while the 
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conduct of monetary policy has been tailored to 
take into account the realities of the changing 
environment (switch to indirect instruments). 
This set of measures, coupled with many others, did 
have their positive impact on the system. There has been 
considerable improvement in the profitability of the 
Nationalised Banks measured in terms of operating and 
net profits. What is equally important is the fact that the 
intermediation process has improved, as is evident from 
the ratio of net interest income to total assets of 
Nationalised Bank has declined. 
The profit of asset portfolio and also the extent of 
the net non-performing loans (NPLs) as percentage of 
total assets have shown improvement during 1996-2001. 
During this period, the supervisory strategy has 
undergone a change, moving from capacity towards 
transparency. A positive externality of the reform process 
has been the building up of the institutional architecture 
in terms of markets, and creation of enabling 
environment through technological and legal 
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infrastructure and improving the managerial competence, 
etc. 
Table 1 : 































































Note : NA - Not Available 
Source : Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in 
India, various years. 
On comparison of performance of Nationalized 
banks for three years in the past reform period, finds a 
certain convergence in performance during 92, 95 and 
98. There is a welcome increase in emphasis or non-
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interest income, banks have tended to show risk averse 
behavior by opting for risk free investment over risky 
loans. In the study compare performance of nationalised 
banks with private banks for 94-95 by using measure of 
profitability productivity and financial management. We 
find that nationalized banks lags behind from the other 
category. The RBI (1999) provides the central bank's 
perspective on how reform has imposed on Nationalised 
Banks performance. The principals finding of the review 
are -
There has been a decline in spreads (defined as net 
interest income to total assets), a widely used measure of 
efficiency in banking, and a tendency towards their 
convergence across all bank-groups, except foreign 
banks. 
— Intermediation costs as a percentage of total assets 
has also declined, especially for nationalized banks 
and new private sector banks, due largely to a 
decline in their wage costs. 
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— Capital adequacy and asset quality (measured by the 
net NPAs as percentage of net advances) have both 
improved over the period 1995-96 to 2000-2001. 
— Median profit per employee of nationalized banks 
witnessed a significant rise between 1996-97 and 
2000-2001. 
— Non-interest income to working funds rose modestly 
for-the nationalized banks. 
— The ratio of wage bill to total expenses remained at 
a high level for nationalized banks. 
— The cost to income ratio declined at the 
nationalized banks. 
Table-2 shows how the nationalized banks 
performed in respect of five key performance indicators -
interest spread, intermediation cost, non-performing 
assets, provisions and contingencies and net profit, all 
measured as a percentage of total assets over the period 
1995-96, one year before financial deregulation was 
initiated, to 1999-2000. Eyeballing the numbers, it 
should be evident that there has been an improvement in 
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every one of these indicators in 1999-2000 over 
1995-96. 
Tablc-2 
As Per Cent of 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00 
Total Assets 
Interest spread 2.92 2.97 2.78 2.77 2.67 
Intermediation cost 2.93 2.85 2.65 2.63 2.56 
Non-performing NA 3.95 3.48 3.26 3.14 
assets 
Provisions and 1.5 0.85 0.71 0.85 0.86 
contingencies 
Net Profit -0.36 0.41 0.62 0.37 0.44 . 
Sourcettrend and progress of banking in India(various 
year) 
However, it is not as if there has been a clear trend 
towards improvemerit over the entire period - a clear 
trend is discernible in the most recent period of 1996-97 
to 1999-2000 (which, perhaps explains why the RBI's 
evaluation has been confined to this period), although 
even in this period net profit has tended to move both 
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ways. In the initial years, we see ups and downs in all 
indicators as banks struggled to come to grips with 
deregulation. 
In the more recent period, the interest spread has 
declined, which is a sign of improved efficiency in the 
system. So have intermediation cost, non-performing 
assets and provisions. Profitability improved sharply over 
the initial period. 
In nationalized banks, one finds an improvement in 
the indicators, with a clear trend in most indicators in the 
most recent period . The net profit to asset ratio of 0.44 
is close to the figure of 0.5, which must be regarded as 
healthy. 
As there is a great deal of talk about the 'poor 
health' of nationalized banks, it is worth comparing the 
profitability of nationalized banks with that of banks 
elsewhere. As per data provided by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS 1999), return on assets, 
defined as profit before tax, ranged from -0.8 to 1.07 in 
the Euro area in 1998 with most countries hovering 
around the 0.5 mark even on a pre-tax basis. In the 
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Scandinavian countries, return on assets was in the range 
of 0.9 to 0.95, again on a pre-tax basis. In the UK, 
returns were higher at 1.19, while Japan recorded a 
miserable -0.74. The only outliners were US banks (1.42) 
and Australia (1.39). The return of assets at nationalized 
banks thus does not compare unfavorably with that of 
banks elsewhere. 
The net profit to total assets ratio of the 
nationalized banks too would move from 0.44 to close to 
0.50. I find that nine out of total nationalised banks 
showed losses in 2000-01 (eight in 1999-2000) after 
adjustment of interest on recapitalisation Bonds, that is, 
the bonds in which the banks invested the recapitalisation 
funds they received from government. The implication is 
that the aggregate profitability numbers for this category 
are deceptive. There are two ways of responding to this 
contention. 
A purely accounting response would be that if the 
equity provided to the banks is to be used in the 
denominator in computing return on assets, then it is 
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only appropriate that the relevant income also be 
included in the numerator. 
But if we wish to move away from scoring points in 
accounting terms, we could argue that at least some of 
the banks could have raised capital when they needed it 
had they been allowed or enabled to do so; perhaps, 
some might have had to under-price their issues, but they 
could have raised capital all the same. Had they raised 
capital on their own, they might have invested the 
proceeds in '.higher return avenues such as loans instead 
of in bonds yielding around 10 per cent. So, the profits 
of the nine banks in question, it could be argued, are 
understated by adding interest on recapitalisation bonds. 
Either, way there is little reason to evaluate the banks' 
performance by excluding such interest. 
Comparing, first, 1999-2000 with 1995-96, we find 
that there is an improvement in net profit as a 
percentage of total profits of 0.29 percentage points. 
This is a huge decline in spread - entirely to be expected 
in the wake of deregulation. - which has been offset by a 
decline in intermediation cost and, more significantly, by 
173 
a decline in provisions and contingencies as tiie level of 
non-performing assets came down. 
When we compare 1999-2000 with 1991-92, the 
first year of reform, the picture changes somewhat. 
There is a bigger jump in profitability, 1.57 percentage 
points. An increase in spread has contributed to this 
jump. Provisions decreased substantially - understandable 
since these were very large in the first two years of 
deregulation when banks' balance sheets were being 
cleaned up - and a modest decline in intermediation cost. 
Putting together the pictures for the two years, 
three points are worth making. First, relative to 
deregulation, there has been an improvement in 
efficiency in the banking system as a whole by the decline 
in interest spread (Table-2). Two, a decrease in 
provisions has driven the increase in profitability. 
Thirdly, when we consider only the deregulation period, 
an increase in spreads has also contributed to improved 
profitability. In other words, the spread took a big knock 
at the onset of deregulation but has looked up since 
although it has stayed below the pre-deregulation level. 
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The recovery in spreads over the deregulation 
period is worth remarking because, in general, the 
decline in spreads that follows deregulation is not only 
steep but hard to reverse. Typically, banks respond to the 
squeeze on spreads and hence on profitability by taking 
on bigger risks, and this ultimately destabilises the 
banking system. In India, the decline in spreads has been 
contained. By giving banks more time to get their acts 
together, this factor has contributed to stability in 
banking. 
The decline in spreads has been contained because 
disintermediation, which typically accompanies financial 
reform, has been aborted in the Indian context. 
Companies are unable to use the capital market as an 
alternative to banks, hence the downward pressure on 
loan yields is less than it might have been if the capital 
market had taken off. 
More importantly, deposit growth has not been 
threatened because depositors are reluctant to desert 
banks in favor of capital market instruments, given their 
experience with the stock market. Bank deposits as a 
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proportion of GDP have risen from 40.3 per cent of GDP 
in 1990-91 to 41.7 per cent in 1999-2000; a stronger 
indicator of aborted disinter-mediation is the decline in 
the ratio of shares and debentures in saving of the 
household sector from 14.3 per cent in 1990-91 to 2.5 
per cent in 1989-99. 
(ii) Evaluation of Relative Performance of 
Nationalized Banks 
We have seen that nationalized banks have 
improved their performance over the reforms period. But 
how have they done in relative terms. To answer this 
question, we begin by comparing the performance of 
nationalized banks with private sector banks (which refers 
to domestic banks in the private sector). 
In the first two years of deregulation, nationalized 
(§&< banks profitability was severely eTfectedy by the new 
accounting and prudential norms and the consequent 
cleaning up of balance sheets. Private sector banks does 
not carried) the same kind of baggage from the past, 
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hence the impact on their performance was not as 
severe. 
Comparing the performance of nationalized banks 
with private sector banks, we find the latter doing better 
on three out of four parameters. The only parameter on 
which the nationalized banks does better is the net 
interest income/total assets or what is called the 
'spread'. In this comparison, the nationalized banks does 
better on the ratio of intermediation costs to total assets. 
The private sector banks include the 'new private 
sector banks' that have been in operation for six years or 
less. As non-performing assets tend to show up over a 
longer time horizon, the NPAs of private sector banks 
may be understated and hence profitability overstated. 
Further, in the years under review, income at many of 
these banks has been boosted by asset sales. It is a moot 
point, therefore, whether a comparison with this 
category can be used to draw any meaningful inferences. 
Table-3 represent the results of the comparison of 
nationalised banks with the old private sector banks. 
Nationalized banks do better on one parameter, interest 
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spread, worse on profitability and there is no significant 
difference in respect of tfie two other parameters. 
Table 3 
Comparison of Performance Between Nationalized 
Banks and Old Private Sector Banks, 1 9 9 5 - 9 6 to 
1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 0 



















Note: (1) Figures in bold indicate significance at 5 
percent level of confidence. 
Key: NP/TA = Profit after tax/total assets; Intcost/TA 
= Intermediation cost/total assets; NII/TA = Net 
interest income/ total assets; NPA/T = non-performing 
assets/total assets 
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To summarizes the results of the different 
comparisons attempted above: 
— When we compare the performance of nationalized 
banks as a whole with respect to private sector 
banks over the period 1995-96 to 1999-2000, we 
find nationalized banks performance to be clearly 
inferior - this is probably the basis for the criticism 
of nationalized banks performance that is often 
heard in public discourse. 
— However, when we fine-tune the comparison, we 
find the picture changing. A comparison of 
nationalized banks with old private sector banks 
shows the gap in performance narrowing. 
— Juxtaposing the above with the improvement in 
performance of nationalized banks over the reform 
period it is fair to suggest that nationalized banks 
are catching up with private sector banks when an 
appropriate comparison is attempted. In short, in 
the wake of reform, nationalized banks have 
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-5 
Case Study of 
Canara Bank 
CASE STUDY OF CANARA BANK 
History of Canara Bank 
On the 1** of July 1906 the Bank was founded as the Canara 
Hindu Permanent fun Ltd. under the leadership of Sri. Subha Rao 
Pai with the help of a group of small businessmen and professionals 
of South Kanara who came together and founded the Canara 
Hindu permanent fund ltd. the start the prime objective was to keep 
the interest rate low and to target the services to the small men. 
The Early Years 
The early years of the bank were so modest that the first safe 
of the Bank was actually borrowed from a Director. The first 
balance sheet showed a capital of Rs. 50,000/- Deposits of Rs. 
42,000/- and advances of Rs. 84,000/-.From such a humble 
beginning the Bank grew gradually . In 1910, the name was 
changed to Canara bank ltd. The country faced a Banking crisis in 
1913-14 as a result of the First World War. In 1922-23 several 
Banks collapsed but Canara Bank withstood all vicissitudes in 
business and Banking spheres. 
The process of more balanced growth started in 1926 when 
the Bank commenced opening Branches in the neighbouring States 
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and distant provinces, thus widening the area of operation. In 
1926, the first Branch at Karkala was opened, followed by Cochin. 
In 1928 the Mumbai Branch was opened. 
Rapid strides 
The shifting of the General Manager's Office from Mangalore 
to Mumbai in 1942 was an important landmark in the Bank's 
development. This facilitated the Bank in gaining more national 
perspective and a permanent foothold in the financial capital of the 
country. The period that followed witnessed the fastest rate of 
growth ever since the Bank's inception. The early fifties saw the 
Bank making organizational changes to meet the growth and to 
keep abreast of the expansion. In 1953, the Bank set up its Foreign 
Department at Mumbai. In the same year the Bank took the lead in 
recognising the trade union and its employees. Ever since, the 
bilateral negotiations have been a regular feature..At its Golden 
Jubilee celebration in 1956, the Bank had already developed a 
fairly well spread network of 51 Branches. The decade was marked 
by the phenomenal growth, with deposits and advances multiplying 
several times over. It strengthened the Banking structure in South 
India and emerged as one among the large Nationalised Banks in 
the country. In 1954, the administrative offices were shifted from 
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Mangalore to Bangalore. The ten years period from 1956 -66; 
between its Golden and Diamond Jubilees , was one of phenomenal 
growth. In 1963, the Bank moved into its own building. The 
Officers'association gained recognition in 1970. 
Performance of Canara Bank: 
The Bank reached Rs. 1 crore mark in the year 1942 and in 
1966 a deposit target of Rs. 120 crores was achieved. It took 
roughly 60 years for the Bank to mobilise the first Rs. 100 crore 
deposits, while the next Rs. 100 crores was added in just 4 years. 
Since 1970, tiie depoat grcwth trend of Canara Bank is as foBcws: 





































Rs. 200 crore 
Rs. 400 crore 
Rs. 800 crore 
Rs. 1600 crore 
Rs. 3037 crore 
Rs. 5628 crore 
Rs. 7878 crore 
Rs. 10923 crore 
Rs. 12578.50 crore 
Rs. 14238.15 crore 
Rs. 16466.07 crore 
Rs. 19838.94 crore 
Rs. 22475.11 crore 
Rs. 26243.24 crore 
Rs. 31445.01 crore 
Rs. 41959.00 crore 
Rs. 48001.00 crore 
Rs. 59070.00 crore 
Source: Banking Odessey, A history of canara bank, by M.V. Kamath, Annual 
Report, Canara Bank (Various year). 
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Branches: 
The first Branch was opened nearly 20 years after the 
inception of the Bank. The Branch network reached the century 
mark in 1961. It took roughly 55 years to establish the network of 
the first 100 Branches, while the next 100 Branches were opened 
within only two years. 
The branch development from 1976 till 2001 is given as 
follows: 





















Source:banking odessey , a history of Canara hank by M.V. 
Kamath, Annual Report, Canara Bank (Various Year). 
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Staff: 
At the time of the inception of the bank, the staff strength 
was 4 (1 Secretary, 1 Clerk and 2 Bill Collectors). The strength rose 
to 1000 in the year 1950 and to 2000 in the year 1960 and 
subsequently to 10,000 staff members in the year 1971.By the end 
of 1980, the staff strength was more than 30,000 and during 
2000-2001 staff strength reached to 58357 employees. 
Other Performances: 
In the sixties, the Bank expanded the network of Branches to 
Northern States of the country and gained a national stature. By the 
end of 1962, Canara Bank emerged as the largest bank in South 
India. By 1968, it was the sixth largest Bank in the country. And in 
1974, the fifth largest Bank in India. In 1985 Canara Bank was 
third among 20 nationalized banks 
In 25 years of international Banking, the Rs. 1000 crores 
turnover target in foreign business has been crossed. Now Canara 
Bank is among the leading 363 Banks in the world. The Bank 
extended a helping hand to weaker Banks and many of them 
sought mergers with it. 
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The period from 1961 to 1985 witnessed the Bank taking 
over the following Banks: 
1961... The Bank of Kerala Limited, Trivandrum; The Seasia 
Midland Bank Limited, Alloppey; The C Raghunathmal 
Bank Limited, Hyderabad; The Trivandrum Permanent 
Bank Limited, Trivandrum. 
1963... The Sri Poomathrayeesa Vilasa, Bank Limited, 
Tripunithura; The Arnad Bank Limited, Tiruchirapally; 
The Cochin Commercial Bank Limited, Cochin; The 
Pandyan Bank Limited, Madurai. 
1964... The Pollachi Union Bank Limited, Pollachi. 
1968... The Pangal Nayak Bank Limited, Udupi. 
1985... The Lakshmi Commercial Bank Limited, having its 
Head Office at New Delhi with 230 Branches mainly 
spread over the States of Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, 
Punjab and Delhi merged with Canara Bank. Roughly 
3500 employees of the Lakshmi Commercial Bank 
Limited have become members of "CANARA BANK" 
family. 
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These mergers are important events not only in the history of 
Canara Bank but also in the Banking industry as well. For, these are 
the biggest mergers that ever took place in the Banking Industry of 
our country. 
Banking beyond the nation's frontiers: 
Over the years, the flow of remittances from abroad, 
especially the Middle East, has gone up manifold. All along the 
Bank was placing increasing reliance on the overseas 
correspondents. To bestow singular attention to this aspect of 
channelling the flow of inward remittances, and to tap the vast 
potential in the foreign exchange business, the Bank assumed 
management responsibilities of three Exchange Companies - AI-
Razouki Exchange Company at Dubai, Canara Exchange Company 
at Kuwait, Eastern Exchange & Financial Organisation at Doha.The 
first Branch abroad was opened in 1983 in London, the financial 
heart of the world and a deposit- taking Indo-Hong Kong Finance 
Company was opened in Hong Kong in 1985. Review and changes 
were made in the organisational structure from time to time to meet 
the challenges arising out of the changes and the growth. The 
Bank has shown its awareness of this quite well. 
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The principle on which the Bank has been working is 
centralized planning and decentralized administration. Progressive 
decentralization backed by delegation of adequate authority is a 
significant characteristic of the Bank's present working model. 
Impact of financial sector reforms on Canara Bank 
performance: 
Table - 3 
Progress at a Glance 
(Rs. in crores, 1 crore= 10 million, 100 crorG= 1 billion) 
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Canara Bank recorded satisfactory performance in 1996-97 
under various business parameters. Tiie emphasis laid on deposit 
mobilization during the year 96-97 has resulted in the Bank 
crossing the Rs. 31000 crore marks in global deposits. Though the 
credit expansion was subdued, the priority sector advances-
continued to record higher growth, constituting 49.5% of net credit 
as at March 1997.As suggested by RBI in its Inspection Report, the 
Bank provided fully for all the accounts listed in the Report. Inspite 
of the increase in the NPAs and in subsequent provisions, the Bank 
posted a net profit of Rs. 147.40 crores for the year 1996-97 and 
declared a dividend of Rs. 23.90 crores to the Government. 
The Bank established 71 new branches of which 22 were 
specialized branches. Fully computerized branches exceeded the 
200 mark during the year 1998-99. The first ever ATM networks 
with intercity and intracity connectivity between Bangalore and New 
Delhi was launched. 'Sugam Anywhere Money', a self-remittance 
facility, having all the conveniences for the customers, and the 
Travelers' Cheque was also introduced. Canara Bank improved its 
performance significantly under various parameters during 1998-
99. The Bank's global deposits posted a 10 per cent growth so as 
to reach a level of Rs. 41959 crore. Global advances went up to 
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Rs. 19530 crore, registering a 16% growth. Foreign business 
turnover of tiie Bank, notwithstanding the sluggish world trade, 
increased to Rs. 39859 crore, recording a growth rate of 17 per 
cent. Productivity, measured in terms of business per employee, 
registered a 15 per cent growth and was of the order of Rs. 117 
lakh Profit per employee- improved to Rs. 0.43 lakh in 1998-99 
from Rs. 0.39 lakh in 1997-98.0wned funds of the bank increased 
to Rs. 2413 crore, posted an addition of Rs 110 crore during the 
year 98-99. During the same year, the Bank raised sub-ordinated 
debt amounting to Rs. 500 crore, resulting in the augmenting of 
Tier II capital. The capital, adequacy ratio of the Bank rose to 10.96 
per cent as at March 31, 1999. 
Non-Performing Assets of the Bank as percentage of its net 
advances declined further from 7.52 per cent as at March 1998 to 
7.09 per cent as at March 1999.Operating profits of the bank 
recorded a noteworthy growth during the year. Net profit of the 
bank increased to Rs. 225.06 crore, registering a growth of 
ll%.The Bank has marked 81 per cent of its investments and 
other approved securities to marljet as against the minimum 
requirement of 70%.The Bank has ensured that all critical hardware 
and software systems are Y2K compliant, as advised by the Reserve 
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Bank of India and the Indian Banks' Association. The Bank 
successfully organised the Twenty First Bank Economists' 
Conference (BECON'98) during December 1998 at Bangalore. 
Capital and reserves: 
The Bank's capital as at March 1997 remained at the 
previous year's level of Rs. 484.82 crores. The reserves increased 
to Rs. 1563.62 crores, the addition during the year 97-98 being 
Rs. 117.76 crores. The owned funds of the Bank went up to Rs. 
2048.44 crores as at the end of March 1997 from Rs. 1930.69 
crores as at March 1996. The Bank's owned funds went up to Rs. 
2413 crore as at the end of March 1999, compared to Rs. 2303 
crore as at March 1998, owned funds rose to Rs. 2596 crore in 
1999-2000, compared with Rs. 2413 crore in 1998-99 in the 
subsequent growth of the owned funds increased to Rs. 2814 crore 
in 2000-01, compared with Rs. 2596 crore in 1999-00. While 
capital remained at the preceding year's level of Rs. 578 crore, the 
accretion to reserves during 2000-01 amounted to Rs. 219 crore. 
Accretion to reserves amounted to Rs. 183 crore, while capital 
remained at the preceding year's level of Rs. 578 crore The 
Bank's capital, as at March 31, 1999, remained at the same level 
of Rs. 578 crore as it was at the end of 1997-98. Reserves 
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however, moved up to Rs. 1835 crore addition during the year 
being Rs. 110 crore.The Bank transferred a sum of Rs. 23.90 
crores to the Government from the profits, for the year 1996-97 
while transferred a sum of Rs. 45.06 crore in the year 1998-99 
and Rs. 48.05 crore, as dividend, for the year 1999-2000. and 
during 2000-01 the Bank transferred a sum of Rs. 57.05 crore, as 
dividend, to the Government, from the profits. 
The capital adequacy ratio of the Bank worked out to 
10.17%, as compared to 10.38% as at the end of March 
1996.Capital adequacy ratio of the Bank worked out to 10.96 per 
cent as at March 31, 1999, up from 9.54 per cent as at the end of 
March 1998. Capital to Risk weighted Assets Ratio of the Bank 
stood at 9.64% compared with 10.96% as at the end of March 
1999. Ratio of the Bank's capital to its risk weighted assets 
increased to 9.84% compared with 9.64% as at the end of March 
2000. During the year, the Bank raised Rs. 300 crore Tier II 








(Rs. in crores, 
Tabic - 4 
1 crore= 10 million, 100 crore= 1 billion) 


























Capital & Reserve (Own Fund) 
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on the basis of our study, we conclude that there is a significant 
change in capital and reserve (own fund) during period 1996-2001 




The Bank's global deposits rose to Rs. 31445 crores as on 
March 1997 from Rs. 26243 crores as at March 1996, registering 
a growth rate of 19.8%. Signifying a growth rate of 16 per cent, 
average domestic deposits of the Bank went up to Rs. 36,058 
crore as at the end of March 1999 as against Rs. 31,115 crore 
recorded for the year ended March 1998. Domestic deposits of the 
Bank also grew at 23.4% to reach Rs. 57,662 crore as at the end 
of March 2001. Average deposits (excluding bank deposits) rose 
from Rs. 41,549 crore to Rs. 48,103 crore, recording a growth 
rate of 16%. Non-Resident deposits increased from Rs. 3879 
crores as at March 1996 to Rs. 4984 crores as at March 1997, 
recording a growth rate of 28.5%. Global deposits of the Bank 
grew at 10 per cent during 1998-99 to reach Rs. 41,959 crore as 
compared to Rs. 38,045 crore recorded at the end of the 
preceding year. Demand Deposits, Savings Deposits and Term 
Deposits accounted for 14.1 per cent, 22.7 per cent, and 62.2 per 
cent respectively of the total deposits as at the end of March 1999. 
Category-wise, Demand Deposits accounted for Rs. 5722 crores. 
Saving Bank Deposits Rs. 6705 crores and Term Deposits, Rs. 




at March 31, 2000, signifying a growtli rate of 14.4%, as against 
10% registered during the preceding year. Average domestic 
deposits of the Bank also grew up by 15% to reach Rs. 41,549 
crore at the end of March 2000. Non-resident deposits mobilised by 
the Bank moved up from Rs. 6302 crore as at March 1998 to Rs. 
7589 crore at the end of financial year 1998-99, registering a 
growth of 20 per cent and moved up from Rs. 7589 crore on 
March 31, 1999 to Rs. 8918 crore as at the end of March 2000. 
Global deposits of the Bank recorded an impressive 23.1% growth 
to reach Rs. 59,070 crore as at March 2001, as against 14.4% 
growth posted during the preceding year. Non-resident deposits, as 
at March 2001, rose to Rs.-9877 crore from Rs. 8918 crore. 
Deposit accounts of the Bank, as at March 2001, stood at 223.63 
lakh. The average deposits of the Bank shot up from Rs. 21392 
crores in 1995-96 to Rs. 25716 crores during 1996-97, 
registering a^growth rate of 20.2%. Deposit accounts of the Bank 
stood at 217.6 lakh as at the end of March 1999, up from 213.5 
lakh as at the end of March 1998 Deposit accounts of the Bank, as 
at March 2000, stood at 222 lakh . 
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Table - 5 
(Rs. in crores, 1 crore= 10 million, 100 crore= 1 billion) 
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t - Test: 
Our study reveals that there is no significant increase in 




During the year, 71 new branches were opened taldng the 
total network of branches to 2262 (including London branch). 
Laying further emphasis on the market segmentation approach, 22 
specialised branches were opened during the year. With these, the 
total number of specialised branches as at March 1997 stood at 
114, comprising 16 Overseas branches, 9 Industrial Finance 
branches, 24 NRI branches, 33 SSI branches, 1 Professionals' 
branch, 12 Hi-tech Agri-finance branches, 5 Capital Market 
branches, 3 Stock Exchange branches, 4 Savings branches, 5 Asset 
Recovery Management branches, 1 Consumer Finance branch and 
1 Special Industrial Accounts branch. Population group-wise, the 
Bank had 751 rural branches, 617 semi-urban branches, 472 
urban branches and 421 metropolitan branches as at the end of 
March 1997. The Bank opened 67 new branches during 1998-99, 
taking the total number of branches to 2379 (including London 
branch). In keeping with market segmentation approach, the Bank 
opened 35 new specialised branches to meet the needs of various 
sectors. The total number of specialised branches as at March 31, 
1999, increased to 171, comprising 45 specialised savings 
branches, 37 SSI branches, 28 NRI branches, 18 Overseas 
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branches, 12 Hi-tech Agricultural Finance branches, 10 Industrial 
Financial branches, 5 branches each for Asset Recovery 
Management and Capital Market, 4 branches each for Stock 
Exchange and Corporate Services, one branch each for 
Professionals, Consumer Finance and Special Industrial Accounts. 
As regards category-wise number of branches, the Bank, as at the 
end of March, 1999, had 760 rural branches, 637 semi-urban 
branches, 510 urban branches, 471 metropolitan branches and one 
branch in London. The number of extension counters as at March 
1999, stood at 190 as compared with 179 as at the end of 1997-
98. Signifying greater thrust on consolidation of the 'existing 
branch network, the Bank opened 21 branches during the year, 
taking the tally of branches to 2397, including its branch at 
London. As part of the branch rationalization exercise, the Bank 
merged business of 4 of its branches with nearby branches during 
the year. Population group wise, the Bank, as at March 31, 2000, 
had 766 rural branches, 636 semi-urban branches, 512 urban 
branches and 482 metropolitan • branches. The number of 
Extension Counters stood at 194. In further pursuance of the 
market segmentation approach, the Bank opened 9 specialized 
branches during the year, comprising 6 specialized savings 
branches, 1 NRI branch, 1 consumer finance branch and 1 
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overseas branch. Towards nationalizing its branch network, the 
Bank brought under close scrutiny even the specialised branches, 
leading to conversion of 5 specialised branches into regular 
branches. As at March 2000, the Bank had 175 specialised 
branches, comprising 52 specialised savings branches, 37 SSI 
branches, 24 NRI branches, 19 overseas branches, 12 hi-tech agri-
finance branches, 10 industrial finance branches, 5 asset recovery 
management branches, 5 capital market branches, 4 stock 
exchange branches, 4 corporate service branches, 2 consumer 
finance branches and one professionals' branch. 
During the year, (1999 aldditional branches were opened by 
the Bank, taking the tally of its branches to 2405, including its 
London branch. Population group-wise, the Bank, as at March 31, 
2001, had 767 rural branches, 639 semi-urban branches, 514 
urban branches and 484 metropolitan branches. The number of 
Extension Counters and Currency Chests stood at 199 and 88 
respectively. Over the years, vigorous pursuit of market 
segmentation approach has strengthened the Bank's niche 
operations. The Bank, as at March 2001, had 173 specialised 
branches, comprising 52 specialised savings branches, 37 SSI 
branches, 24 NRI branches, 19 overseas branches, 11 hi-tech 
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agricultural finance branches, 9 industrial finance branches, 5 asset 
recovery management branches, 5 capital market branches, 4 stock 
exchange branches, 4 corporate service branches, 2 consumer 
finance branches and one professionals' branch. 
Table - 6 





















y = 70.9x + 2131.4 






t - Test: 
There is no significance change in rate of expansion of 
branches here p < .05. 
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Capital adequacy ratio: 
The capital adequacy of the Bank as on 31.03.1997 is 
10.17% (previous year 10.38%) as against the norms of 8% 
stipulated by RBI. During the year the Bank had raised funds by 
private placement of redeemable Unsecured Bonds of s. 500.00 
crores with maturities of 5 to 7 years eligible for Tier II Capital to 
further strengthen the Capital Adequacy Ratio. The capital 
adequacy of the Bank as on 31.3.1999 is 10.96% (previous year 
9.54%) as against the norm of 8% stipulated by RBI. The capital 
adequacy ratio as assessed by the Bank as at 31.3.2000 works out 
to 9.64% and as on 31.3.2001 is 9.84% as against the norm of 
9% stipulated by RBI. The Capital Adequacy Ratio has increased on 
account of plough back of profits and issue of fresh sub-ordinated 
debt instrument for Rs. 300 crores.details are given in table below; 
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Table - 7 
(Rs. in crores, 1 crore= 10 million, 100 crore= 1 billion) 
(Rupees in crores) 
1 
Total Tier 1 Capital Funds 
Total Tier 11 Capital Funds 
Total Capital Funds 
Total Risk Weiqhted Assets 
2 
Total Tier 1 Capital Funds 
Total Tier 11 Capital Funds 
Total Capital Funds 
Total Risk Weiqhted Assets 
3 
Total Tier I Capital Funds 
Total Tier 11 Capital Funds 
Total Capital Funds 
Total Risk Weiqhted Assets 
4 
Total Tier I Capital Funds 
Total Tier 11 Capital Funds 
Total capital fund 









































Source:annual report, canara bank(various year) 
The reduction in Capital Adequacy Ratio is on account of: 
a) Increase in Risk Weighted Assets by Rs. 4951.90 crores from 
Rs. 24,880.32 crores to Rs. 29,832.22 crores over the 
previous year. 
b) Deduction of Rs. 36.78 crores, out of subordinated debt 
instrument eligible for Tier-II Capital as per RBI guidelines. 
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c) Change in norms for assignment of Risk Weiglits as per RBI 
guidelines, as a result of which the Risk Weighted Assets have 
increased by Rs. 423.88 crores during the year. 
Table - 8 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (1996-2001) 
Year 
0 
































Capital Adequacy Ratio 
y = -0.082x+10.293 
R^  = 0.0832 
3 
Year 
t - Test: 
Capital Adequacy Ratio is declining significantly and level of 
significance is less then .05. 
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Net Profit: 
The Net Profit of Rs. 147.40 crores (previous year Rs. 
252.52 crores) in 96-97, Net Profit of Rs. 126.40 crores98-99, 
Rs. 285.10 crores 99-2000 Net Profit of Rs. 236.05 crore 
2000-2001 Rs. 285.10 crores has been arrived after providing for 
non-performing advances, depreciation on investments, taxation 
and contingencies/others(as a prudent measure) table below: 
TABLE-9 
Provisions & Contingencies 
(Rs. in crores, 1 crore= 10 million, 100 crore= 1 billion) 
(Rs. in crores) 
Year 
Provision for-Nori performing Advances 
• 
Depreciation on Investments 
Taxation 
Contingencies 
TOTAL PROVISION & CONTINGENCIES 
Year 
Provision for-Bad and Doubtful Debts 
Depreciation/ (appreciation) on investments 
Less; Transfer from Investment Ructuation Reserve 
Taxation (inclusive of Dividend Tax) 
Others/Contingencies 


























Provision for-Standard Assets 
Bad and Doubtful Debts 
Depreciation/(appreciation) on investments 
Less: Transfer from Investment Fluctuation Reserve 
















Total 687 .11 732.35 
Year 31 .03 .2001 31 .03 .2000 
Provision for-Standard Assets 
Bad and Doubtful Debts 
Depreciation on investments 
Less: Transfer from Investment 
Ructuation Reserve 













Year 31 .03 .2001 31 .03 .2000 
Provision for-Standard Assets 
Bad and Doubtful Debts 
Depreciation on Investments* 

















Source: Annual report Canara Bank(uarious year) Excluding Rs. 6.74 
crores debited to Funding Cost of CANFINA (a wholly owned 
subsidiary) 
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Table - 10 
















y = 0.309x+1.574 
R^  = 0.9434 
^ 1 o ' 
OL 0.5 
0 2 3 
Year 
t - Test: 
It is obsen/ed that Net Profit is also increasing significantly 
and p < .005. 
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Advances: 
The global advances of the Bank reached a level of 
Rs. 14413 crores as at March 1997 from Rs. 13096 crores as at 
Mach 1996, credit growth during the year being 10.1%. The 
priority sector advances rose by 16.6%. The number of borrower 
accounts as at March 1997, stood at 24.39 lakhs. In spite of 
recessionary trends in several sectors of the Indian economy, the 
Bank's global advances (net) registered a 16 per cent growth during 
1998-99 to reach Rs. 19540 crore as compared to Rs. 16825 
crore as at March 1998. The number of borrowed accounts as at 
March 1999 was 24.99 lakh. Global advances (net) of the Bank 
registered a 21% growth to reach Rs. 23,547 crore as at March 
2000, from Rs. 19,530 crore as at the end of the preceding year. 
Outstanding advances in respect of retail credit schemes of the 
Bank were to the tune of Rs. 1300 crore. The Bank also 
sanctioned more than Rs.lOOO crore of advances to the 
infrastructure sector. The number of borrowed accounts as at 
March 2000 stood at 23.44 lakh. 
The advances shown in the Balance Sheet are net of Interest 
Suspense Account, provision for non-performing assets and write 
off. Schedule-9 of the Balance Sheet gives the details of advances 
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under three categories based on duration, security and sector-wise 
deployment. The advances of the Bank to the different sectors of 
the economy increased by Rs. 4016.62 crores over the previous 
year having registered a growth of 20.57% in 2000. Further, 
advances have been classified into performing and non-performing 
advances by implementing guidelines issued by Reserve Bank of 
India from time to time. 
Operating Profit: 
The operating Profits of the Bank for the year ended 
31.03.1997 is Rs. 654.20 crores as against Rs. 651.13 crores in 
the previous year. The operating Profits have remained more or 
less at the same level as in the previous year. The provision for 
interest tax liability of Rs. 50.00 crores (previous year Rs. 33.50 
crores) has been netted from interest collected on advances and 
previous year figures has been regrouped. There is a pressure on 
interest spread on account of increase in the cost of Deposits during 
the year though there has been savings under cost of borrowings 
and the operating profit of the Bank for the year ended 31.3.1999 
is Rs. 957.41 crores as against Rs. 672.52 crores in the previous 
year recording a growth rate of 42.36% and in the year 99 
operating profit as a percentage to working funds has increased 
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from 1.75% to 2.17%. The increase in the operating profit is on 
account of increase in Interest Spread. The operating profit of the 
Banl< for the year ended 31.3.2000 is Rs. 923.15 crores as against 
Rs. 957.41 crores in the previous year. For the year ended 31.3. 
2001 the bank operating profit is Rs. 1131.23 crores as against 
Rs. 923.15 crores in the previous year. 
Interest spread: 
The Interest Spread for the year ended 31.3.1999 has 
increased from 2.80% to 3.50% on account of increase in Interest 
collected in investments by Rs. 572.53 crores a major part of which 
is on account of settlement of dispute between Bank and the Psu's 
and for the year ended 31.3.2000 stood at 2.83% and Interest 
Spread for the year ended 31.3.2001 stood at 3.25%. The Other 
Income from Profit on Sale of Investments has increased by Rs. 
68.50 crores and Profit on Exchange Transactions by Rs. 27.12 
crores as compared to previous year(2000). 
Domestic advances: 
The Bank has achieved progress in the level of Domestic 
Advances as on 31.03.1997, though the credit off-take during the 
year was not commensurate with the funds position of the Bank. 
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The CD ratio has come down to 52.88% from 56.99% in the 
previous year{1996). The money market was also easy throughout 
the year and hence the entire surplus funds could not be deployed 
more profitably which has resulted in loss of income in the current 
year. Other Income from Commission, Exchange and Brokerage 
has increased by Rs. 22.74 crores, Profit on Sale of Investments by 
Rs, 71.52 crores and Miscellaneous Income by Rs. 49.72 crores as 
compared to previous year. The Other Income from Commission, 
Exchange and Brokerage has increased by Rs. 42.92 crores and 
Miscellaneous Income by 16.79 crores compared to previous year. 
The borrowing cost has come down from 15.04% to 12.12% 
during the year. The average level of borrowings as on 31.3.1999 
is Rs. 962.23 crores which is almost at the same level in the 
previous year (1998) During the year (99) the money market was 
easy due to excess liquidity and hence the average call borrowings 
was less compared to previous year (98). Also the Bank had availed 
Export Credit Refinance where the interest rates are less compared 
to other categories of borrowings. The borrowing cost has come 
down from 12.12% to 11.54% during the year (99). The average 
level of borrowings as on 31.3.2000 is Rs. 843.06 crores, which is 
less by Rs. 119.17 crores than the previous year(99). During the 
year (2000) the money market was easy due to excess liquidity and 
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hence the average call borrowings was less compared to previous 
year (99). The borrowing cost has come down from 11.54% to 
9.43% during the year (2000). The average level of borrowings as 
on 31.3.2001 is Rs. 817.24 crores, which is less by Rs. 25.82 
crores than the previous year(2000). During the year(2001), there 
was a change in the composition of borrowings by reduction of high 
cost refinance/rediscount schemes to low cost refinance schemes 
and hence the borrowing cost was less compared to previous 
year(2000). 
The cost of deposits has shown a marginal reduction from 
7.86% to 7.81% in the current year(2001) due to reduction in 
interest rates on Deposits during the current year. The cost of 
deposits has shown a reduction of 0.53% from 7.81% to 7.28% in 
the current year due to reduction in interest rates and re-pricing of 
Deposits during the year.(2000) 
All the above factors have contributed to increase in Interest 
Spread during the current year and hence the Operating Profit has 
substantially increased over the previous year. 
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Profits and Profitability: 
The operating profit of the Bank showed a marginal increase 
from Rs. 651.13 crores in 1995-96 to Rs. 654.20 crores in 
1996-97, and during year 1998-99, registered 42 per cent growth 
to reach Rs, 957 crore as compared to Rs. 673 crore for 1997-98. 
The Bank's business per employee rose from Rs. 102 lakh as at 
March 1998 to Rs. 117 lakh as at March 1999, signifying a growth 
rate of 15 per cent.. For the year ended March 31, 2000, the 
Bank posted operating profits of Rs. 923 crore, as against Rs. 957 
crore for the preceding year which further grow to Rs. 1131 crore 
for the year ending March 31, 2001, as against Rs. 923 crore in 
the preceding year, recording a growth rate of 22.5%. 
The Bank posted a lower net profit of Rs. 147.40 crores for 
the year 1996-97 compared to Rs. 252.52 crores recorded for the 
year 1995-96. The decline in net profit for the year 1996-97 is 
mainly on account of increased provisions in respect of income tax, 
non-performing assets and increase in provision for contingencies 
and other assets. The Bank recorded a net profit of Rs. 225 crore 
for the year ended March 31, 1999 as compared to Rs. 203 crore 
for 1997-98, growth rate being 11 per cent. Net profit per 
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employee also increased from Rs. 0.39 lakh for 1997-98 to Rs. 
0.43 lakh for the year ended March 1999 Net profits moved up 
from Rs. 225 crore to Rs. 236 crore during the same period. 
Return on Assets worked out to 0.43% in 1999-2000. The major 
contributing factors being decline in non-interest income, increase 
in the level of Non-Performing Assets and lower interest spread 
compared to the previous year. Net profits moved up to Rs. 285 
crore from Rs. 236 crore recording a growth rate of 21%. Return 
on Assets worked out to 0.43%. The improvement in operating 
and net profit has been after absorbing extraordinary expenditure of 
Rs. 239 crore during the year on account of Special Voluntary 
Retirement Scheme, brought out by the Bank. 
The Bank's interest income increased from Rs. 2915 crores 
in 1995-96 to Rs. 3414 crores, registering a growth of 17.1% for 
the year 1996-97 while thejnterest expenditure of the Bank rose 
by 21.3%, the growth in the non-interest expenditure of the Bank 
was of the order of 9.7% for the year same year 1996-97. Interest 
income earned by the Bank grew by 23 per cent to reach Rs. 4691 
crore compared to Rs. 3823 crore recorded during the preceding 
year. Non-interest income, however, marginally rose from Rs. 608 
crore in 1997-98 to Rs. 629 crore in 1998-99. Non-interest 
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expenditure of the Bank gew by 22 per cent whereas growth in 
interest expenditure was modest at 14 per cent. Business per 
employee increased to Rs. 1.91 crore as at March 2001, from Rs. 
1.35 crore as at March 2000, recording a growth rate of 41%. 
Profit per employee also rose to Rs. 0.63 lakhs from Rs. 0.45 
lakhs, registering a growth rate of 40% during the year. 
Anedysis of profit & profitability: 
The details of operating Profit, their components and net 
Profit and some important ratios for the year96-97 are given in 
Table-11: 
(Rs. in crores, 
INTEREST EARNED 
Less: Interest expended 
SPREAD 
Add: Other Income 
OPERATING INCOME 
Less: Operating Expenditure 
OPERATING PRORT 
Less: Transfer to Provisions and 
Contingencies 
NET PROFIT 
AVERAGE WORKING RINDS 
IMPORTANT RATIOS AVERAGE 
FUNDS 
RETURN ON AVERAGE ASSETS 
RETURN ON EQUITY 
RETURN ON CAPITAL 
Table - 11 
1 crore= 10 million, 100 crore= 1 billion) 
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EARNING PER SHARE (Rs.) 3.04 5.21 
BOOK VALUE (Rs.) 39.09 36.54 
Source : annual report canara bank, 1996-97 
The interest income has increased from Rs. 2914.58 crores 
to Rs. 3413.80 crores showing an increase of Rs. 499.22 crores 
recording a growth rate of 17.13% compared to previous year. The 
increase is on account of better yield on advances as well as on 
investments compared to previous year. However, the other 
income has shown a reduction of around Rs. 12 crores compared 
to previous year which is mainly on account of reduction in Profit 
on Exchange Transactions. The Profit on Exchange Transactions 
has come down to Rs. 80.92 crores from Rs. 125.43 crores 
compared to previous year. This is due to Dollar Rupee rate being 
stable during the year as against wide fluctuations in the previous 
year. This has been offset by Profit on Sale of Investments of Rs. 
22.45 crores in the current year as against a loss of Rs. 21.33 
crores in the previous year. There is a marginal reduction under 
Miscellaneous Income. The income under Commission, Exchange 
& Brokerage has rernained at the same level compared to previous 
year. On the expenditure side, the interest expended has increased 
to Rs. 2277.88 crores as against Rs. 1877.00 crores during 
previous year showing an increase of Rs.400.88 crores registering 
an increase of 21.36%. 
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The increase under interest expended is on account of 
increase in tlie cost of deposits, as interest rates during 1996-97 
have been revised upwards at periodical intervals. The minimum 
period under Term Deposits has also undergone changes during 
1996-97 wherein the Bank had to pay interest for 30 days deposits 
which had a direct effect on the interest expenditure. In view of the 
above, the spread has come down from 3.71% to 3.54% during 
the current year. Under operating expenses, though there is 
quantum-vise increase, the percentage of operating expenses to 
average working funds has come down from 3.05% to 2.91%. The 
major increase under operating expenses is under "Payment to and 
Provision for Employees" which has increased by Rs. 53.68 crores 
compared to previous year. There is an additional burden of Rs. 
12.02 crores on account of contribution to Pension Fund in the 
current year. The other operating expenses are in tune with the 
level of business. 
The details of operating Profit, their components and net 
Profit and some important ratios for the year 97-98 and 98-99 are 
given in Table -12. 
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Tabic - 12 
(Rs. in crores, 1 crore= 10 million, 100 crore= 1 billion) 
INTEREST EARNED 
Less: Interest expended 
SPREAD 
Add: Other Income 
OPERATING INCOME 
Less: Operating Expenditure 
OPERATING PROHT 
Less: Transfer to Provisions and 
Contingencies 
NET PROFIT 
AVERAGE WORKING FUNDS 
IMPORTANT RATIOS GROSS 
PROHT TO AVERAGE FUNDS 
RETURN ON ASSETS 
RETURN ON CAPITAL 
EARNING PER SHARE (Rs.) 






























































Source -.annual report canara bank(various year) 
The details of operating Profit, their components and net 
Profit and some important ratios for the year99-2000 and 2000-
2001 are^iven in Table - 13: 
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Tabic - 13 
(Rs. in crores, 1 crore= 10 million, 100 crore= 1 billion) 
INTEREST EARNED 
Less: Interest expended 
SPREAD 
Add: Other Income 
OPERATING INCOME 
Less: Operating Expenditure 
OPERATING PRORT 
Less: Transfer to Provisions 
and Contingencies 
NET PROFIT 
Average working funds 
Important Ratios: 
Gross Profit to Average 
Working Funds 
Return on Assets 
Return on Capital 
Earning per Share (Rs.) 



































































Source: annual report canara bank 2000-2001 
Level of NPAs: 
The percentage of Net Non-Performing Assets to Net 
Advances of the Bank as at 31.3.2000 is 5.28% while it was 
7.09% during the year 1999 and it went down to4.84% as at 
financial year2001. After the banking sector reforms there is a 
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visible growth of financial performance of the banks. The net 
performing asset that is the major block for banking growth is 
decreasing year after year which is clearly visible in the data. The 
Bank has further provided Rs. 83.00 crores (previous year Rs. 
78.00 crores) out of current year's profit towards the envisaged 
shortfall in servicing the dues by its wholly owned subsidiary 
CANFINA from the year 2000 onwards (shortfall at current NPV 
works out to Rs. 316.53 crores) and for which purpose the Bank is 
building up a contingency provision. The total amount set apart till 
31.3.2001 is Rs. 324.00 crores (previous year Rs. 241.00 crores) 
Movement in NPAs: 
Tabic - 14 
(Rs. in crores, 1 crore= 10 million, 100 crore= 1 billion) 
Particulars 
Opening Balance as on 1.4.2000 
Add: Additions during the year 
Total 
Less: Reductions during the year 
















Source: Annual report Canara bank 
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Income and Expenditure: 
Interest income earned by the Bank rose to Rs. 4852 crore. 
Non-interest income too went up by Rs. 173 crore to reach Rs. 
836 crore, signifying a growth rate of 26%. The highlight of the 
Bank's performance during 1999-2000 related to a significant 
decline in the growth rate of its interest expenditure to 9% 
compared with 14% in 1998-99. Cost of raising funds came down 
to 7.46% as compared with 7.96% during 1998-99. Due to 
downward revision it effected on interest rates on deposits, the cost 
of deposits came down to 7.28% in 1999-2000 from 7.81% in 
1998-99. Non-interest expenditure of the Bank stood at Rs. 1350 
crore as against Rs.l231 crore during the previous year. 
Treasury & International Operations: 
Aggregate investments of the Bank moved up from Rs. 
20,023 crore as at March 2000 to Rs. 21,445 crore as at March 
2001. Investments marked to market constituted about 77% of 
total investments, which was above the stipulated level of 75%. 
Reserve Bank of India nominated the Bank as an authorised agency 
for handling Bullion business from August, 1997. For the year 
2000-01, total turnover of the Bank in gold amounted to Rs. 4.69 
crore. 
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Foreign business turnover of the Banl< recorded a 14% 
growth during 2000-01 to reach Rs. 61,119 crore compared with 
Rs. 53,634 crore as at March 31, 2000. The turnover under 
exports, imports and remittances were of the order of Rs. 17,603 
crore, Rs. 21,923 crore and Rs. 21,593 crore respectively. As at-
March 2001, bank's market share under exports and imports 
worked out to 8.55% and 9.43% respectively. Bank's outstanding 
advances to the export rose to Rs. 3517 crore as at March 2001, 
constituting 12.54% of its net credit vis-a-vis the 12% stipulation. 
The Bank bagged 'Niryat Bandhu' Gold trophy for 1998-99 and 
1999-00, instituted by the Federation of Indian Exports 
Organization, for its outstanding achievements in export finance. 
Due to major thrust accorded to business under trading activities, 
the Bank's earnings from proprietary trading recorded nearly 90% 
growth during the year. With the wide network of correspondent 
banking arrangements, the Bank has considerably improved its 
international banking activities. To extend remittance facilities to 
expatriate Indians, Bank has Rupee Drawing Arrangements with 16 
Exchange Houses in 2000-01. 
Other noteworthy areas where the Bank continued its social 
endeavours included organisation of competitive sports events for 
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the disabled, awareness programme on abuse and illicit trafficking 
of drugs, environmental campaigns, support to eye donation 
camps, educational assistance'to students in the slums and various 
health care activities. 
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Conclusions & Suggestions 
It is clear from the study that performance of Indian 
banking sector after adopting the reforms in the early 
years have shown an overall progress in geographical 
and functional coverage but its operational efficiency 
remained unsatisfactory and characterized by low 
profitability growing non-performing assets and 
relatively low capital base. The external factors bearing 
profitability banking system related to high level of 
pre-emptions in the form of reserve requirements. The 
external factors in the term of reserve requirements 
administered structure of interest rates and credit 
allocation to certain sectors. Banking sector reforms 
were undertaken in order to promote a diversified 
efficient and competitive banking system. The thrust of 
the process has been to cut cost and raise the production 
efficiency-banking sector as a whole. The 
implementation of Narsimham Committee cause great 
strain on the performance of the banks but lately they 
are improving their over all performance in every critical 
areas but still it is not upto the global standard. In our 
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study we have examined that the first two years of 
deregulation nationalized banks profitability was severely 
impacted by the new accounting and prudential norms 
and the cousequent cleaning up of balance sheets. We 
use four financial ratios for comparison net profit/total' 
assets, net interest income/total assets, inter mediation 
cost/total assets and compute averages for each of these 
ratios for the entire period of 1995-2000 for 
Nationalized banks we find that nationalized banks 
performance not upto the mark. Nationalized banks do 
better only on the ratio of intermediation costs to total 
assets. 
Further examination reveals other noteworthy 
developments in banking sector after reforms period 
are:-
(i) Financial regulation through statutory 
pre-emptions has been lowered while stepping 
up prudential regulations at the same time. 
(ii) Interest rates have been de-regulated allowing 
banks the freedom to determine deposit and 
lending rates. Currently on the deposit sides the 
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interest rate on saving deposit administered; 
whereas on the lending side, while sub-PLR 
lending has been permitted the maximum spread 
is restricted to 4% over the PLR of each bank 
and there is a ceiling of PLR on small loans upto 
Rs. 2 lacs. 
(iii) Steps have been inflated to strengthen 
Nationalized banks through increasing their 
autonomy. 
(iv) A set of micro-prudential measures have been 
stipulated to impart greater strength to the 
banking system and also ensure their safety and 
soundness with the declared objective of moving 
towards international best practices (capital 
adequacy norms, exposure links, recognition 
rules for NPAs, provisioning norms, accounting 
rules valuation norms etc.) 
(v) Measures have also been taken to broaden the 
ownership base of Nationalized banks. 
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(vi) The banking system has also witnessed greater 
levels of transparency and standards of 
disclosure. 
(vii) As the banking system has liberalized and 
become increasingly market-oriented the 
financial markets have been concurrently 
developed, while the conduct of monetary policy 
has been tailored to take into account the 
realities of the changing environment. 
(viii) There has been considerable improvement in the 
profitability of the banking system measured in 
loans of operating and net profits. 
Further in our study we have examined that during 
banking sector reforms there were lots of weaknesses are 
as foUows:-
Capital adequacy 
The prescription of capital adequacy ratio was 
suggested by the Narsimham's Committee found that it a 
ready solution for acceptance by the regulatory 
authorities. The rationale behind the perception of 
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capital adequacy is that a banl< may become distressed if 
it faces loan losses and it did not have adequate 
provisions to meet the same. In order to provide cushion 
against such sudden losses which the bank may not be 
able to meet, regulations all over the world have 
prescribed minimum level of capital relative to their total 
assets. The Basle in 1993 had agreed on a minimum 
capital asset ratio of 8% that has been accepted for 
implementation by the Indian regulations too. Some of 
the banks failed in USA and other countries despite 
reporting strong capital adequacy ratio therefore it is 
considered as an important indicator of the strength of 
any financial institution by regulations all over the world. 
In case of Indian Nationalized banks the Govt, acted as a 
pillar of confidence even though some banks reported 
loses after implementation of prudential norms, but the 
regulators have not released the capital level and instead 
have followed prudence in further increasing the same 
and widening its applicability. Besides increasing CRAR 
to 9%, the RBI has stipulated that banks investments in 
all securities including those outside SLR (statutory 
liquidity Ratio) should be assigned risk weighted of 2.5% 
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for market risk with effect from March 31 , 2001 . A 
related development is the "New capital adequacy Frame 
work" developed by the Basle committee under which a 
three-pillar approach is to be adopted. This includes 
minimum capital requirements supervisory review and 
market discipline. In our study we examined that due to 
burden of non-performing assets and lacking of a 
favorable recovery environment, the surplus generating 
capacity of nationalized banks has been nominal. 
Therefore, to a large measure the capital levels 
prescribed has not been achieved through infusion of 
capital in the banks by the govt, in this study we have 
observed that till March 99, the total re-capitalization in 
public sector banks has been over Rs. 20,000cr. (200 
billion). When the banks try to raise fund from market of 
the banks have been able to top the market only few of 
the banks have been able to tap the market for equity 
while in other cases, augmenting capital has been 
through debt. The current poor valuation of bank stocks 
has further dampened the efforts of banks. Although 
some banks have still ventured to tap the market. From 
the above discussion we have observed that only few 
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nationalized banks could attain the capital adequacy ratio 
according to norms, which is about 9%, thus to meet the 
increasing capital requirements banks will have to 
increasingly depend upon their internal surplus which 
will be achieved through better performance and the 
short strategy. In the medium term strategy if banks have 
to sustain their performance and fill out more rigorous 
prudential regulatory prescriptions, significant 
improvements in the recovery climate and more 
operational autonomy will be required this only can 
restore the confidence of the market in bank Scripps. 
Interest Rate Deregulation 
In the area of interest on deposits/savings, there 
does not appear any systematic architecture of the 
interest rate structure. To substantiate, no defined time 
path or defined reconditions have been identified in the 
area of deregulation of saving bank rates. It is apparent 
that banks, especially public sector banks are not ready 
for this reforms since there is a potential for instability 
in the form of shifts in saving bank deposits between 
banks, depending on the interest rates that emerge. 
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Thus, this is essentially a structural issue and conditional 
on improvements in operational efficiency of the public 
sector banks rather than an overall interest rate issue in 
the macroeconomic sense. Furthermore, on the overall 
interest rate structure in the financial system, with 
different authorities setting different interest rates, it 
might impinge upon the signaling mechanism of the 
Bank Rate. 
Non-performing Assets: 
The improvement in the position regarding NPAs in 
nationalized banks is viewed as more superficial than 
real. The root problem is that there is a sizeable 
overhang component arising from the weak debt 
recovery processes, inadequate legal structure, weakness 
in underlying secrecy, inadequate risk management 
techniques, etc. Any solution to the overhang problem of 
large magnitude requires well-crafted medium to long-
term actions, devoted to specific definition of goals and 
negotiation of the process rather than ad hoc 
approaches. 
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Operationally in nationalized banks it seems 
imprudent to treat all non-performing loans as a single 
'catch-air category. Broadly, they can be categorized as 
loans to agricultural sector, directed lending, loans to 
small enterprises and loans to corporate sector. Many of 
the directed loans are subsistence loans, where default 
rates are high and recovery prospects not bright. As 
regards loan from nationalized banks to agricultural 
borrowers, legal impediments often prove to be a 
challenging proposition to recover their dues. Loans to 
small enterprise become difficult to recover due to 
inordinate judicial delays. Even if court decrees can be 
obtained towards recovery, by the time the charge of the 
assets is taken, its realizable value is significantly 
diminished because of several reasons including 
depreciation of the asset, lack of borrowers cooperation, 
limited market value of the asset, with the concomitant 
effect that such decrees are not executed. As regards 
corporate loans, suits pending/referred to Board for 
Industrial and Financial Reconstruction leaves little 
headroom for nationalized banks to effect recovery. 
Inadequate corporate governance practices coupled with 
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problems of fixation of accountability leaves little 
maneuverability for banks towards an all-out recovery 
drive. With the environmental changes that are taking 
place, it seems that the credit portfolio of banks is 
becoming vulnerable and the issue of NPAs would need 
to be tackled head-on. NPLs is a bane to the system and 
one should be bold enough to bring out the true 
position/tackle in ruthlessly. 
Directed Lending: 
The issue of direct lending in nationalized banks is 
also an area of concern. In a developing economy with a 
democratic polity and a large section of the populace 
below poverty line, while the policies are to the left of 
center, the implementation somehow is to the right of 
center. For instance, despite the definitional changes for 
eligibility under priority sector lending that have been 
effected consistently, the share of priority sector 
advances in total non-food gross bank credit of 
scheduled commercial banks (SCBs) has come down from 
40.3 per cent in December 1980 to 35.9 per cent in 
March 2001 . The direct agricultural lending accounts of 
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all nationalized banks show a declining trend (2.13 crore 
in 1994 versus 1.59 crore in 2000). Although during 
1993 to 1998, their credit-deposit (C-D) ratio has 
declined from 67 per cent to 44 per cent (42 per cent in 
2001), the share of agricultural loans in total loans has 
come down from 52.4 per cent to 44.4 per cent during 
the corresponding period. 
Corporate Governance: 
Last, but not the least of the problem areas with 
nationalized banks is the weak corporate governance 
practices. . It must be appreciated that the reforms 
process is only an enabling mechanism; leveraging it 
fully is possible only if the institutional players in the 
system are receptive to good governance. Good 
governance practices are a 'coping mechanism' for an 
institution. Lack of such mechanism can prove to be a 
major source of weakness among financial institutions 
and banks, in India. 
To syncopate, the reforms process cannot be 
entirely painless. While there are achievements, there 
are pitfalls as well. What is important is to strike a 
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balance: tread a careful middle path between the ex-
cathedra overzeal for intervention and a complacent 
belief in the ability of the banking system to self-rectify 
its deficiencies. This is because, in an ideal world, there 
is always a smattering of small disturbances every year or 
two to keep the authorities on their toes. The real world, 
however is often far divorced from idealism: long periods 
of tranquility with little or no financial disturbance, 
engender a sense of complacency which eventually 
culminate in periods of turmoil which contain several 
failures and the threat of many more. A constant 
challenge, therefore, remains for the authorities in 
identifying newer risks, eschewing harmful incentives and 
strengthening the banking sector to keep pace with 
changes in technology. Vigil is the eternal price of 
freedom, which includes economic freedom as well. The 
present effort is a humble attempt in that directions. 
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Case Study of Canara Bank 
From the on-going discussion it is evident that over 
all performance even after adopting Narsimham's 
committee findings could not be upto the mark of the 
Nationalized banks and the Canara Bank is not an 
exception. From our study and analysis it is clear that 
the performance of Canara bank during the period 
1995-96 to 2000-2001 which indicates all-round 
improvement in its working after adopting the banking 
sector reforms. The volume of bank transactions 
tremendously high and so far proving top most 
performance among all nationalized banks. The bank has 
also achieved significant improvements in business and 
efficiency parameters. In this study we have observed 
that the deposit growth during the period (1996-2001) 
of Canara Bank is improved but does not show 
significant improvement. Business per employee is 
considered as an indicator of productivity level. In terms 
of this criteria Canara Bank improvement has been 
marginal from the other banks. Income and expenditure 
being the major determinants of profit volumes (gross) 
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assume significant in any performance analysis. As 
evident from our study Canara Bank registering a 
marginal growth and have maintained their market 
leadership during the year 9 6 - 2 0 0 1 . One of the key 
indicators of profitability of banks relates to operating 
profits as a proportion of average working funds. The 
present study shows that Canara Bank stood among the 
top banks and show significant increase in net profit. In 
case of provision and contingencies Canara Bank 
register a negative growth in the given period. Quite 
significantly Canara Bank is found to be in maintaining 
their asset quality during 1996-2001 . Net NPA ratio is 
significantly low as compared with the ratio for the other 
nationalized banks. The drop in NPA position has been 
owing to vigorous recovery efforts put in by the bank. 
Further study reveals that Canara Bank maintained its 
position on the top on high profit growth as well as 
volumes among the nationalized banks. It could be a 
judicious manpower mix, which has placed Canara Bank 
in the top bracket in terms of profit per employee. It is 
observed from our study that the capital adequacy ratio 
of Canara Bank is maintained during the period of 
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9 6 - 2 0 0 1 , with new norms on the anvil Canara Bank is 
placed on a sound footing as regards their capital 
adequacy ratio. Traditional banking has already 
undergone significant changes, with greater emphasis on 
business diversification and off-balance sheet and 
non-fund based activity has also cushioned the bank 
against sharp decline in interest spreads. Non-interest 
income to average working funds ratio indicates the 
exposure of a Banks to its non-fund based activities. In 
our study we find that the Canara Bank having ratios 
much higher than the same for other nationalized banks. 
Canara Bank also strengthens credit review and 
monitoring mechanism. Productivity as measured in 
terms of business per employee increases and bank 
recorded a growth in profit per employee. Canara bank 
is actively involve in rendering financial support to small-
scale industries and weaker section of the society and 
minority communities. Apart from these, the bank also 
provided assistance to other priority sectors viz. retailers 
farmer self employed persons etc. 
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Weakness: 
Apart from the above progress we observed that 
the bank having weaknesses in some areas. Some of its 
weaknesses are:-
1. The improvement in the position regarding NPAs is 
viewed as more superficial than real. The RBI 
report on Trend and progress of banking 97-98 
has revealed that gross non-performing assets 
(NPAs) of Nationalized banks has risen to Rs. 
54700 crores as on March 3 1 , 2001 . At present 
most of the banks have 10-20% NPAs. That none 
of the Nationalized banks has been able to contain 
NPAs as per international standards at tolerable 
levels of around 3 to 4 percent and Canara Bank is 
not an exception, beside all the measures taken by 
Canara bank to control its NPA it still stands 
among these banks who are having large amount of 
NPAs. 
2. Another serious weakness is in the area of 
ownership and control. The assisting and the 
continued government ownership has proved to be 
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problematic. While there was a merit in the 
nationalized bank model when it was adopted, a 
time has come for the government to review its 
position. Overlap of ownership and regulatory and 
supervisory functions forbearance with its attendant 
on financial stability. 
Although Canara bank favourably placed in 
comparison with other banks deposit mobilization 
but still from our study we have find that Canara 
Bank have not been taking full advantage. Deposit 
mobilization shows that till recently the 
mobilization efforts lacked a sense of direction. 
The per employee deposit rate of Canara bank is 
inferior to the other banks. 
4. Branches are the profit making windows are of the 
banks and the consolidated profit position of all 
branches primarily determines the profil of the 
banks. It has been observe that there are number of 
loss making branches in rural and semi urbpn areas 
of Canara Bank. 
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5. The capital adequacy norms are not made 
applicable uniformly though announced in India in 
1992-93 . To begin with all Indian Banks with 
international presence were asked to achieve a 
captial to risk weighted assets ratio (CRAR) of 8%-
by March 3, 1994. Other banks were asked to 
achieve 4% ratio by March 3 1 , 1993 and 8% by 
march 3 1 , 1996. The Canara bank have a CRAR 
above the minimum (8%) and stood among those 
banks who require additional capital in the next five 
years. 
6. Different types of deposits grew in all the 
population centres. But it appears from the facts 
and figures that the share of fixed deposits during 
the period mentioned did not show any significant 
variation in case of Canara Bank. 
7. The world over, technology has been a major 
driving force of changes in the banking industry and 
it has modified completely the way in which 
banking is conducted. Extensive use of technology 
enables banks to satisfy customers needs speedily 
242 
and adequately. It improves the availability of 
information for management decision and for 
monitoring operations. Technology must be use to 
strengthen internal controls, improve the accuracy 
of records and provide new banking products and 
services viewed in relation to the technological 
progress made by banks abroad. Present status of 
Canara bank is not at all encouraging. The 
introduction of technological changes in Canara 
bank has been half hearted and sporadic, lack of 
direct involvement of the management, lack of 
resource planing and co-ordination, absence of 
vision and strong trade union resistance have been 
the major reasons for the poor progress of Canara 
bank on the technological front. 
8. Interest rate risk management will pose a great 
challenge to banks in the year ahead. This has not 
received sufficient attention till recently as the rates 
were regulated by the Reserve bank of India. 
Deregulation of Interest rates on both deposits and 
advantages will result in higher volatility of Interest 
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rates. Even if the interest rates that move within a 
narrow band a situation of unstable interest rates is 
going to be a major problem in future and Canara 
bank is no exception. 
SUGGESTIONS 
Improving profitability and viability in only one 
aspect of enhancing the performance of banks. The 
other is how adequately and satisfactorily banks are able 
to meet the demands of customers. The ultimate test of 
success of the financial sector reforms is truely customer 
satisfaction, customer as a borrower and a depositor. 
Through the various reforms measures we are laying the 
foundation for an efficient and well-functioning banking 
system. Significant changes have already taken place. It 
has however still a long way to go. In the light of our 
study we have some suggestions are:-
1. Ownership pattern of nationalized banks should be 
improved to achieve greater degree of autonomy on 
their operation than as at present, and full freedom 
available to the management to take major 
decisions. 
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2. Banks are to be more autonomous to raise capital 
from the market according to their needs. 
3. Even though the level of NPAs have been steadily 
decreasing over the year, it still stands alarmingly 
high as compared to elsewhere. Reforming the 
Banking sector alone will not itself strengthen the 
banks. There is a dire need to speed up the entire 
recovery mechanism in the country. 
4. India requires a legal system, which gives powers to 
the banks to immediately possess the current and 
fixed assets of the defaulters and sell them in the 
open market in case of defaulter do not arrange 
timely payment of dues. 
5. Defaulters name should be made public. 
6. Use of modern technology in banking is being 
increasingly seen as an essential ingredient as good 
customer service. The old manual systems on which 
the Indian banking has depended for centuries are 
unable to deliver the goods. About four decades of 
public sector banking has widened the banks branch 
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network and customer base to such gigantic 
proportions that the time tested manual systems of 
yesteryears are now buckling under the pressure of 
sheer volume and variety transactions. The service 
starved customers of the Indian banking system 
have, therefore, pinned their hopes on these banks 
to lead the way to introduction of modern 
technology in Indian banking. As the matter stands 
today, most of the foreign banks and all newly 
established private sector banks operating in India 
are fairly advanced in the use of technology. Most 
of their branches are fully computerized, many of 
them are equipped with ATM (Automated Teller 
Machine). As a result their customers are able to 
enjoy the following additional benefits -
(i) Statements of Accounts are neatly printed 
as against the illegible hand writing on the 
statements supplied by most of the 
nationalized banks. 
(ii) Statements of accounts can be supplied at 
the desired frequency if needed, necessary 
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as against the currently prevailing practice 
of not providing any statements at all by all 
nationalized banks. 
(iii) Even passbooks for saving Bank accounts 
can be neatly printed by a pass book 
printing machine hooked on to the 
computer system. A similar machine 
installed in the customer lobby can help the 
customers help themselves by updating 
their pass books marely by inserting the 
passbook in to the machine. 
(iv) ATM, installed in every important corners 
of the city and they are inter and intra 
connected around the country. 
In suggestion these facilities are now necessary to 
satisfy the customers. Nationalized banks should think 
over it seriously. 
7. The CRR (Cash Reserve Ratio) is a heavy tax on 
the banking system and balances with the Reserve 
Bank, which earn no interest represent an indirect 
247 
tax on the bank depositors. Phased reduction in the 
CRR and its eventual withdrawal needs to be high 
on the agenda in coming years. This would ensure 
a more level playing field between banks and 
non-bank institutions and would enable banks to 
offer better rates to the depositors. 
8. Bank merger should be considered as a possible 
avenue for improving the structure and efficiency of 
the banking industry. 
9. Banking failure was observed in 1980, world over. 
The massive bank losses in industrial and 
developing countries during this period could be 
attributed to a plethora of reasons, such as poor 
asset quality, bad debt, sloppy management, 
speculation, economic scenario inefficiency, fraud, 
shocks from other markets excessive overheads 
asset liability and treasury mismatches excess taxes 
and regulation. Huge fiscal deficits were 
responsible in Argentina, Chile and Malaysia. In 
today globalize world, weakness in the financial 
system of any country which have an impact on 
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other countries also. East - Asian crises had led 
banking systems of other countries to a vulnerable 
position for some time. It is need of the time across 
the world are to monitored and supervised banks 
closely. 
10. Indian banks have to concentrate on asset quality 
and earnings, which are determinant of internal 
capital generation. Profitability and risks 
management is two key aspects to assess financial 
performance of commercial banks. The 
performance of a bank will obviously be better with 
higher profitability and lower risk. 
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